What is Attachment Disorder?:
Attachment disorder, sometimes called reactive attachment disorder, is based on the concept that the infant/caretaker bond can be disrupted. Disruption can occur for a variety of reasons. A premature baby who is hospitalized for the first few months of life, or a child living in an orphanage for three to six months prior to being adopted may display attachment disorder. A physically or sexually abused child, or merely a neglected one may also fail to form attachments with adult caregivers and show evidence of attachment disorder.
In infants as young as six months, signs of attachment disorder may surface as poor crying response or excessive crying. A child may not want to be touched or held, and especially may not want to be cuddled. The child may not visually track adults who are responsible for care and may not respond to smiles. Motor skills like crawling, sitting up and creeping may also be delayed. As the child ages these motor skills may continue to be delayed and developmental milestones like walking and talking may be reached far later than average.
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Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Thursday, September 1, 2011
Emotional Difficulties in Adoptees
Emotional Difficulties in Adoptees | ModernMom.com:
For adoptees, exit from one family and entrance into another can create an array of emotional challenges. This major life change can lead to challenges both in the years immediately following the adoption as well as in the future when the adoptee attempts to delve deeper into who he is and forms relationships with others. While nothing can completely eliminate these emotional ramifications of adoption, being aware of the issues and preparing for their possible eventual surfacing can help you assist the adoptee in your family to overcome these struggles more effectively.
Read More:
For adoptees, exit from one family and entrance into another can create an array of emotional challenges. This major life change can lead to challenges both in the years immediately following the adoption as well as in the future when the adoptee attempts to delve deeper into who he is and forms relationships with others. While nothing can completely eliminate these emotional ramifications of adoption, being aware of the issues and preparing for their possible eventual surfacing can help you assist the adoptee in your family to overcome these struggles more effectively.
Read More:
Adopting - Emotional Issues
Adopting - Emotional Issues:
Emotional Issues of Adopting
This page and its links explain some of the emotional effects that adoption can have on a child. Being aware of these issues will allow you to better help your child.
Impact of Adoption on Adopted Persons
Every child goes through periods of adjustment and development issues as he or she grows. In addition to the normal development issues, a child that has been adopted, as opposed to being born into the family, faces unique issues and concerns. These issues often center around feelings of loss, grief, abandonment, self-esteem, and identity.
Emotional Issues of Adopting
This page and its links explain some of the emotional effects that adoption can have on a child. Being aware of these issues will allow you to better help your child.
Impact of Adoption on Adopted Persons
Every child goes through periods of adjustment and development issues as he or she grows. In addition to the normal development issues, a child that has been adopted, as opposed to being born into the family, faces unique issues and concerns. These issues often center around feelings of loss, grief, abandonment, self-esteem, and identity.
Emotional Struggles of Adopted Children
Emotional Struggles of Adopted Children | Suite101.com:
Many adopted children struggle with feelings of rejections, although they may not tell their parents. Adolescence is especially confusing for adoptees.
Much has been written about the joys of adoption. It seems to be the ideal solution for not only the unwed mother, but also for childless couples who yearn for children. Adoption, although a positive experience, also has challenges. This is especially true regarding how many adopted children struggle emotionally with their adoptions.
Read more:
Many adopted children struggle with feelings of rejections, although they may not tell their parents. Adolescence is especially confusing for adoptees.
Much has been written about the joys of adoption. It seems to be the ideal solution for not only the unwed mother, but also for childless couples who yearn for children. Adoption, although a positive experience, also has challenges. This is especially true regarding how many adopted children struggle emotionally with their adoptions.
Read more:
Child Protective Services
Legally Kidnapped: Child Protective Services:
Arizona Republic columnist Laurie Roberts talks about instances when Arizona's Child Protective Services fails to protect children in its care from further abuse. She discusses her struggle to gain access to records in cases of a fatality and near fatality that, if made public, can help hold the agency accountable by giving the public a better understanding of what went wrong.
Arizona Republic columnist Laurie Roberts talks about instances when Arizona's Child Protective Services fails to protect children in its care from further abuse. She discusses her struggle to gain access to records in cases of a fatality and near fatality that, if made public, can help hold the agency accountable by giving the public a better understanding of what went wrong.
New Case Law: US Supreme Court – Due Process and Jail Time For Contempt
New Case Law: US Supreme Court – Due Process and Jail Time For Contempt | The Oregon Divorce Blog:
The United States Supreme Court issued an oppinion on June 20, 2011 in Turner v. Rogers that touches on self represented litigant’s due process rights in contempt proceedings where jail time is at issue. The Father, Turner, was ordered to show cause why he should not have been held in contempt for failing to comply with child support order. The South Carolina Family Court, Oconee County, found father in willful contempt and sentenced father to 12 months’ imprisonment. Father appealed. The court found that Turner’s incarceration violated due process because he received neither counsel nor the benefit of alternative procedures to resolve the matter. He did not have clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical question in his civil contempt proceeding. No one provided him with a form (or the equivalent) designed to elicit information about his financial circumstances. And the trial court did not find that he was able to pay his arrearage, but nonetheless found him in civil contempt and ordered him incarcerated.
You can see the full opinion here.
TURNER v. ROGERS ( No. 10-10 )
387 S. C. 142, 691 S. E. 2d 470, vacated and remanded.
Syllabus
Opinion
[Breyer]
Dissent
[Thomas]
HTML version
PDF version HTML version
PDF version HTML version
PDF version
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TURNER v . ROGERS et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina
No. 10–10. Argued March 23, 2011—Decided June 20, 2011
After a South Carolina family court ordered petitioner Turner to pay $51.73 per week to respondent Rogers to help support their child, Turner repeatedly failed to pay the amount due and was held in contempt five times. For the first four, he was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, but he ultimately paid what he owed (twice without being jailed, twice after spending a few days in custody). The fifth time he did not pay but completed a 6-month sentence. After his release, the family court clerk issued a new “show cause” order against Turner because he was $5728.76 in arrears. Both he and Rogers were unrepresented by counsel at his brief civil contempt hearing. The judge found Turner in willful contempt and sentenced him to 12 months in prison without making any finding as to his ability to pay or indicating on the contempt order form whether he was able to make support payments. After Turner completed his sentence, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim that the Federal Constitution entitled him to counsel at his contempt hearing, declaring that civil contempt does not require all the constitutional safeguards applicable in criminal contempt proceedings.
Held :
1. Even though Turner has completed his 12-month sentence, and there are not alleged to be collateral consequences of the contempt determination that might keep the dispute alive, this case is not moot, because it is “capable of repetition” while “evading review,” Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n , 219 U. S. 498 . A case remains live if “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U. S. 147 . Here, the “challenged action,” Turner’s imprisonment for up to 12 months, is “in its duration too short to be fully litigated” through the state courts (and arrive here) prior to its “expiration.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U. S. 765 . And there is a more than “reasonable” likelihood that Turner will again be “subjected to the same action” because he has frequently failed to make his support payments, has been the subject of several civil contempt proceedings, has been imprisoned several times, and is, once again, the subject of civil contempt proceedings for failure to pay. DeFunis v. Odegaard , 416 U. S. 312 , and St. Pierre v. United States , 319 U. S. 41 , distinguished. Pp. 5–7.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process Clause does not automatically require the State to provide counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent noncustodial parent who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration. In particular, that Clause does not require that counsel be provided where the opposing parent or other custodian is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to adequate notice of the importance of the ability to pay, a fair opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and express court findings as to the supporting parent’s ability to comply with the support order. Pp. 7–16.
(a) This Court’s precedents provide no definitive answer to the question whether counsel must be provided. The Sixth Amendment grants an indigent criminal defendant the right to counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Dixon , 509 U. S. 688 , but does not govern civil cases. Civil and criminal contempt differ. A court may not impose punishment “in a civil contempt proceeding when it is clearly established that the alleged contemnor is unable to comply with the terms of the order.” Hicks v. Feiock , 485 U. S. 624 , n. 9. And once a civil contemnor complies with the underlying order, he is purged of the contempt and is free. Id. , at 633. The Due Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural protections in civil contempt proceedings than in a criminal case. Id. , at 637–641. Cases directly concerning a right to counsel in civil cases have found a presumption of such a right “ only ” in cases involving incarceration, but have not held that a right to counsel exists in all such cases. See In re Gault , 387 U. S. 1 ; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 ; and Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. , 452 U. S. 18 . Pp. 7–10.
(b) Because a contempt proceeding to compel support payments is civil, the question whether the “specific dictates of due process” require appointed counsel is determined by examining the “distinct factors” this Court has used to decide what specific safeguards are needed to make a civil proceeding fundamentally fair. Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U. S. 319 . As relevant here those factors include (1) the nature of “the private interest that will be affected,” (2) the comparative “risk” of an “erroneous deprivation” of that interest with and without “additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in not providing “additional or substitute procedural requirement[s].” Ibid.
The “private interest that will be affected” argues strongly for the right to counsel here. That interest consists of an indigent defendant’s loss of personal liberty through imprisonment. Freedom “from bodily restraint” lies “at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U. S. 71 . Thus, accurate decisionmaking as to the “ability to pay”—which marks a dividing line between civil and criminal contempt, Hicks, supra , at 635, n. 7—must be assured because an incorrect decision can result in a wrongful incarceration. And because ability to comply divides civil and criminal contempt proceedings, an erroneous determination would also deprive a defendant of the procedural protections a criminal proceeding would demand. Questions about ability to pay are likely to arise frequently in child custody cases. On the other hand, due process does not always require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration is threatened. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 . To determine whether a right to counsel is required here, opposing interests and the probable value of “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” must be taken into account. Mathews, supra , at 335.
Doing so reveals three related considerations that, taken together, argue strongly against requiring counsel in every proceeding of the present kind. First, the likely critical question in these cases is the defendant’s ability to pay, which is often closely related to his indigence and relatively straightforward. Second, sometimes, as here, the person opposing the defendant at the hearing is not the government represented by counsel but the custodial parent un represented by counsel. A requirement that the State provide counsel to the noncustodial parent in these cases could create an asymmetry of representation that would “alter significantly the nature of the proceeding,” Gagnon, supra , at 787, creating a degree of formality or delay that would unduly slow payment to those immediately in need and make the proceedings less fair overall. Third, as the Federal Government points out, an available set of “substitute procedural safeguards,” Mathews, supra , at 335, if employed together, can significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty. These include (1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information from him; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for him to respond to statements and questions about his financial status; and (4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay.
This decision does not address civil contempt proceedings where the underlying support payment is owed to the State, e.g., for reimbursement of welfare funds paid to the custodial parent, or the question what due process requires in an unusually complex case where a defendant “can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate,” Gagnon, supra , at 788. Pp. 10–16.
3. Under the circumstances, Turner’s incarceration violated due process because he received neither counsel nor the benefit of alternative procedures like those the Court describes. He did not have clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical question in his civil contempt proceeding. No one provided him with a form (or the equivalent) designed to elicit information about his financial circumstances. And the trial court did not find that he was able to pay his arrearage, but nonetheless found him in civil contempt and ordered him incarcerated. P. 16.
387 S. C. 142, 691 S. E. 2d 470, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, and in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, JJ., joined as to Parts I–B and II.
The United States Supreme Court issued an oppinion on June 20, 2011 in Turner v. Rogers that touches on self represented litigant’s due process rights in contempt proceedings where jail time is at issue. The Father, Turner, was ordered to show cause why he should not have been held in contempt for failing to comply with child support order. The South Carolina Family Court, Oconee County, found father in willful contempt and sentenced father to 12 months’ imprisonment. Father appealed. The court found that Turner’s incarceration violated due process because he received neither counsel nor the benefit of alternative procedures to resolve the matter. He did not have clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical question in his civil contempt proceeding. No one provided him with a form (or the equivalent) designed to elicit information about his financial circumstances. And the trial court did not find that he was able to pay his arrearage, but nonetheless found him in civil contempt and ordered him incarcerated.
You can see the full opinion here.
TURNER v. ROGERS ( No. 10-10 )
387 S. C. 142, 691 S. E. 2d 470, vacated and remanded.
Syllabus
Opinion
[Breyer]
Dissent
[Thomas]
HTML version
PDF version HTML version
PDF version HTML version
PDF version
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TURNER v . ROGERS et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina
No. 10–10. Argued March 23, 2011—Decided June 20, 2011
After a South Carolina family court ordered petitioner Turner to pay $51.73 per week to respondent Rogers to help support their child, Turner repeatedly failed to pay the amount due and was held in contempt five times. For the first four, he was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, but he ultimately paid what he owed (twice without being jailed, twice after spending a few days in custody). The fifth time he did not pay but completed a 6-month sentence. After his release, the family court clerk issued a new “show cause” order against Turner because he was $5728.76 in arrears. Both he and Rogers were unrepresented by counsel at his brief civil contempt hearing. The judge found Turner in willful contempt and sentenced him to 12 months in prison without making any finding as to his ability to pay or indicating on the contempt order form whether he was able to make support payments. After Turner completed his sentence, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim that the Federal Constitution entitled him to counsel at his contempt hearing, declaring that civil contempt does not require all the constitutional safeguards applicable in criminal contempt proceedings.
Held :
1. Even though Turner has completed his 12-month sentence, and there are not alleged to be collateral consequences of the contempt determination that might keep the dispute alive, this case is not moot, because it is “capable of repetition” while “evading review,” Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n , 219 U. S. 498 . A case remains live if “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U. S. 147 . Here, the “challenged action,” Turner’s imprisonment for up to 12 months, is “in its duration too short to be fully litigated” through the state courts (and arrive here) prior to its “expiration.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U. S. 765 . And there is a more than “reasonable” likelihood that Turner will again be “subjected to the same action” because he has frequently failed to make his support payments, has been the subject of several civil contempt proceedings, has been imprisoned several times, and is, once again, the subject of civil contempt proceedings for failure to pay. DeFunis v. Odegaard , 416 U. S. 312 , and St. Pierre v. United States , 319 U. S. 41 , distinguished. Pp. 5–7.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process Clause does not automatically require the State to provide counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent noncustodial parent who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration. In particular, that Clause does not require that counsel be provided where the opposing parent or other custodian is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to adequate notice of the importance of the ability to pay, a fair opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and express court findings as to the supporting parent’s ability to comply with the support order. Pp. 7–16.
(a) This Court’s precedents provide no definitive answer to the question whether counsel must be provided. The Sixth Amendment grants an indigent criminal defendant the right to counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Dixon , 509 U. S. 688 , but does not govern civil cases. Civil and criminal contempt differ. A court may not impose punishment “in a civil contempt proceeding when it is clearly established that the alleged contemnor is unable to comply with the terms of the order.” Hicks v. Feiock , 485 U. S. 624 , n. 9. And once a civil contemnor complies with the underlying order, he is purged of the contempt and is free. Id. , at 633. The Due Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural protections in civil contempt proceedings than in a criminal case. Id. , at 637–641. Cases directly concerning a right to counsel in civil cases have found a presumption of such a right “ only ” in cases involving incarceration, but have not held that a right to counsel exists in all such cases. See In re Gault , 387 U. S. 1 ; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 ; and Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. , 452 U. S. 18 . Pp. 7–10.
(b) Because a contempt proceeding to compel support payments is civil, the question whether the “specific dictates of due process” require appointed counsel is determined by examining the “distinct factors” this Court has used to decide what specific safeguards are needed to make a civil proceeding fundamentally fair. Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U. S. 319 . As relevant here those factors include (1) the nature of “the private interest that will be affected,” (2) the comparative “risk” of an “erroneous deprivation” of that interest with and without “additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in not providing “additional or substitute procedural requirement[s].” Ibid.
The “private interest that will be affected” argues strongly for the right to counsel here. That interest consists of an indigent defendant’s loss of personal liberty through imprisonment. Freedom “from bodily restraint” lies “at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U. S. 71 . Thus, accurate decisionmaking as to the “ability to pay”—which marks a dividing line between civil and criminal contempt, Hicks, supra , at 635, n. 7—must be assured because an incorrect decision can result in a wrongful incarceration. And because ability to comply divides civil and criminal contempt proceedings, an erroneous determination would also deprive a defendant of the procedural protections a criminal proceeding would demand. Questions about ability to pay are likely to arise frequently in child custody cases. On the other hand, due process does not always require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration is threatened. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 . To determine whether a right to counsel is required here, opposing interests and the probable value of “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” must be taken into account. Mathews, supra , at 335.
Doing so reveals three related considerations that, taken together, argue strongly against requiring counsel in every proceeding of the present kind. First, the likely critical question in these cases is the defendant’s ability to pay, which is often closely related to his indigence and relatively straightforward. Second, sometimes, as here, the person opposing the defendant at the hearing is not the government represented by counsel but the custodial parent un represented by counsel. A requirement that the State provide counsel to the noncustodial parent in these cases could create an asymmetry of representation that would “alter significantly the nature of the proceeding,” Gagnon, supra , at 787, creating a degree of formality or delay that would unduly slow payment to those immediately in need and make the proceedings less fair overall. Third, as the Federal Government points out, an available set of “substitute procedural safeguards,” Mathews, supra , at 335, if employed together, can significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty. These include (1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information from him; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for him to respond to statements and questions about his financial status; and (4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay.
This decision does not address civil contempt proceedings where the underlying support payment is owed to the State, e.g., for reimbursement of welfare funds paid to the custodial parent, or the question what due process requires in an unusually complex case where a defendant “can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate,” Gagnon, supra , at 788. Pp. 10–16.
3. Under the circumstances, Turner’s incarceration violated due process because he received neither counsel nor the benefit of alternative procedures like those the Court describes. He did not have clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical question in his civil contempt proceeding. No one provided him with a form (or the equivalent) designed to elicit information about his financial circumstances. And the trial court did not find that he was able to pay his arrearage, but nonetheless found him in civil contempt and ordered him incarcerated. P. 16.
387 S. C. 142, 691 S. E. 2d 470, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, and in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, JJ., joined as to Parts I–B and II.
What Kinds of Emotional Issues will my Adopted Child Face during Adolescence?
What Kinds of Emotional Issues will my Adopted Child Face during Adolescence?:
It's easy to claim that an adopted child is "just like any other child," but adopted children and adoptive parents know that's not necessarily true – especially when an adopted child reaches adolescence. On top of the usual slate of "typical" teen and adolescent issues surrounding a child's passage to adulthood, children adopted in infancy or as a very young child are also very likely to experience their own unique set of emotional struggles – and in turn, adoptive parents are likely to encounter their own questions about how best to support and guide their adopted child through such a challenging time.
Most research suggests that children adopted during infancy may not begin to question or "probe" their familial identity and their "natural" roots until the onset of adolescence – the time when children begin to explore, challenge and question their identity, beliefs and values. In other words, the physical and emotional conditions of adolescence tend to serve as a natural trigger for deeper emotional issues related to adoption.
Feelings of grief, loss, abandonment, rejection and even guilt or shame may characterize your teen's attitude towards the fact that he/she is adopted, even if he/she previously seemed well-adjusted and "fine" with being adopted. If your teen begins to express these types of feelings – or if his/her behavior seems to indicate issues more serious than "typical teen" behavior (suicidal tendencies, significant withdrawal from family and peer groups, loss of interest in favorite activities or drastic change in social group or academic performance, for example) – it's important to understand that this may be a sign that deeper emotional concerns over adoption may be surfacing in your teen.
In addition to seeking post-adoption support in the form of professional counseling, family therapy and even camps or schools equipped to properly support teens dealing with behavioral and emotional issues associated with adoption, it's also important to understand where your adopted teen's feelings may be coming from. Grief, for instance, is a fundamental part of the adoption process, and while it may take years for your adopted child to recognize or fully deal with his/her grief, it's only natural that while he/she may enjoy a great deal of happiness as part of your family, he/she has also "lost" his/her own natural parents and family.
Your adopted teen may also experience a sense of loss in addition to grief over his/her natural family – especially as he/she begins to examine questions of identity in an effort to define "who he/she is." Again, while you may have tended to view adoption as a positive, joyous event, it's important to appreciate the fact that for all your teen's gratitude, he/she may also feel that he/she has "lost" his "natural identity," and as a result, he/she may even begin to express a never-before-articulated desire to find a birth parent or parents.
It's also normal for your teen to feel angry or to feel that he/she was rejected or abandoned by his/her birth parent as a result of being adopted. As a parent, you may understand or sympathize with the birth parent's decision to allow the adoption of your child, but as an adolescent, your child may need some time – and open, positive support from you – to come to terms with his/her adoption in a way that is healthy and constructive. As a part of this process, it may help you to understand that teens who were formerly very open about their adoption may suddenly seem ashamed or guilty about the fact that their birth parents decided to "give them up." Again, maintaining an open, positive and communicative relationship with your teen during this stage of his/her adolescence is crucial: most adoption research suggests that the more supportive and open adoptive parents are about the issues their adopted child or teen faces, the more successful the adopted teen will be at successfully and constructively working through these concerns.
It's easy to claim that an adopted child is "just like any other child," but adopted children and adoptive parents know that's not necessarily true – especially when an adopted child reaches adolescence. On top of the usual slate of "typical" teen and adolescent issues surrounding a child's passage to adulthood, children adopted in infancy or as a very young child are also very likely to experience their own unique set of emotional struggles – and in turn, adoptive parents are likely to encounter their own questions about how best to support and guide their adopted child through such a challenging time.
Most research suggests that children adopted during infancy may not begin to question or "probe" their familial identity and their "natural" roots until the onset of adolescence – the time when children begin to explore, challenge and question their identity, beliefs and values. In other words, the physical and emotional conditions of adolescence tend to serve as a natural trigger for deeper emotional issues related to adoption.
Feelings of grief, loss, abandonment, rejection and even guilt or shame may characterize your teen's attitude towards the fact that he/she is adopted, even if he/she previously seemed well-adjusted and "fine" with being adopted. If your teen begins to express these types of feelings – or if his/her behavior seems to indicate issues more serious than "typical teen" behavior (suicidal tendencies, significant withdrawal from family and peer groups, loss of interest in favorite activities or drastic change in social group or academic performance, for example) – it's important to understand that this may be a sign that deeper emotional concerns over adoption may be surfacing in your teen.
In addition to seeking post-adoption support in the form of professional counseling, family therapy and even camps or schools equipped to properly support teens dealing with behavioral and emotional issues associated with adoption, it's also important to understand where your adopted teen's feelings may be coming from. Grief, for instance, is a fundamental part of the adoption process, and while it may take years for your adopted child to recognize or fully deal with his/her grief, it's only natural that while he/she may enjoy a great deal of happiness as part of your family, he/she has also "lost" his/her own natural parents and family.
Your adopted teen may also experience a sense of loss in addition to grief over his/her natural family – especially as he/she begins to examine questions of identity in an effort to define "who he/she is." Again, while you may have tended to view adoption as a positive, joyous event, it's important to appreciate the fact that for all your teen's gratitude, he/she may also feel that he/she has "lost" his "natural identity," and as a result, he/she may even begin to express a never-before-articulated desire to find a birth parent or parents.
It's also normal for your teen to feel angry or to feel that he/she was rejected or abandoned by his/her birth parent as a result of being adopted. As a parent, you may understand or sympathize with the birth parent's decision to allow the adoption of your child, but as an adolescent, your child may need some time – and open, positive support from you – to come to terms with his/her adoption in a way that is healthy and constructive. As a part of this process, it may help you to understand that teens who were formerly very open about their adoption may suddenly seem ashamed or guilty about the fact that their birth parents decided to "give them up." Again, maintaining an open, positive and communicative relationship with your teen during this stage of his/her adolescence is crucial: most adoption research suggests that the more supportive and open adoptive parents are about the issues their adopted child or teen faces, the more successful the adopted teen will be at successfully and constructively working through these concerns.
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