It's quite obvious DCYF/CPS and the Family Court's are NOT helping anyone but themselves. I have put together a list of changes that NEED to be made to help our children and families who face and have faced the abuses they suffer at the hands of DCYF/CPS and the Family Court's.
1. Stop ALL Title IV Funding
2. Open ALL Family Court's
3. Jury trials for ALL accused parent's
4. Stop All incentive money for children taken from their families and placed in Foster care
5. Shared parenting; 50/50 custody
6. Get rid of CASA and GALs
7. Every family MUST have Family Advocates
8. Make Administrative Rules, which DCYF/CPS are SUPPOSED to follow, into LAWS, that they HAVE to follow
9. Stop allowing 'Hearsay" without proof of guilt
10. Stop allowing Lawyer's who are NOT child custody Lawyer's to work on child custody cases
11. Stop allowing DCYF/CPS from immediate removal of a child without services provided to the family
12. Stop allowing Judges to deny the admittance of evidence proving innocence
13. Stop the Judges from denying the families record's, transcripts and CD's pertaining to their cases
14. When the placement of a child must be made, relative placement MUST be first priority
15. Stop the drugging of our traumatized children
16. DCYF/CPS MUST be stopped from threatening parent's into signing a case plan
17. DCYF/CPS MUST be stopped from signing applications a parent refuses to sign/A parent MUST NOT be forced into signing up for Welfare/TANF in order for DCYF/CPS to get Federal funding
18. DCYF/CPS AND the Judges MUST be held responsible when ordering a parent into non-existent programs, making compliance IMPOSSIBE
19. STOP DCYF/CPS from slandering families with proven false reports
20. Give parent's the same rights as criminals/When new evidence proving innocence arises, the parent MUST be EXONERATED
21. The Family Courts MUST follow the SAME rules as the Criminal Courts
22. When a parent's criminal charges are dismissed, the Family Court charges MUST be dismissed AND the children RETURNED
23. Stop terminating the Rights of FICTITIOUS Fathers
24. Stop using waivers to place children in foster homes illegally
25. "Reasonable Effort's" MUST consist of services to HELP in Reunification/Not just drug tests and visitation
26. Parent's of children in foster care MUST be allowed at Medical appointments
27. Stop allowing Parental Alienation from harming families
28. Stop removing children without a REAL investigation
29. Stop removing children from parent's without evidence of abuse and neglect
30. Stop removing children from parents for "anticipated" "Neglect in the Future"
31. Stop the ILLEGAL adoptions of children in Foster care
32. Stop denying parents from firing useless Lawyers who "Work for the Court's", NOT the parents
33. Stop ILLEGAL, INCOMPLETE Home Studies
34. Stop Probate Court Judges from denying fact's and testimony in Parental Rights Terminations
35. Stop the removal of children for frivolous allegations
36. Stop DCYF/CPS from changing the name of a child BEFORE adoption occurs
37. DCYF/CPS MUST work toward Family Preservation, NOT Family Destruction
38. Stop placing children in foster homes and preadoptive homes of foster strangers with too many people living there already
In New Hampshire CACR 26 will be voted on soon. This BILL MUST pass the way it is written. No longer will the Chief Justice have the authority to make up the rules of the Family Courts. Please contact the NH State Reps. and let them know they MUST Support this BILL.
Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Monday, March 12, 2012
GRANDPARENTS MAY, UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK TO VOID ADOPTION ORDERS WHERE THEY WERE OBTAINED BY FRAUD
http://www.nysnavigator.org/files/legal/post_adoption.pdf
GRANDPARENTS MAY, UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK TO
VOID ADOPTION ORDERS WHERE THEY WERE OBTAINED BY FRAUD
As a rule, courts won’t reverse an order of adoption. Yet, there are certain
circumstances when they will consider it. In the Matter of Kevin G. (Anonymous)
227 A.D.2d 622, 643 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1996). Courts will consider reversal when
there is evidence of fraud, newly discovered evidence, or other sufficient causes.”
Dometic Relations Law Sections 112-3. (Adoption from an Authorized Agency;
Order of Adoption.); Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl S., 141 Misc.2d 905, 535
N.Y.S.2d 676, (1988). However, because permanency and stability are favored, it
is necessary to assert this right as soon as possible.
GRANDPARENTS MAY, UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK TO
VOID ADOPTION ORDERS WHERE THEY WERE OBTAINED BY FRAUD
As a rule, courts won’t reverse an order of adoption. Yet, there are certain
circumstances when they will consider it. In the Matter of Kevin G. (Anonymous)
227 A.D.2d 622, 643 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1996). Courts will consider reversal when
there is evidence of fraud, newly discovered evidence, or other sufficient causes.”
Dometic Relations Law Sections 112-3. (Adoption from an Authorized Agency;
Order of Adoption.); Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl S., 141 Misc.2d 905, 535
N.Y.S.2d 676, (1988). However, because permanency and stability are favored, it
is necessary to assert this right as soon as possible.
Missouri court rules immigrant's adoption rights terminated illegally
Missouri court rules immigrant's adoption rights terminated illegally - Page 2 - CNN:
Missouri Supreme Court Decision
January 25, 2011|By the CNN Wire Staff
The Missouri Supreme Court Tuesday overturned a lower court ruling that terminated the parental rights of a Guatemalan woman whose son, the woman says, was adopted without her consent while she was imprisoned following an immigration sting in 2007.
The court ruled that the state violated its own laws in terminating the parental rights of Encarnacion Bail Romero, but the supreme court sent the case back to the lower court for retrial rather than return the boy to his biological mother.
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"The trial court plainly erred by entering judgment on the adoption petition and terminating Mother's parental rights without complying with the investigation and reporting requirements ... ," Judge Patricia Breckenridge wrote in the court's principle opinion.
"The trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights, allowing the adoption to proceed without Mother's consent to the adoption, and granting of the adoption, although supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence on the record, is reversed. The cause is remanded for a new trial in which Adoptive Parents and Mother will have the opportunity to present evidence on all claims in all counts of the petition that pertain to Mother."
Bail Romero was caught up in an immigration sting in May 2007, six months after her son was born. She was not deported, however; instead, she was imprisoned as an illegal immigrant who used a stolen Social Security number to work at a poultry processing plant.
Her brother and sister took care of the boy at first, attorneys in the case said. Eventually they sought help from a clergy couple who offered baby-sitting services. When that couple asked to adopt the boy, Bail Romero said no, her attorney, Omar Riojas, said.
Rebuffed, the couple introduced the boy to Seth and Melinda Moser and eventually put him up for adoption -- something the boy's biological mother said they lacked the legal ability to do. The Mosers soon asked a judge for temporary custody, said their lawyer, Richard Schnake.
Bail Romero -- in prison at the time -- did not contact the Mosers or their attorney or object to them having custody, he said. After a judge granted the Mosers temporary custody, they waited a year -- rather than the six month minimum stipulated by Missouri law -- before asking to adopt the boy, Schnake says.
Bail Romero said she did not fully understand what was going on and certainly did not give her blessing for them to adopt her son.
(Page 2 of 2)
In October 2008, a judge approved the adoption, ruling that Bail Romero had abandoned her child by not trying to contact the Mosers for a year. Bail Romero said she doesn't speak English and was left with no way to ask for help to plead her side.
In addition to the clergy couple not having the authority to put up her son for adoption, Riojas has argued that Bail Romero was deprived of due process because she had no consular access or access to legal documents in her language. He also says an attorney who represented her at one point did not represent her well.
AdvertisementIn July 2010, a court ruled that the adoption was invalid, a ruling appealed by the Mosers, who argue that they are the only parents the boy has really known.
All seven of the court's judges agreed to reverse the termination of Bail Romero's parental rights, although some members thought the now 4-year-old boy -- called Carlitos by his mother and Jamison by the Mosers -- should have been returned to Bail Romero.
Breckenridge addressed those concerns in a footnote to her opinion.
"Every member of this Court agrees that this case is a travesty in its egregious procedural errors, its long duration, and its impact on Mother, Adoptive Parents, and, most importantly, Child," she wrote.
"The dissenting members of this Court rely significantly on information outside the record to find that Mother has been victimized repeatedly and that her rights have been violated. The dissenting members believe passionately that custody of Child should be returned to Mother without further proceedings. That result can be reached only by disregarding the law."
The federal government intends to deport Bail Romero to Guatemala, where her other two children live, but has delayed the proceedings until this case is complete.
NH Reversed Adoption-Father was NOT given Proper Notice of adoption Proceedings
In re Sky D., 643 A.2d 529 (N.H. 1994)
In re SKY D.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
138 N.H. 543; 643 A.2d 529
June 7, 1994, Decided
Hillsborough County Probate Court
BROCK, C.J. The plaintiff, Martin M., petitioned to vacate a decree of adoption on the ground that he was the natural father of the adopted child, Sky D., and had not been given proper notice of the adoption proceedings. The Hillsborough County Probate Court (Cloutier, J.) denied his petition ruling that because the plaintiff had not filed with the office of child support enforcement, as required by RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) (1990) (current version at RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) (Supp. 1993)) and RSA 170-B:6 (1990), he was not entitled to notice of the adoptionproceedings. We reverse.
The plaintiff and the defendant, the mother of Sky D., lived together in Pennsylvania for several months during 1990. During that time, she became pregnant. While she was pregnant, she repeatedly acknowledged that the plaintiff was the father of the child. The defendant moved out of the plaintiff's home before the child, Sky D., was born in June 1991, and had little contact with the plaintiff thereafter, despite his attempts to see her and the child. She moved to New Hampshire during the summer of 1991 and married another man.
In October 1991, the plaintiff filed a petition for custody of the child in the Merrimack County Superior Court. In January 1992, the defendant and her new husband filed a petition to adopt the child in Hillsborough County Probate Court. At the end of January, in response to the Merrimack County Superior Court's order in his pending custody suit, the plaintiff filed a petition to legitimate the child. The Hillsborough County Probate Court issued a certificate of adoption on March 19, 1992. The Merrimack County Superior Court then stayed the plaintiff's action to legitimate Sky D. to allow him an opportunity to challenge the legality of the adoption in Hillsborough County Probate Court.
In May 1992, the plaintiff petitioned to vacate the adoption because he had not been given notice of the adoptionproceeding. The probate court denied the petition stating that the plaintiff "is not within the class of people who are entitled to notice under New Hampshire law." The plaintiff appealed.
We review a decision of the probate court for errors of law and will not disturb its factual findings "unless they are so plainly erroneous that such findings could not be reasonably made." RSA 567-A:4 (Supp. 1993); In re Jessie E., 137 N.H. 336, 341, 627 A.2d 591, 594 (1993). Adoption is wholly statutory, and therefore, our review of the law is limited to interpretation of the applicable statutes. In re Estate of McQuesten, 133 N.H. 420, 422, 578 A.2d 335, 337 (1990).
The probate court found that the plaintiff was the natural father of the adopted child, Sky D. In the context ofadoption, a natural father is "a person other than a legal father who has been named as the father of the child, or who is the subject of a pending paternity action, or who has filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child pursuant to RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c)." RSA 170-B:2, XIV (1990). It is undisputed that the plaintiff had not filed a notice of his claim of paternity under RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) at the time of the adoption proceeding.
In October 1991, months before the petition to adopt was filed, however, the plaintiff filed an action titled "Petition for Custody of Child Under RSA 458-A and Temporary Orders" in Merrimack County Superior Court that sought, in part, to establish his paternity of the child. The petition requested the following relief:
"That if she [Sky D.'s mother] denies Petitioner's paternity of [Sky D.], [Sky D.'s mother] be ordered to submit him to blood tests (to which Petitioner offers to submit) to determine if Petitioner is the father of [Sky
On October 15, 1991, the superior court ordered the plaintiff, the defendant, and the child to submit to blood testing.
Following a hearing held on January 15, 1992, the marital master directed the plaintiff to correct his pleading by filing a petition to legitimate, which he did on January 28, 1992. When the adoption petition was filed in Hillsborough County Probate Court on January 10, 1992, the plaintiff's petition for custody and the Merrimack County Superior Court's orders for blood testing were pending. Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff's petition for custody of the child sufficiently raised the question of his paternity to make him the subject of a pending paternity action within the meaning of RSA 170-B:2, XIV. Therefore, the probate court's determination that the plaintiff is the natural father of the adopted child is neither plainly erroneous nor contrary to law.
In particular circumstances, a natural father is entitled to notice of a pending adoption proceeding and has a right to request a hearing to prove his paternity. RSA 170-B:5-a. If the natural father then requests a hearing and proves his paternity, his consent to the adoption is required. RSA 170-B:5, I(d). The statute provides that the court shall give notice of a pending adoption to a natural father "when the natural mother . . . has executed a consent under RSA 170-B:9, . . . if [the natural father's] identity is known by the court; the adoption agency which is the legal guardian of the child; or the proposed adoptive parents or their attorney." RSA 170-B:5-a, I(b). Thus, the notice requirement of RSA 170-B:5-a, I, applies to a natural father when the mother has properly consented to the adoption and when his identity is known by the court, the proposed adoptive parents, or their attorney.
The probate court found that the defendant, the mother of Sky D., consented to the adoption. Although the defendant contends in her brief that she did not need to, and did not, consent to the adoption of her child by her husband, the child's stepfather, at oral argument her attorney conceded that her signature on the petition to adopt served as her consent. Without the defendant's consent, the adoption would be invalid. RSA 170-B:5, I(b) (1990); Smith v. Consul General of Spain, 110 N.H. 62, 64, 260 A.2d 95, 96-97 (1969); see RSA 170-B:4, V(a) (1990). Consent by a parent to the adoption of a child by a stepparent must be executed as provided by RSA 170-B:9, I(c) (1990). We conclude that the defendant's execution of the petition acknowledged by a notary public met the statutory requirements of execution of consent under RSA 170-B:9, I(c) in this case.
The defendant and the attorneys for the defendant and her new husband knew the identity of the plaintiff. In addition, the court knew that someone who claimed to be Sky D.'s father had filed a petition to legitimate the child in Merrimack County Superior Court. Therefore, the plaintiff, as the natural father of the child, was entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding pursuant to RSA 170-B:5-a, I(b) and had a right to request a hearing to prove his paternity. Although the defendant notes that the plaintiff received information about the pendingadoption proceeding from her attorney, she does not contend that the statutory notice requirement of RSA 170-B:5-a was satisfied, and we find that it was not.
If the plaintiff had requested a hearing and had proven his paternity as provided by statute, his consent to theadoption would have been required pursuant to RSA 170-B:5, I(d). We have not considered the effect of RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) (Supp. 1993) on this case as the amended version of the statute was not effective at the time of the proceedings in question. Because the plaintiff was not given the required notice of the adoption proceeding, the adoption of Sky D. is invalid. Lucius v. Wistner, 97 N.H. 128, 130, 82 A.2d 602, 603 (1951). The probate court's order denying the plaintiff's petition is reversed, and the adoption decree is vacated.
Reversed.
All concurred.
In re SKY D.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
138 N.H. 543; 643 A.2d 529
June 7, 1994, Decided
Hillsborough County Probate Court
BROCK, C.J. The plaintiff, Martin M., petitioned to vacate a decree of adoption on the ground that he was the natural father of the adopted child, Sky D., and had not been given proper notice of the adoption proceedings. The Hillsborough County Probate Court (Cloutier, J.) denied his petition ruling that because the plaintiff had not filed with the office of child support enforcement, as required by RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) (1990) (current version at RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) (Supp. 1993)) and RSA 170-B:6 (1990), he was not entitled to notice of the adoptionproceedings. We reverse.
The plaintiff and the defendant, the mother of Sky D., lived together in Pennsylvania for several months during 1990. During that time, she became pregnant. While she was pregnant, she repeatedly acknowledged that the plaintiff was the father of the child. The defendant moved out of the plaintiff's home before the child, Sky D., was born in June 1991, and had little contact with the plaintiff thereafter, despite his attempts to see her and the child. She moved to New Hampshire during the summer of 1991 and married another man.
In October 1991, the plaintiff filed a petition for custody of the child in the Merrimack County Superior Court. In January 1992, the defendant and her new husband filed a petition to adopt the child in Hillsborough County Probate Court. At the end of January, in response to the Merrimack County Superior Court's order in his pending custody suit, the plaintiff filed a petition to legitimate the child. The Hillsborough County Probate Court issued a certificate of adoption on March 19, 1992. The Merrimack County Superior Court then stayed the plaintiff's action to legitimate Sky D. to allow him an opportunity to challenge the legality of the adoption in Hillsborough County Probate Court.
In May 1992, the plaintiff petitioned to vacate the adoption because he had not been given notice of the adoptionproceeding. The probate court denied the petition stating that the plaintiff "is not within the class of people who are entitled to notice under New Hampshire law." The plaintiff appealed.
We review a decision of the probate court for errors of law and will not disturb its factual findings "unless they are so plainly erroneous that such findings could not be reasonably made." RSA 567-A:4 (Supp. 1993); In re Jessie E., 137 N.H. 336, 341, 627 A.2d 591, 594 (1993). Adoption is wholly statutory, and therefore, our review of the law is limited to interpretation of the applicable statutes. In re Estate of McQuesten, 133 N.H. 420, 422, 578 A.2d 335, 337 (1990).
The probate court found that the plaintiff was the natural father of the adopted child, Sky D. In the context ofadoption, a natural father is "a person other than a legal father who has been named as the father of the child, or who is the subject of a pending paternity action, or who has filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child pursuant to RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c)." RSA 170-B:2, XIV (1990). It is undisputed that the plaintiff had not filed a notice of his claim of paternity under RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) at the time of the adoption proceeding.
In October 1991, months before the petition to adopt was filed, however, the plaintiff filed an action titled "Petition for Custody of Child Under RSA 458-A and Temporary Orders" in Merrimack County Superior Court that sought, in part, to establish his paternity of the child. The petition requested the following relief:
"That if she [Sky D.'s mother] denies Petitioner's paternity of [Sky D.], [Sky D.'s mother] be ordered to submit him to blood tests (to which Petitioner offers to submit) to determine if Petitioner is the father of [Sky
On October 15, 1991, the superior court ordered the plaintiff, the defendant, and the child to submit to blood testing.
Following a hearing held on January 15, 1992, the marital master directed the plaintiff to correct his pleading by filing a petition to legitimate, which he did on January 28, 1992. When the adoption petition was filed in Hillsborough County Probate Court on January 10, 1992, the plaintiff's petition for custody and the Merrimack County Superior Court's orders for blood testing were pending. Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff's petition for custody of the child sufficiently raised the question of his paternity to make him the subject of a pending paternity action within the meaning of RSA 170-B:2, XIV. Therefore, the probate court's determination that the plaintiff is the natural father of the adopted child is neither plainly erroneous nor contrary to law.
In particular circumstances, a natural father is entitled to notice of a pending adoption proceeding and has a right to request a hearing to prove his paternity. RSA 170-B:5-a. If the natural father then requests a hearing and proves his paternity, his consent to the adoption is required. RSA 170-B:5, I(d). The statute provides that the court shall give notice of a pending adoption to a natural father "when the natural mother . . . has executed a consent under RSA 170-B:9, . . . if [the natural father's] identity is known by the court; the adoption agency which is the legal guardian of the child; or the proposed adoptive parents or their attorney." RSA 170-B:5-a, I(b). Thus, the notice requirement of RSA 170-B:5-a, I, applies to a natural father when the mother has properly consented to the adoption and when his identity is known by the court, the proposed adoptive parents, or their attorney.
The probate court found that the defendant, the mother of Sky D., consented to the adoption. Although the defendant contends in her brief that she did not need to, and did not, consent to the adoption of her child by her husband, the child's stepfather, at oral argument her attorney conceded that her signature on the petition to adopt served as her consent. Without the defendant's consent, the adoption would be invalid. RSA 170-B:5, I(b) (1990); Smith v. Consul General of Spain, 110 N.H. 62, 64, 260 A.2d 95, 96-97 (1969); see RSA 170-B:4, V(a) (1990). Consent by a parent to the adoption of a child by a stepparent must be executed as provided by RSA 170-B:9, I(c) (1990). We conclude that the defendant's execution of the petition acknowledged by a notary public met the statutory requirements of execution of consent under RSA 170-B:9, I(c) in this case.
The defendant and the attorneys for the defendant and her new husband knew the identity of the plaintiff. In addition, the court knew that someone who claimed to be Sky D.'s father had filed a petition to legitimate the child in Merrimack County Superior Court. Therefore, the plaintiff, as the natural father of the child, was entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding pursuant to RSA 170-B:5-a, I(b) and had a right to request a hearing to prove his paternity. Although the defendant notes that the plaintiff received information about the pendingadoption proceeding from her attorney, she does not contend that the statutory notice requirement of RSA 170-B:5-a was satisfied, and we find that it was not.
If the plaintiff had requested a hearing and had proven his paternity as provided by statute, his consent to theadoption would have been required pursuant to RSA 170-B:5, I(d). We have not considered the effect of RSA 170-B:5-a, I(c) (Supp. 1993) on this case as the amended version of the statute was not effective at the time of the proceedings in question. Because the plaintiff was not given the required notice of the adoption proceeding, the adoption of Sky D. is invalid. Lucius v. Wistner, 97 N.H. 128, 130, 82 A.2d 602, 603 (1951). The probate court's order denying the plaintiff's petition is reversed, and the adoption decree is vacated.
Reversed.
All concurred.
Sunday, March 11, 2012
Advocates push for foster children to be appointed lawyers to get them out of system faster
Advocates push for foster children to be appointed lawyers to get them out of system faster - The Washington Post:
MIAMI — When Lauren entered foster care at age 16, she was too scared to go to the court hearings that were deciding her future. She was wary of the judge and struggled to navigate the complex legal system of dependency court on top of adjusting to life in a group home.
MIAMI — When Lauren entered foster care at age 16, she was too scared to go to the court hearings that were deciding her future. She was wary of the judge and struggled to navigate the complex legal system of dependency court on top of adjusting to life in a group home.
Forced Adoptions: Curtain lifts on decades unwed mothers in Canada Forced into giving up children
Forced Adoptions: Curtain lifts on decades unwed mothers in Canada coerced into giving up children | News | National Post:
Karen Lynn was 19 when her mother sent her to a home for unmarried pregnant women in Clarkson, Ont., in 1963. There, she was known as Karen No. 1 to protect her family’s reputation, and said it was clear she would not have been allowed to stay there if she did not agree to an adoption. A year later, Sharon Pedersen was 20-years-old when she was drugged and tied to her bed during labour and then shown four different babies through the nursery window at a hospital in Victoria, she said.
Karen Lynn was 19 when her mother sent her to a home for unmarried pregnant women in Clarkson, Ont., in 1963. There, she was known as Karen No. 1 to protect her family’s reputation, and said it was clear she would not have been allowed to stay there if she did not agree to an adoption. A year later, Sharon Pedersen was 20-years-old when she was drugged and tied to her bed during labour and then shown four different babies through the nursery window at a hospital in Victoria, she said.
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