Child neglect cases harder to handle - Arizona News from The Arizona Republic:
Families in New Hampshire get NO help from Child Protective Services. All they get is railroaded and their children NEVER returned!
There was a time when Phoenix mother Jessica Power chose heroin over her son.
Her addiction led her to abandon the child, then 3 years old, with his grandmother and prompted state Child Protective Services to launch a neglect investigation.
Months later, authorities jailed Power for violating probation, and she learned she was pregnant with her second child. Prosecutors offered residential drug treatment to the mother and Caden was born, addicted to methadone, five months later.
Power, 25, and her children are now on their own. It took nearly three years, commitment from caseworkers and counselors, and Power’s dedication.
Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Monday, November 7, 2011
Parent's of Children Sent to Philbrook Psychiatric Hospital in NH
Parent's of Children Sent to Philbrook Psychiatric Hospital in NH
We, as a group are looking for parent's and families whose children were patient's at Philbrook Hospital in NH. Especially children sent there by NH DCYF. Children sent there, traumatized due to the loss of their families. Children of any age, who suffered even more traumatization, made to stand before a Judge and treated like a criminal. Children with NO mental illness, yet sent there by our illustrious DCYF because their "Chosen" DCYF placement didn't know how to handle their new found violent behavior. Because the needless drugging of our children is the norm these days where DCYF is concerned. Because our next generation is being turned into drugged up zombies. Because our "Stolen" children are worth more to DCYF once they turn them into drugged up Zombies.
We are looking for children whose families and DCYF were told there was NOTHING wrong with their children. Told by the Doctor's there is nothing wrong with their child, after the family speaks to the child on the phone. Told by the Doctor he knows exactly what's wrong with the child. That after speaking to his family his whole demeanor has changed. That all he want's is his family. Then of course after DCYF hear's that the child spoke to his family, all family phone calls are stopped. No visits are allowed by family, per DCYF order's. Only the foster stranger's are allowed contact. Even the parent's aren't allowed information on their child.
Funny how the Judge saw no reason for "Involuntary" placement, so of course DCYF and the hospital Social Worker's try to push "Voluntary" placement. No need for hospitalization, yet they were kept and drugged anyway, after their parent's were coerced into signing consent forms for treatment. Threatened by NH DCYF they would lose their rights if they didn't sign, while other extremely dangerous children are sent home with the parent's who brought them there for help, after claiming the child is completely normal. Is trying to kill your family normal? Then when the parent beg's for help, DCYF takes custody of the child and in turn collect Social Security for the so-called normal child.
Is it even legal for DCYF to collect Social Security for the children they claim to be normal? Is it even legal to sign a child up for Social Security immediately after they've been removed from their families? Children who were never diagnosed with any medical or mental issues, yet now all of a sudden because DCYF has them in their grasp, the child is now eligible for Social Security?
Philbrook Hospital is contracted out by NH DHHS/DCYF. Is Philbrook and DCYF scamming our government? Placing normal children on Medicaid in Philbrook, drugging them and defrauding our government, yet sending dangerous children home. Dangerous children NOT in DCYF custody. Dangerous children NOT on Medicaid. Collecting Social Security benefits for children who now have violent behavior due to DCYF Abuse!
Please contact me if your child and family has suffered at the hands of Philbrook Hospital!
We, as a group are looking for parent's and families whose children were patient's at Philbrook Hospital in NH. Especially children sent there by NH DCYF. Children sent there, traumatized due to the loss of their families. Children of any age, who suffered even more traumatization, made to stand before a Judge and treated like a criminal. Children with NO mental illness, yet sent there by our illustrious DCYF because their "Chosen" DCYF placement didn't know how to handle their new found violent behavior. Because the needless drugging of our children is the norm these days where DCYF is concerned. Because our next generation is being turned into drugged up zombies. Because our "Stolen" children are worth more to DCYF once they turn them into drugged up Zombies.
We are looking for children whose families and DCYF were told there was NOTHING wrong with their children. Told by the Doctor's there is nothing wrong with their child, after the family speaks to the child on the phone. Told by the Doctor he knows exactly what's wrong with the child. That after speaking to his family his whole demeanor has changed. That all he want's is his family. Then of course after DCYF hear's that the child spoke to his family, all family phone calls are stopped. No visits are allowed by family, per DCYF order's. Only the foster stranger's are allowed contact. Even the parent's aren't allowed information on their child.
Funny how the Judge saw no reason for "Involuntary" placement, so of course DCYF and the hospital Social Worker's try to push "Voluntary" placement. No need for hospitalization, yet they were kept and drugged anyway, after their parent's were coerced into signing consent forms for treatment. Threatened by NH DCYF they would lose their rights if they didn't sign, while other extremely dangerous children are sent home with the parent's who brought them there for help, after claiming the child is completely normal. Is trying to kill your family normal? Then when the parent beg's for help, DCYF takes custody of the child and in turn collect Social Security for the so-called normal child.
Is it even legal for DCYF to collect Social Security for the children they claim to be normal? Is it even legal to sign a child up for Social Security immediately after they've been removed from their families? Children who were never diagnosed with any medical or mental issues, yet now all of a sudden because DCYF has them in their grasp, the child is now eligible for Social Security?
Philbrook Hospital is contracted out by NH DHHS/DCYF. Is Philbrook and DCYF scamming our government? Placing normal children on Medicaid in Philbrook, drugging them and defrauding our government, yet sending dangerous children home. Dangerous children NOT in DCYF custody. Dangerous children NOT on Medicaid. Collecting Social Security benefits for children who now have violent behavior due to DCYF Abuse!
Please contact me if your child and family has suffered at the hands of Philbrook Hospital!
ALERT!! absolute power-Trauma of Child Removal
Now ALL of you N0n-believers can see for yourselves what our children and families go through at the hands of a rogue government agency. I personally didn't need to see this video to show me. I've been there, only my grandson was dragged out the door and down the street by FOUR Police Officer's attending the kidnapping by Nashua, NH DCYF. NO Court Order and NO warrant. It can happen to anyone. Please stand up for your rights and your children's rights. This reign of terror against families MUST STOP!
Child welfare conference speakers agree birth families need more resources and support
Child welfare conference speakers agree birth families need more resources and support | OregonLive.com:
Birth Families ALL over the Nation Need Support and Resources! Not just in Oregon!
At the 13th Annual "Shoulder to Shoulder" child welfare conference, Carrie Medina filed a missing report. Medina wasn’t reporting a lost child. She was drawing attention to a hole she sees in our child welfare system: a hole that causes families to lose children, and children to lose families.
Birth Families ALL over the Nation Need Support and Resources! Not just in Oregon!
At the 13th Annual "Shoulder to Shoulder" child welfare conference, Carrie Medina filed a missing report. Medina wasn’t reporting a lost child. She was drawing attention to a hole she sees in our child welfare system: a hole that causes families to lose children, and children to lose families.
House Counsel Ed Mosca Arrives Unprepared, Abets judicial child abuse
STOP Judicial Child Abuse: House Counsel Ed Mosca Arrives Unprepared, Abets judicial child abuse:
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2011
House Counsel Ed Mosca Arrives Unprepared, Abets judicial child abuse
The following letter was sent to the N.H. House Judiciary Committee on Nov. 5, 2011 and was obtained by STOP Judicial Child Abuse investigators.
Apparently, house counsel Ed Mosca arrived unprepared to adequately advise the Judiciary Sub-committee at a hearing on Tues., Nov. 1, 2011 forcing the sub-committee to reconvene for another hearing approximately a month later - all while hundreds, if not thousands of children remain estranged from fit parents.
Read the letter below, reproduced in blue.
Nov. 5, 2011
Dear Honorable Judiciary Committee Representatives,
Below, I have prepared a quick research memorandum of law, which will hopefully answer your question as to whether a "marital master is a judicial officer under the N.H. Constitution." I was present at the hearing this past week on HR7 and there seemed to be a problem extracting definitive answers from house counsel Edward Mosca. He did not arrive prepared (no handouts, no answers, etc.) and brought no binding authority (case law, etc.). I am merely a concerned citizen, bringing these answers to you.
First, let it be known, I personally desire every under-performing, mal-administering, and corrupt judge and marital master removed forthwith, but my first loyalty is to the constitution, irrespective of whether it is favorable to me or not in a particular instance.
I am disappointed by what I have to report to you, as it goes against my desire to impeach marital masters. The Supreme Court does not consider marital masters judicial officers pursuant to the N.H. Constitution.
In support thereof:
1) "I. Are presently sitting marital masters judicial officers under Part II, Article 46 of the New Hampshire Constitution?"
Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 17, p.19 (1986). As of the date of this email, the Shepard's Report indicates that this case is still good law in New Hampshire.
Beginning further down p.19, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reasoned "Presently appointed marital masters of the superior court are not judicial officers within the meaning of part II, article 46 (Supp. 1985) of the Constitution of New Hampshire, and we accordingly answer no to your first question.
A necessary characteristic of a judicial officer is the authority to render judgment to determine issues that are properly raised before the judicial branch. See The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838); N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 37, pt. II, art. 72-a. That final authority may be exercised only by an officer appointed in accordance with the State Constitution and invested with the constitutional incidents of judicial office. Thus, a judicial officer within the meaning of part II, article 46 (Supp. 1985) must, by definition, be "nominated and appointed by the governor and council," id., and must be commissioned to hold office during good behavior, N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 73, except where the constitution otherwise provides. See N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 75 (five-year term for justices of the peace); see also Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Marital and other masters are not so appointed, tenured or empowered. See generally R. Wiebusch, 5 New Hampshire Practice, Civil Practice and Procedure chap. 39 (1984). They are appointed by the superior court, and although their appointments are made and reviewed on a periodic basis, they have no tenure and are removable by the court at will. At most, such masters are authorized to make recommendations, which, though normally approved, have no binding force upon the court. But see Cornforth v. Cornforth, 123 N.H. 61, 455 A.2d 1049 (1983) (in absence of record, court may not alter master's recommended award without hearing or presentation of evidence)."
A question could be raised "The year 1984 was nearly 28 year ago. Has the criteria for 'judicial officials' under the N.H. Constitution changed in the ensuing years?" A historical review of Pt.2 Art.46 of the N.H. Constitution reveals that it has survived four eras in New Hampshire History: The first was June 2, 1784, The second, it was amended in 1792 making minor changes in wording, the third, it was amended in 1877 deleting solicitors and sheriffs from those appointed by governor and council, and finally, the last era began in 1976 when it was amended deleting appointment of coroners by governor and council.
The answer as to whether the criteria for "judicial officers" has changed in the past 28 years, appears to be "no, it has not."
2) In addressing questions posed by the legislature relative to HB 236, the N.H. Supreme Court ruled similarly in Opinion of the Justices (Recommendations of Marital Masters), 155 N.H. 524 (N.H. 2007)
3) In addressing questions posed relative to SB 112, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held(in pertinent part) in OPINION OF THE JUSTICES RECOMMENDATIONS OF MARITAL MASTERS v. OPINION OF THE JUSTICES (RECOMMENDATIONS OF MARITAL MASTERS)., Request of the Senate No. 2007-263., May 30, 2007:
"Although marital masters provide invaluable service to the judicial branch and the citizens of the state, we conclude that they are not judicial officers within the meaning of Part II, Articles 46 and 73 of the New Hampshire Constitution."
4) In Witte v. Justices of the N.H. Superior Court, 831 F.2d 362 (1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that marital masters in New Hampshire 'have no inherent power, but rather derive all their power from the appointing judge or from the agreement of the parties.'
"Plaintiff proceeds as if marital masters have the authority, over the objection of the parties, to finally determine cases. They do not. Rather, they may only make recommendations, and the recommendations have "no binding force upon the court." Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 17, 20, 509 A.2d 746, 748 (1986).
Masters have no inherent power, but rather derive all their power from the appointing judge or from the agreement of the parties. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:9; R. Wiebusch, 5 New Hampshire Civil Practice and Procedure § 1371 (1984). And masters are required to file a report with the court for the court's action thereon.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:10; Rules of the Superior Court of New Hampshire 84 (report of master to be presented to presiding judge for judge's order). Upon request by either party, masters must "state specifically all matters of fact found by them to have been proved, and their rulings upon all questions of law." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:11. The judge, after reviewing the report, may accept it, recommit the case to the master for further proceedings, or hold further evidentiary hearing himself. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:12; Cornforth v. Cornforth, 123 N.H. 61, 64, 455 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1983). After the judge enters a final judgment, the parties may seek review of the judgment from the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Thus, under the marital master system, it is a judge, not a master, which determines the case."
I hope that these findings are of assistance, and will help to save our valuable commodity; time. I ask once again why house counsel could not have prepared a simple memorandum like this for the edification of the Judiciary Subcommittee at the HR7 hearing last Tuesday? It seems inexcusable, considering his position as house "counsel" and the value of his contract.
Representatives, just because a marital master may not meet the litmus test of "judicial officer," does not mean that they are off the hook. A recommendation should be made by this committee to the judiciary to terminate Philip Cross immediately - something you have the power to do. The onus is upon the Judiciary to act - and to fire Cross immediately - but the impetus must come from you!
Furthermore, I believe this finding can be looked at in a positive light; now we can address the impeachable "judicial officers," the "judges of the state," who perfunctorily and recklessly sign marital masters' "recommendations" without thoroughly reviewing them, in true "rubber stamp" fashion. HR7 addresses not only Philip Cross, but any other superior court "officer."
In high regard,
Concerned Citizen
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2011
House Counsel Ed Mosca Arrives Unprepared, Abets judicial child abuse
The following letter was sent to the N.H. House Judiciary Committee on Nov. 5, 2011 and was obtained by STOP Judicial Child Abuse investigators.
Apparently, house counsel Ed Mosca arrived unprepared to adequately advise the Judiciary Sub-committee at a hearing on Tues., Nov. 1, 2011 forcing the sub-committee to reconvene for another hearing approximately a month later - all while hundreds, if not thousands of children remain estranged from fit parents.
Read the letter below, reproduced in blue.
Nov. 5, 2011
Dear Honorable Judiciary Committee Representatives,
Below, I have prepared a quick research memorandum of law, which will hopefully answer your question as to whether a "marital master is a judicial officer under the N.H. Constitution." I was present at the hearing this past week on HR7 and there seemed to be a problem extracting definitive answers from house counsel Edward Mosca. He did not arrive prepared (no handouts, no answers, etc.) and brought no binding authority (case law, etc.). I am merely a concerned citizen, bringing these answers to you.
First, let it be known, I personally desire every under-performing, mal-administering, and corrupt judge and marital master removed forthwith, but my first loyalty is to the constitution, irrespective of whether it is favorable to me or not in a particular instance.
I am disappointed by what I have to report to you, as it goes against my desire to impeach marital masters. The Supreme Court does not consider marital masters judicial officers pursuant to the N.H. Constitution.
In support thereof:
1) "I. Are presently sitting marital masters judicial officers under Part II, Article 46 of the New Hampshire Constitution?"
Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 17, p.19 (1986). As of the date of this email, the Shepard's Report indicates that this case is still good law in New Hampshire.
Beginning further down p.19, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reasoned "Presently appointed marital masters of the superior court are not judicial officers within the meaning of part II, article 46 (Supp. 1985) of the Constitution of New Hampshire, and we accordingly answer no to your first question.
A necessary characteristic of a judicial officer is the authority to render judgment to determine issues that are properly raised before the judicial branch. See The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838); N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 37, pt. II, art. 72-a. That final authority may be exercised only by an officer appointed in accordance with the State Constitution and invested with the constitutional incidents of judicial office. Thus, a judicial officer within the meaning of part II, article 46 (Supp. 1985) must, by definition, be "nominated and appointed by the governor and council," id., and must be commissioned to hold office during good behavior, N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 73, except where the constitution otherwise provides. See N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 75 (five-year term for justices of the peace); see also Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Marital and other masters are not so appointed, tenured or empowered. See generally R. Wiebusch, 5 New Hampshire Practice, Civil Practice and Procedure chap. 39 (1984). They are appointed by the superior court, and although their appointments are made and reviewed on a periodic basis, they have no tenure and are removable by the court at will. At most, such masters are authorized to make recommendations, which, though normally approved, have no binding force upon the court. But see Cornforth v. Cornforth, 123 N.H. 61, 455 A.2d 1049 (1983) (in absence of record, court may not alter master's recommended award without hearing or presentation of evidence)."
A question could be raised "The year 1984 was nearly 28 year ago. Has the criteria for 'judicial officials' under the N.H. Constitution changed in the ensuing years?" A historical review of Pt.2 Art.46 of the N.H. Constitution reveals that it has survived four eras in New Hampshire History: The first was June 2, 1784, The second, it was amended in 1792 making minor changes in wording, the third, it was amended in 1877 deleting solicitors and sheriffs from those appointed by governor and council, and finally, the last era began in 1976 when it was amended deleting appointment of coroners by governor and council.
The answer as to whether the criteria for "judicial officers" has changed in the past 28 years, appears to be "no, it has not."
2) In addressing questions posed by the legislature relative to HB 236, the N.H. Supreme Court ruled similarly in Opinion of the Justices (Recommendations of Marital Masters), 155 N.H. 524 (N.H. 2007)
3) In addressing questions posed relative to SB 112, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held(in pertinent part) in OPINION OF THE JUSTICES RECOMMENDATIONS OF MARITAL MASTERS v. OPINION OF THE JUSTICES (RECOMMENDATIONS OF MARITAL MASTERS)., Request of the Senate No. 2007-263., May 30, 2007:
"Although marital masters provide invaluable service to the judicial branch and the citizens of the state, we conclude that they are not judicial officers within the meaning of Part II, Articles 46 and 73 of the New Hampshire Constitution."
4) In Witte v. Justices of the N.H. Superior Court, 831 F.2d 362 (1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that marital masters in New Hampshire 'have no inherent power, but rather derive all their power from the appointing judge or from the agreement of the parties.'
"Plaintiff proceeds as if marital masters have the authority, over the objection of the parties, to finally determine cases. They do not. Rather, they may only make recommendations, and the recommendations have "no binding force upon the court." Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 17, 20, 509 A.2d 746, 748 (1986).
Masters have no inherent power, but rather derive all their power from the appointing judge or from the agreement of the parties. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:9; R. Wiebusch, 5 New Hampshire Civil Practice and Procedure § 1371 (1984). And masters are required to file a report with the court for the court's action thereon.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:10; Rules of the Superior Court of New Hampshire 84 (report of master to be presented to presiding judge for judge's order). Upon request by either party, masters must "state specifically all matters of fact found by them to have been proved, and their rulings upon all questions of law." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:11. The judge, after reviewing the report, may accept it, recommit the case to the master for further proceedings, or hold further evidentiary hearing himself. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519:12; Cornforth v. Cornforth, 123 N.H. 61, 64, 455 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1983). After the judge enters a final judgment, the parties may seek review of the judgment from the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Thus, under the marital master system, it is a judge, not a master, which determines the case."
I hope that these findings are of assistance, and will help to save our valuable commodity; time. I ask once again why house counsel could not have prepared a simple memorandum like this for the edification of the Judiciary Subcommittee at the HR7 hearing last Tuesday? It seems inexcusable, considering his position as house "counsel" and the value of his contract.
Representatives, just because a marital master may not meet the litmus test of "judicial officer," does not mean that they are off the hook. A recommendation should be made by this committee to the judiciary to terminate Philip Cross immediately - something you have the power to do. The onus is upon the Judiciary to act - and to fire Cross immediately - but the impetus must come from you!
Furthermore, I believe this finding can be looked at in a positive light; now we can address the impeachable "judicial officers," the "judges of the state," who perfunctorily and recklessly sign marital masters' "recommendations" without thoroughly reviewing them, in true "rubber stamp" fashion. HR7 addresses not only Philip Cross, but any other superior court "officer."
In high regard,
Concerned Citizen
Judiciary Infecting Legislature Via the N.H. Bar Assn.
STOP Judicial Child Abuse: Judiciary Infecting Legislature Via the N.H. Bar Assn.:
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2011
Judiciary Infecting Legislature Via the N.H. Bar Assn.
A Question:
Why are union-monopoly BAR-admitted attorneys working for the legislature and permitted to participate, even administratively, in the legislative process?
An Observation:
BAR-Admitted Attorneys practicing in branches of government other than the judicial branch violates the separation of powers doctrine specifically because the professional rules of conduct and the attorney's oath create an officership of the admitted attorney with the court binding a primary loyalty to the judiciary; not a loyalty to the client and not a loyalty to any other branch of government.
This means for example, attorney Edward Mosca acting as house counsel, as a bar admitted attorney, when counseling the legislature, creates a violation of the separation of powers. His motivation and loyalty is necessarily bound to the judiciary, which means that his legal counsel and advice to the legislature is, ipso facto, stained with preexistent and superior loyalties to another branch of government.
In simpler terms, he will likely give counsel to the legislature which is favorable to the industry in which he works; in the judiciary, and with judges - every day. He is really a lobbyist disguised as house counsel.
We find this to be the case, right down to legislative services' attorneys being members of the bar.
I ask, where can we obtain justice, when there is such a deep and complex co-mingling of the branches of government who have such complicated webs of devotion and loyalty and obligation woven artfully but hypocritically throughout their duplicitous careers?
This professional schizophrenia needs to stop immediately.
I would think that there is only one lawful means for a bar admitted attorney to practice in another branch of government: if he withdrew his membership from the bar or at a bare minimum, suspended the membership during their course of practice with another branch of government.
I guess, this would mean that bar admitted attorneys, could not practice law at all while serving in another branch.
This solution would discourage the pandemic proliferation of corruption by attorneys such as Edward Mosca, who seek a foothold in the law making process even after losing a bid for State Rep.
This solution would encourage more "common" people to get a hold of their legislature and would most assuredly make government more transparent.
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2011
Judiciary Infecting Legislature Via the N.H. Bar Assn.
A Question:
Why are union-monopoly BAR-admitted attorneys working for the legislature and permitted to participate, even administratively, in the legislative process?
An Observation:
BAR-Admitted Attorneys practicing in branches of government other than the judicial branch violates the separation of powers doctrine specifically because the professional rules of conduct and the attorney's oath create an officership of the admitted attorney with the court binding a primary loyalty to the judiciary; not a loyalty to the client and not a loyalty to any other branch of government.
This means for example, attorney Edward Mosca acting as house counsel, as a bar admitted attorney, when counseling the legislature, creates a violation of the separation of powers. His motivation and loyalty is necessarily bound to the judiciary, which means that his legal counsel and advice to the legislature is, ipso facto, stained with preexistent and superior loyalties to another branch of government.
In simpler terms, he will likely give counsel to the legislature which is favorable to the industry in which he works; in the judiciary, and with judges - every day. He is really a lobbyist disguised as house counsel.
We find this to be the case, right down to legislative services' attorneys being members of the bar.
I ask, where can we obtain justice, when there is such a deep and complex co-mingling of the branches of government who have such complicated webs of devotion and loyalty and obligation woven artfully but hypocritically throughout their duplicitous careers?
This professional schizophrenia needs to stop immediately.
I would think that there is only one lawful means for a bar admitted attorney to practice in another branch of government: if he withdrew his membership from the bar or at a bare minimum, suspended the membership during their course of practice with another branch of government.
I guess, this would mean that bar admitted attorneys, could not practice law at all while serving in another branch.
This solution would discourage the pandemic proliferation of corruption by attorneys such as Edward Mosca, who seek a foothold in the law making process even after losing a bid for State Rep.
This solution would encourage more "common" people to get a hold of their legislature and would most assuredly make government more transparent.
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