Man Pleads Guilty to Killing Pregnant Woman Refusing Abortion | LifeNews.com
A Washington state man has pleaded guilty to charges of murder in the death of 28-year-old Jennifer “J” Morgan and 13-month-old Ema Morgan after Jennifer refused his request to get an abortion.
Thomas Hicks, 31, was charged after he was apprehended following the discovery of the bodies by Morgan’s mother and in cooperation with other relatives who aided them in locating Hicks.
Hicks was diagnosed as depressed and suicidal for some time after having lost his job and that the condition worsened when he learned Morgan was pregnant. Legal papers the Seattle Times obtained say Hicks wanted Morgan to have an abortion and claimed she “was just trying to trap him with the pregnancy.” They say Hicks made several threats about killing Morgan and himself.
Now, KOMO News reports Hicks was in court today and pleaded guilt to aggravated murder and he told the judge he understands he will spend the rest of his live in prison without the possibility of parole. Because of the mental health issues, prosecutors for King County decided against pursuing the death penalty. The sentencing will take place on February 18.
The documents indicate that Hicks was upset after the birth of the baby because he was disappointed Ema was a girl and not a boy.
The papers also say he “became very jealous and suspicious of Jennifer,” and questioned whether he was in fact the baby’s biological father.
Morgan, the newspaper indicated, had planned to tell Hicks last week while her mother was at work that he needed to move out of their home. When Morgan’s mother returned home late that evening, she was glad to see Hicks’ truck gone and assume he had left.
She assumed Morgan and Ema were sleeping and, when she went downstairs the next morning, she discovered they had been shot and killed.
Hicks left a note apologizing and the police paperwork indicated Hick’s father shot and killed his mother when he was young.
Although Morgan did not have an abortion, incidents of mothers facing pressure and coercion to have an abortion by their husband or boyfriend are commonplace. Surveys of women who have had abortions indicate as many as 60 percent have said they faced pressure from a partner, family, or employer.
Cases involving the death of or injury to women who refuse to have abortions are frequent and Congress and more than two dozen states have passed laws offering protecting and justice for women and their unborn children victimized by such crimes. The laws make it so criminals are held accountable for two crimes instead of one because there are two victims — mother and unborn child — instead of just one.
in Washington state, the killing of an “unborn quick child” is manslaughter, according to a 1999 law.
Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
HSLDA | Mississippi Moves to Protect Children
HSLDA | Mississippi Moves to Protect Children
On January 17, 2011, Mississippi State Representative Andy Gipson introduced legislation intended to protect children and their parents during social services investigations. House Bill 985 would require that social workers be trained in their legal duties to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of children and families from the initial time of contact in an investigation through any intervention with the family.
This Mississippi bill is an effort to comply with the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) which requires states to adopt and implement measures protecting families during social services investigations. Specifically, states must adopt provisions and procedures to (1) require child protective services personnel at the initial time of contact to advise individuals subject to a child abuse and neglect investigation of the complaint or allegation made against them and (2) require child protective services workers to be trained in their duty to protect the statutory and constitutional rights of those they are investigating. The Mississippi legislature previously complied with the first of these two requirements by passing a bill during its 2007 session.
Why is CAPTA important to homeschooling families? Home educators are not the only families who encounter threatening investigations by social workers. But the fact that parents have chosen this educational option for their children places these families in a suspect class in the mind of many social workers. More often than not, when HSLDA families are being investigated, some aspect of homeschooling is part of the case. And the danger to the family is that the vast majority of social workers have no knowledge of the limits placed on them by the United States Constitution, particularly the search and seizure protections in the Fourth Amendment. Most social workers wrongly believe that they are not subject to the same constitutional limitations as police officers, including those related to the interview and removal of children.
In all, 23 states have complied with federal law to some extent by enacting one or both of the CAPTA protections. With the legislatures in all 50 states having sessions during 2011, this provides an opportunity for states with partial or no compliance to enact this important safeguard for families. To this end, HSLDA stands ready to assist in any way we can in getting a bill introduced and passed this year. If you are interested in spearheading this effort in your state, we encourage you to contact the HSLDA legal assistant for your state.
On January 17, 2011, Mississippi State Representative Andy Gipson introduced legislation intended to protect children and their parents during social services investigations. House Bill 985 would require that social workers be trained in their legal duties to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of children and families from the initial time of contact in an investigation through any intervention with the family.
This Mississippi bill is an effort to comply with the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) which requires states to adopt and implement measures protecting families during social services investigations. Specifically, states must adopt provisions and procedures to (1) require child protective services personnel at the initial time of contact to advise individuals subject to a child abuse and neglect investigation of the complaint or allegation made against them and (2) require child protective services workers to be trained in their duty to protect the statutory and constitutional rights of those they are investigating. The Mississippi legislature previously complied with the first of these two requirements by passing a bill during its 2007 session.
Why is CAPTA important to homeschooling families? Home educators are not the only families who encounter threatening investigations by social workers. But the fact that parents have chosen this educational option for their children places these families in a suspect class in the mind of many social workers. More often than not, when HSLDA families are being investigated, some aspect of homeschooling is part of the case. And the danger to the family is that the vast majority of social workers have no knowledge of the limits placed on them by the United States Constitution, particularly the search and seizure protections in the Fourth Amendment. Most social workers wrongly believe that they are not subject to the same constitutional limitations as police officers, including those related to the interview and removal of children.
In all, 23 states have complied with federal law to some extent by enacting one or both of the CAPTA protections. With the legislatures in all 50 states having sessions during 2011, this provides an opportunity for states with partial or no compliance to enact this important safeguard for families. To this end, HSLDA stands ready to assist in any way we can in getting a bill introduced and passed this year. If you are interested in spearheading this effort in your state, we encourage you to contact the HSLDA legal assistant for your state.
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Foster care proponents back mental health bill of rights
Foster care proponents back mental health bill of rights | Local News | PE.com | Southern California News | News for Inland Southern California
SACRAMENTO - Former foster children from Inland Southern California rallied at the Capitol on Monday to urge support for legislation meant to improve mental health treatment in the state's foster care system.
"They just observe them and ... they say, 'You're ADHD,' " said Mirian Lara, 18, of Riverside, referring to attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.
Lara and several young adults from the Inland area were among about 200 former foster children who came to Sacramento as part of the annual California Youth Connection conference. The group advocates for improving conditions for the 75,000 children and teen-agers in foster care in the state.
The organization's latest effort is to pass recently introduced legislation that would create a Foster Youth Mental Health Bill of Rights.
Under the bill, foster youth would get the right to interview therapists, to be presented with a range of treatment options, and to be able to refuse medical treatment unless a judge orders it.
Foster children have to cope with the dissolution of their families. In addition, many have been the victims of abuse, neglect or other mistreatment.
SACRAMENTO - Former foster children from Inland Southern California rallied at the Capitol on Monday to urge support for legislation meant to improve mental health treatment in the state's foster care system.
"They just observe them and ... they say, 'You're ADHD,' " said Mirian Lara, 18, of Riverside, referring to attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.
Lara and several young adults from the Inland area were among about 200 former foster children who came to Sacramento as part of the annual California Youth Connection conference. The group advocates for improving conditions for the 75,000 children and teen-agers in foster care in the state.
The organization's latest effort is to pass recently introduced legislation that would create a Foster Youth Mental Health Bill of Rights.
Under the bill, foster youth would get the right to interview therapists, to be presented with a range of treatment options, and to be able to refuse medical treatment unless a judge orders it.
Foster children have to cope with the dissolution of their families. In addition, many have been the victims of abuse, neglect or other mistreatment.
New York Child Welfare Found To Be Poorly Managed
New York Child Welfare Found To Be Poorly Managed
Independent Democratic Conference: Examining Spending at the Office of Children and Family Services, New York
Independent Democratic Conference: Examining Spending at the Office of Children and Family Services, New York
"FRAUD UPON THE COURT" AND "DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES"
"FRAUD UPON THE COURT" AND "DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
"Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court.
It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
Under Illinois and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").
That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law.
If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.
However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
"Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court.
It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
Under Illinois and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").
That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law.
If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.
However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.
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