In Re James N. holds that delinquent acts cannot be the basis of a CHINS petition : New Hampshire Family Law Blog
Posted on October 21, 2008 by Kysa Crusco
The problem in this case is the child SHOULD HAVE been provided services under a Chins as he was suffering from ongoing hallucinations and had already been determined to be mentally disabled/mentally ill by the Social Security Administration. NH DHHS collected his SS money but failed to provide him with services!!!He was denied services under a Chin's and was instead called a Juvenile Delinquent, STILL NOT given any services, Still mentally ill AND his illness progressed further.
In Re James N. holds that delinquent acts cannot be the basis of a CHINS petition
The New Hampshire Supreme Court released In Re James N. on October 8, 2008 holding that the basis of a CHINS petition under the Child in Need of Services statute cannot be founded upon a delinquent act.
In 2007, the Mother filed a CHINS petition involving her 6 year old son James, who at the time was in DCYF’s custody. Mother alleged that he was a child in need of services for failing to obey the reasonable commands of his parent, guardian or custodian pursuant to RSA 169-D:2, II(b). The specific acts alleged in the petition were: threatening others with physical harm, threatening to set fire to a residence, harming his foster family’s dog, attempting to strangle his foster brother, head butting, biting, and placing glass “sharps” in others’ clothing.
At the hearing, James, joined by DCYF, moved to dismiss arguing that the alleged underlying facts are delinquent acts and may not be included in a CHINS petition. The court granted James’ motion finding that the petition failed because the acts alleged were delinquent acts.
The mother then filed four delinquency petitions alleging cruelty to animals, simple assault, and reckless conduct. James moved to dismiss arguing that a six-year old is presumed not to be competent to stand trial in delinquency proceedings and is presumed not to be capable of committing a crime due to his tender age. The court agreed with James and found that he could not consult with his attorney or have a rational understanding of the proceeding. Therefore, it would be a violation of his due process rights to make him stand trial.
The mother appeals to the NH Supreme Court and argues that the allegation of a delinquent act should not be fatal to a CHINS petition if the child cannot form the required mens rea (guilty mind). The court disagreed, and stated that the plain language of the statute does not allow delinquent acts to be included in a CHINS petition. Further, under the Mother’s interpretation the child would have to prove his guilt with respect to the act in order to show the act should be excluded from the petition. This would be an absurd result and the legislature would not pass an act leading to an absurdity. Additionally, the court points out that the definition of a child in need of services supports their interpretation because the definition does not overlap with the definition of a delinquent.
Crusco Law Office Law Clerk Marisa L. Ulloa contributed to this post.
TAGS: CHINS, In Re James N, Juvenile Law, New Hampshire Supreme Court, RSA 169-B, RSA 169-D, delinquent child
Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
No. 2007-693. - IN RE: JAMES N. - NH Supreme Court
No. 2007-693. - IN RE: JAMES N. - NH Supreme Court
IN RE: JAMES N.
IN RE: JAMES N.
No. 2007-693.
-- October 08, 2008
Paula J. Werme, of Boscawen, by brief, for the petitioner.Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Rosemary Wiant, attorney, on the memorandum of law), for the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families.Stephanie Hausman, assistant appellate defender, on the memorandum of law, for the juvenile.
The petitioner, the mother of James N., appeals an order of the Brentwood Family Division (LeFrancois, J.) dismissing her child in need of services (CHINS) petition involving James N. See RSA ch. 169-D (2002 & Supp.2007). We affirm.
The following facts are supported by the record. In September 2007, the petitioner filed a CHINS petition involving her then six-year-old son, James N., alleging he was a child in need of services for failing to obey the reasonable commands of his parent, guardian or custodian. See RSA 169-D:2, II(b) (Supp.2007). At this time, James N. was in the custody of the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), and was not living in his mother's home. The specific acts of James N. alleged in the petition consisted of threatening others with physical harm, threatening to set fire to his mother's residence, harming his foster family's dog, attempting to strangle his foster brother with a shoe string, head butting, biting, and placing glass “sharps” (small pieces of glass) in others' clothing.
At a hearing on the petition, the juvenile, joined by DCYF, moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed on its face because it did not specify the times and dates of the alleged offenses, see RSA 169-D:5, II (2002 & Supp.2007), and because the alleged offenses constitute delinquent acts, which by statute may not be included in a CHINS petition, see RSA 169-D:5, IV (2002 & Supp.2007). The court granted the motion, finding that the petition lacked the required specificity. The court added, however, that
[a]ssuming that the Petitioner may be able to provide more particularity as to date and time, the court also finds that the Petition is alleging delinquent acts, which can not be charged in a CHINS petition. Although an argument could be made that a parent or custodian can make a reasonable lawful command not to commit delinquent acts, the lawful command definition of a CHINS petition would swallow up all the delinquency petitions under that reasoning. You need not look any further than the specific prohibition of RSA 169-D:5 (IV) that [“]no acts which qualify as delinquent acts” shall be included in any CHINS petition to reach the conclusion that the “lawful commands” definition of a CHINS is limited to non-delinquent act commands.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed four delinquency petitions involving James N., alleging cruelty to animals, simple assault, and reckless conduct. See RSA ch. 169-B (2002 & Supp.2007). The juvenile again moved to dismiss, arguing that a six-year-old is, or is presumed to be, not competent to stand trial in a delinquency proceeding and is, or is presumed to be, not capable of committing a crime due to his tender age. The court again agreed with the juvenile, finding James N. could not consult with his lawyer or have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him in violation of his due process rights, and dismissed the petitions. In ruling on the delinquency petitions, the court recognized its previous dismissal of the CHINS petition based upon that petition's allegation of delinquent acts, but noted:
It does not follow, however, that because of the dismissal of CHINS Petitions alleging delinquency acts that six year old James must be subject to the delinquency statute for the same or similar acts alleged in the dismissed CHINS petitions. It may be that the delinquency and CHINS statutes together do not cover all issues for all children that may need help or services.
The petitioner appealed both the CHINS and delinquency petitions' dismissal; however, only the appeal from the CHINS dismissal is now before us.
As an initial matter, James N. argues that the petitioner's appeal is not properly before us, asserting that the CHINS statute does not authorize a direct appeal to this court. RSA 169-D:20 (2002) provides, in pertinent part: “An appeal, under this chapter, may be taken to the superior court ․ within 30 days of the final dispositional order.” We have previously determined that, in providing for appeals from “the final dispositional order” under this statute, “the legislature was referring to the order issued after the final dispositional hearing”; that is, the hearing held following the initial adjudicatory hearing and CHINS finding. In re Cindy G., 124 N.H. 51, 58, 466 A.2d 943 (1983). Further, we have held in a similar context construing similar statutory language that a dismissal after an adjudicatory hearing, but before a hearing on final disposition, is not a final dispositional order for purposes of appeal. See In re Jessica J., 130 N.H. 625, 627, 546 A.2d 1056 (1988) (issuance of “final dispositional order” is predicated upon adjudicatory finding of abuse or neglect) (decided under prior version of RSA 169-C:28). Because this matter was dismissed at a preliminary stage and not following a final dispositional hearing, the pending appeal is not an appeal from a “final dispositional order,” and, therefore, the petitioner was not required to first appeal to the superior court. We, therefore, treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, and conclude it is properly before us.
James N. raises several other alleged procedural defects that he argues should preclude our consideration of the petitioner's appeal. We disagree. James N. asserts that the question briefed by the petitioner is not the same as that raised in her notice of appeal, contrary to our court rules. However, we conclude that the question briefed by the petitioner is a subsidiary question to that posed in her notice of appeal, and is properly before us. See Sup.Ct. R. 16(3)(b). Although the notice of appeal asks whether failing to obey the reasonable commands of a parent under RSA 169-D:2, II(b) may be considered a delinquent act, the question also contains reference to the child's questionable legal competence to commit the alleged acts in connection with the CHINS petition. We believe this is sufficient to satisfy Rule 16(3)(b) in this case. The remaining procedural issues have not been adequately briefed, and we therefore decline to address them. See State v. Crie, 154 N.H. 403, 411, 913 A.2d 767 (2006).
We now turn to the petitioner's appeal, which requires that we interpret RSA 169-D:5, IV. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the legislature's intent regarding the meaning of a statute considered as a whole. Nenni v. Comm'r, N.H. Ins. Dep't, 156 N.H. 578, 581, 938 A.2d 116 (2007). We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent, and we refuse to consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id.
RSA 169-D:5, IV provides, “No acts which qualify as delinquent acts as described in RSA 169-B:2, IV shall be included in any petition filed under this chapter.” RSA 169-B:2, IV (2002 & Supp.2007) defines “delinquent” as “a person who has committed an offense before reaching the age of 17 years which would be a felony or misdemeanor under the criminal code of this state if committed by an adult, and is expressly found to be in need of counselling, supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation as a consequence thereof.” Thus, if a petition alleges an act which would qualify as a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult, the petition has included a delinquent act contrary to the plain language of the statute.
The petitioner argues that the allegation of a delinquent act should not be fatal to a CHINS petition if the child is incapable of forming the required mens rea for the alleged act. We disagree. RSA 169-D:5, IV states that no acts which qualify as delinquent acts as described in RSA 169-B:2, IV shall be included in a CHINS petition. Neither statute contains any reference to a mens rea requirement. We will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. See Nenni, 156 N.H. at 581, 938 A.2d 116. Furthermore, we have stated that competency to commit the acts alleged in the petition is not of jurisdictional magnitude in a CHINS proceeding. See In re Juvenile 2005-212, 154 N.H. 763, 767, 917 A.2d 703 (2007). Thus, the district court may decide, on the face of the petition, if the petition alleges a delinquent act.
Taking the petitioner's interpretation to its logical conclusion, RSA 169-D:5, IV would allow delinquent acts, as described in RSA 169-B:2, IV, to be included in a CHINS petition. The plain language of the statute does not allow this interpretation. Furthermore, under the petitioner's interpretation, the child would essentially be required to prove his guilt with respect to the alleged delinquent act in order to show the act should be excluded from the petition pursuant to RSA 169-B:5, IV. This interpretation would lead to an absurd result. See State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 568, 794 A.2d 790 (2002) (we do not presume legislature would pass an act leading to an absurd result).
The definition of a “child in need of services” supports our interpretation. RSA 169-D:2, II(c) (Supp.2007). A “child in need of services” is defined, in pertinent part, as a child who is under the age of eighteen and who is expressly found to be “[a] child who has exhibited willful repeated or habitual conduct constituting offenses which would be violations under the criminal code of this state if committed by an adult.” Id. Other parts of the definition include a child who is habitually truant from school or runs away from home. RSA 169-D:2, II(a), (b). This definition, taken together with RSA 169-D:5, IV, demonstrates a clear intent by the legislature to restrict the availability of a CHINS petition to those acts that do not rise to the level of felony or misdemeanor acts.
We have stated that the definitions of “delinquent” and “child in need of services” do not overlap. In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 262, 414 A.2d 934 (1980). However, there is no indication in the statutory scheme that exclusion from either the delinquency or CHINS statute necessitates inclusion by the other. As the district court aptly noted, “It may be that the delinquency and CHINS statutes together do not cover all issues for all children that may need help or services.” This may be such a case. If the legislature did not intend this result, it is free to amend the statutes as it sees fit. See In the Matter of LaRue & Bedard, 156 N.H. 378, 381, 934 A.2d 577 (2007).
To the extent the petitioner challenges the decision of the family division with respect to the delinquency petition, and the validity of the infancy defense in such a proceeding, we decline to address these arguments, as they are not the proper subject of this appeal.
Affirmed.
BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred.
IN RE: JAMES N.
IN RE: JAMES N.
No. 2007-693.
-- October 08, 2008
Paula J. Werme, of Boscawen, by brief, for the petitioner.Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Rosemary Wiant, attorney, on the memorandum of law), for the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families.Stephanie Hausman, assistant appellate defender, on the memorandum of law, for the juvenile.
The petitioner, the mother of James N., appeals an order of the Brentwood Family Division (LeFrancois, J.) dismissing her child in need of services (CHINS) petition involving James N. See RSA ch. 169-D (2002 & Supp.2007). We affirm.
The following facts are supported by the record. In September 2007, the petitioner filed a CHINS petition involving her then six-year-old son, James N., alleging he was a child in need of services for failing to obey the reasonable commands of his parent, guardian or custodian. See RSA 169-D:2, II(b) (Supp.2007). At this time, James N. was in the custody of the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), and was not living in his mother's home. The specific acts of James N. alleged in the petition consisted of threatening others with physical harm, threatening to set fire to his mother's residence, harming his foster family's dog, attempting to strangle his foster brother with a shoe string, head butting, biting, and placing glass “sharps” (small pieces of glass) in others' clothing.
At a hearing on the petition, the juvenile, joined by DCYF, moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed on its face because it did not specify the times and dates of the alleged offenses, see RSA 169-D:5, II (2002 & Supp.2007), and because the alleged offenses constitute delinquent acts, which by statute may not be included in a CHINS petition, see RSA 169-D:5, IV (2002 & Supp.2007). The court granted the motion, finding that the petition lacked the required specificity. The court added, however, that
[a]ssuming that the Petitioner may be able to provide more particularity as to date and time, the court also finds that the Petition is alleging delinquent acts, which can not be charged in a CHINS petition. Although an argument could be made that a parent or custodian can make a reasonable lawful command not to commit delinquent acts, the lawful command definition of a CHINS petition would swallow up all the delinquency petitions under that reasoning. You need not look any further than the specific prohibition of RSA 169-D:5 (IV) that [“]no acts which qualify as delinquent acts” shall be included in any CHINS petition to reach the conclusion that the “lawful commands” definition of a CHINS is limited to non-delinquent act commands.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed four delinquency petitions involving James N., alleging cruelty to animals, simple assault, and reckless conduct. See RSA ch. 169-B (2002 & Supp.2007). The juvenile again moved to dismiss, arguing that a six-year-old is, or is presumed to be, not competent to stand trial in a delinquency proceeding and is, or is presumed to be, not capable of committing a crime due to his tender age. The court again agreed with the juvenile, finding James N. could not consult with his lawyer or have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him in violation of his due process rights, and dismissed the petitions. In ruling on the delinquency petitions, the court recognized its previous dismissal of the CHINS petition based upon that petition's allegation of delinquent acts, but noted:
It does not follow, however, that because of the dismissal of CHINS Petitions alleging delinquency acts that six year old James must be subject to the delinquency statute for the same or similar acts alleged in the dismissed CHINS petitions. It may be that the delinquency and CHINS statutes together do not cover all issues for all children that may need help or services.
The petitioner appealed both the CHINS and delinquency petitions' dismissal; however, only the appeal from the CHINS dismissal is now before us.
As an initial matter, James N. argues that the petitioner's appeal is not properly before us, asserting that the CHINS statute does not authorize a direct appeal to this court. RSA 169-D:20 (2002) provides, in pertinent part: “An appeal, under this chapter, may be taken to the superior court ․ within 30 days of the final dispositional order.” We have previously determined that, in providing for appeals from “the final dispositional order” under this statute, “the legislature was referring to the order issued after the final dispositional hearing”; that is, the hearing held following the initial adjudicatory hearing and CHINS finding. In re Cindy G., 124 N.H. 51, 58, 466 A.2d 943 (1983). Further, we have held in a similar context construing similar statutory language that a dismissal after an adjudicatory hearing, but before a hearing on final disposition, is not a final dispositional order for purposes of appeal. See In re Jessica J., 130 N.H. 625, 627, 546 A.2d 1056 (1988) (issuance of “final dispositional order” is predicated upon adjudicatory finding of abuse or neglect) (decided under prior version of RSA 169-C:28). Because this matter was dismissed at a preliminary stage and not following a final dispositional hearing, the pending appeal is not an appeal from a “final dispositional order,” and, therefore, the petitioner was not required to first appeal to the superior court. We, therefore, treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, and conclude it is properly before us.
James N. raises several other alleged procedural defects that he argues should preclude our consideration of the petitioner's appeal. We disagree. James N. asserts that the question briefed by the petitioner is not the same as that raised in her notice of appeal, contrary to our court rules. However, we conclude that the question briefed by the petitioner is a subsidiary question to that posed in her notice of appeal, and is properly before us. See Sup.Ct. R. 16(3)(b). Although the notice of appeal asks whether failing to obey the reasonable commands of a parent under RSA 169-D:2, II(b) may be considered a delinquent act, the question also contains reference to the child's questionable legal competence to commit the alleged acts in connection with the CHINS petition. We believe this is sufficient to satisfy Rule 16(3)(b) in this case. The remaining procedural issues have not been adequately briefed, and we therefore decline to address them. See State v. Crie, 154 N.H. 403, 411, 913 A.2d 767 (2006).
We now turn to the petitioner's appeal, which requires that we interpret RSA 169-D:5, IV. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the legislature's intent regarding the meaning of a statute considered as a whole. Nenni v. Comm'r, N.H. Ins. Dep't, 156 N.H. 578, 581, 938 A.2d 116 (2007). We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent, and we refuse to consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id.
RSA 169-D:5, IV provides, “No acts which qualify as delinquent acts as described in RSA 169-B:2, IV shall be included in any petition filed under this chapter.” RSA 169-B:2, IV (2002 & Supp.2007) defines “delinquent” as “a person who has committed an offense before reaching the age of 17 years which would be a felony or misdemeanor under the criminal code of this state if committed by an adult, and is expressly found to be in need of counselling, supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation as a consequence thereof.” Thus, if a petition alleges an act which would qualify as a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult, the petition has included a delinquent act contrary to the plain language of the statute.
The petitioner argues that the allegation of a delinquent act should not be fatal to a CHINS petition if the child is incapable of forming the required mens rea for the alleged act. We disagree. RSA 169-D:5, IV states that no acts which qualify as delinquent acts as described in RSA 169-B:2, IV shall be included in a CHINS petition. Neither statute contains any reference to a mens rea requirement. We will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. See Nenni, 156 N.H. at 581, 938 A.2d 116. Furthermore, we have stated that competency to commit the acts alleged in the petition is not of jurisdictional magnitude in a CHINS proceeding. See In re Juvenile 2005-212, 154 N.H. 763, 767, 917 A.2d 703 (2007). Thus, the district court may decide, on the face of the petition, if the petition alleges a delinquent act.
Taking the petitioner's interpretation to its logical conclusion, RSA 169-D:5, IV would allow delinquent acts, as described in RSA 169-B:2, IV, to be included in a CHINS petition. The plain language of the statute does not allow this interpretation. Furthermore, under the petitioner's interpretation, the child would essentially be required to prove his guilt with respect to the alleged delinquent act in order to show the act should be excluded from the petition pursuant to RSA 169-B:5, IV. This interpretation would lead to an absurd result. See State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 568, 794 A.2d 790 (2002) (we do not presume legislature would pass an act leading to an absurd result).
The definition of a “child in need of services” supports our interpretation. RSA 169-D:2, II(c) (Supp.2007). A “child in need of services” is defined, in pertinent part, as a child who is under the age of eighteen and who is expressly found to be “[a] child who has exhibited willful repeated or habitual conduct constituting offenses which would be violations under the criminal code of this state if committed by an adult.” Id. Other parts of the definition include a child who is habitually truant from school or runs away from home. RSA 169-D:2, II(a), (b). This definition, taken together with RSA 169-D:5, IV, demonstrates a clear intent by the legislature to restrict the availability of a CHINS petition to those acts that do not rise to the level of felony or misdemeanor acts.
We have stated that the definitions of “delinquent” and “child in need of services” do not overlap. In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 262, 414 A.2d 934 (1980). However, there is no indication in the statutory scheme that exclusion from either the delinquency or CHINS statute necessitates inclusion by the other. As the district court aptly noted, “It may be that the delinquency and CHINS statutes together do not cover all issues for all children that may need help or services.” This may be such a case. If the legislature did not intend this result, it is free to amend the statutes as it sees fit. See In the Matter of LaRue & Bedard, 156 N.H. 378, 381, 934 A.2d 577 (2007).
To the extent the petitioner challenges the decision of the family division with respect to the delinquency petition, and the validity of the infancy defense in such a proceeding, we decline to address these arguments, as they are not the proper subject of this appeal.
Affirmed.
BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred.
15 Famous People With Personality Disorders
Online Degree 15 Famous People With Personality Disorders
At the risk of sounding like the awful US Weekly segment devoted to showing how stars are just like us because they also buy gasoline and eat food (who knew?), famous people are, well, people. They're no better or worse than anyone else, and no less susceptible to things like personality disorders or emotional or mental instability. Unfortunately, problems like that tend to be pretty heavily stigmatized in Hollywood, which drives those who suffer from them to ignore or hide their problems, which only makes them worse. If there's anything to be gleaned from the collective stories of these famous people who've suffered from personality disorders -- some of whom are famous because of those disorders -- it's that it's never too late to get help, and it's always OK to be honest with people about what you're going through.
1.Carrie Fisher: Carrie Fisher has made no secret of her struggles with substance abuse and bipolar disorder. Stephen Fry (who appears later on this list) also suffers from the disease, also known as manic depression, and Fisher appeared on a TV special he did about the disease and its various stigmas and myths. As Fisher said a few years ago, "It is really important to see a doctor, particularly a psychiatrist who specializes in mental illness."
2.Herschel Walker: In his autobiography, former running back Herschel Walker revealed that he suffered from dissociative identity disorder, or what used to be called multiple personality disorder. As a result of the warring personalities, Walker says he doesn't remember the moment or even the season that he won the Heisman Trophy. "I feel the greatest achievement of my life will be to tell the world my truth," he wrote.
3.Howard Hughes: In his prime, Howard Hughes was known for being a pioneer in business, aviation, and filmmaking -- three skill sets that merged when he designed a new cantilevered bra for Jane Russell -- but now he's sadly remembered as a recluse driven to crippling depths by obsessive-compulsive disorder. Yet even his fixation on Russell's physique was a sign of his mind's inability to let things alone. In December 1947, he spent four months in his private screening room, holed up like an animal. He spent most of the end of his life hiding from public view and addicted to various medications.
4.Paula Deen: Paula Deen is known to TV viewers as a cook unafraid to use staggering amounts of butter on everything, but she's also struggled with anxiety disorders. A bout of depression in her early 20s led to an onset of agoraphobia, and she became basically housebound for close to 20 years. She spent most of her time cooking for her family because it allowed her to pursue a skill without having to set foot outside her home. She didn't even know much about her agoraphobia until learning about the disorder on an episode of The Phil Donahue Show, which encouraged her to re-examine things. Her approach worked for her, but most people are better off talking with a professional.
5.Elton John: A persistent but dangerous myth about bulimia nervosa is that it only affects women, or teenage girls. In truth, it can affect people of both genders and all ages. In a 2002 interview with Larry King, Elton John revealed not only that he'd been aware of Princess Diana's struggles with the problem but that he had battled it, too. He eventually found treatment in a Chicago clinic.
6.Brooke Shields: In 2005, Brooke Shields went public with her battles against postpartum depression, which had wrecked her after the birth of her first child in 2003. The depression manifests itself in fatigue, diminished sexual urges, erratic eating patterns, and an inability to stay emotionally balanced. It's a common problem for many women (and occasionally a few men), and Shields' problems were likely complicated by personal stresses including a previous miscarriage and the death of her father shortly before the birth. As many people remember, she was subsequently blasted by Tom Cruise for seeking psychiatric help to overcome the problem.
7.John Nash: John Nash's lifelong struggle with paranoid schizophrenia was ably documented in the 2001 film A Beautiful Mind. Although the man was a mathematical genius who was wooed by the Ivy League and who eventually won a Nobel Prize, he began to believe that a shadowy group of men was chasing him with the intention of starting a new government. Some medications worked better than others, and through sheer perseverance, Nash eventually began to climb out of the mental hole he'd dug.
8.Michael Phelps: Amid the insane number of world records and Olympic gold medals, Michael Phelps is just another guy who's had to deal with a problem that's confronted many other people: attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD. After an inability to concentrate led to the diagnosis when Phelps was in middle school, he worked with his parents and teachers to impose a better structure on his life and learning habits. Coupled with the right medication and dedication, he was able to overcome the issue.
9.Stephen Fry: Stephen Fry's been making fantastic comedy since the early 1980s, but it wasn't until years later that he discussed his struggles with bipolar disorder. His documentary, Stephen Fry: The Secret Life of a Manic Depressive, examined his ups and downs while also interviewing other celebrities who've dealt with the issue. Fry even attempted suicide at one point, but he's been able to push through and take a dryly positive on the affair: "I rely on it to give my life a sense of adventure, and I think most of the good about me has developed as a result of my mood swings."
10.Richard Dreyfuss: Richard Dreyfuss was one of the many who appeared on Fry's documentary, and he spoke about his own battles with bipolar disorder. Before being diagnosed, Dreyfuss would often lose control of his emotions, but work and medication have turned him around. "I reclaimed a career," he says of his ability to not only live with the disease but thrive.
11.Billy Joel: Billy Joel's latter-day battles with alcohol were popular tabloid fodder, but the man had some serious issues with depression when he was younger. Career setbacks in the early 1970s led to an onset so severe that he tried to kill himself by drinking furniture polish. The only thing that saved him was being taken to the hospital by his drummer. He was eventually able to bounce back and resume his musical career.
12.Drew Carey: For all his outward good humor, Drew Carey's dealt with some serious problems in his day. His 1997 autobiography revealed that he was once molested and that he later suffered bouts of depression and even attempted suicide (twice) by swallowing copious amounts of sleeping pills. It was his time in the military in his 20s that helped him discover purpose and direction and helped shape the personality he'd eventually use in his stand-up comedy.
13.Brian Wilson: Beach Boy Brian Wilson's mental health issues aren't news -- there have been songs about them -- but they serve as a reminder to everyone else that the earlier you seek diagnosis and help, the better. His creative worries and despondency deepened when the release of Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band forced him to abandon his band's own Smile, and he spent years locked away in his home. He was later diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, as well as hints of other ailments. Thankfully, he's made improvements, even releasing Smile after decades of getting it just right.
14.Jim Carrey: Extreme moods are no strangers to comedians, and Jim Carrey's no exception. In 2004, he revealed that he's had problems with depression, and took medication for a while before trying a regimen that mixed dietary restrictions with spiritual focus.
15.Mike Wallace: Legendary journalist Mike Wallace was frank about his depression in a recent interview, saying, "There's nothing, repeat, nothing to be ashamed of when you're going through a depression. If you get help, the chances of your licking it are really good. But, you have to get yourself onto a safe path." Wallace sank into depression in the mid-1980s, spurred by a libel lawsuit filed by Gen. Westmoreland about a piece Wallace had done on Vietnam two years earlier. His keys to survival were the same ones for everyone: treatment and support.
At the risk of sounding like the awful US Weekly segment devoted to showing how stars are just like us because they also buy gasoline and eat food (who knew?), famous people are, well, people. They're no better or worse than anyone else, and no less susceptible to things like personality disorders or emotional or mental instability. Unfortunately, problems like that tend to be pretty heavily stigmatized in Hollywood, which drives those who suffer from them to ignore or hide their problems, which only makes them worse. If there's anything to be gleaned from the collective stories of these famous people who've suffered from personality disorders -- some of whom are famous because of those disorders -- it's that it's never too late to get help, and it's always OK to be honest with people about what you're going through.
1.Carrie Fisher: Carrie Fisher has made no secret of her struggles with substance abuse and bipolar disorder. Stephen Fry (who appears later on this list) also suffers from the disease, also known as manic depression, and Fisher appeared on a TV special he did about the disease and its various stigmas and myths. As Fisher said a few years ago, "It is really important to see a doctor, particularly a psychiatrist who specializes in mental illness."
2.Herschel Walker: In his autobiography, former running back Herschel Walker revealed that he suffered from dissociative identity disorder, or what used to be called multiple personality disorder. As a result of the warring personalities, Walker says he doesn't remember the moment or even the season that he won the Heisman Trophy. "I feel the greatest achievement of my life will be to tell the world my truth," he wrote.
3.Howard Hughes: In his prime, Howard Hughes was known for being a pioneer in business, aviation, and filmmaking -- three skill sets that merged when he designed a new cantilevered bra for Jane Russell -- but now he's sadly remembered as a recluse driven to crippling depths by obsessive-compulsive disorder. Yet even his fixation on Russell's physique was a sign of his mind's inability to let things alone. In December 1947, he spent four months in his private screening room, holed up like an animal. He spent most of the end of his life hiding from public view and addicted to various medications.
4.Paula Deen: Paula Deen is known to TV viewers as a cook unafraid to use staggering amounts of butter on everything, but she's also struggled with anxiety disorders. A bout of depression in her early 20s led to an onset of agoraphobia, and she became basically housebound for close to 20 years. She spent most of her time cooking for her family because it allowed her to pursue a skill without having to set foot outside her home. She didn't even know much about her agoraphobia until learning about the disorder on an episode of The Phil Donahue Show, which encouraged her to re-examine things. Her approach worked for her, but most people are better off talking with a professional.
5.Elton John: A persistent but dangerous myth about bulimia nervosa is that it only affects women, or teenage girls. In truth, it can affect people of both genders and all ages. In a 2002 interview with Larry King, Elton John revealed not only that he'd been aware of Princess Diana's struggles with the problem but that he had battled it, too. He eventually found treatment in a Chicago clinic.
6.Brooke Shields: In 2005, Brooke Shields went public with her battles against postpartum depression, which had wrecked her after the birth of her first child in 2003. The depression manifests itself in fatigue, diminished sexual urges, erratic eating patterns, and an inability to stay emotionally balanced. It's a common problem for many women (and occasionally a few men), and Shields' problems were likely complicated by personal stresses including a previous miscarriage and the death of her father shortly before the birth. As many people remember, she was subsequently blasted by Tom Cruise for seeking psychiatric help to overcome the problem.
7.John Nash: John Nash's lifelong struggle with paranoid schizophrenia was ably documented in the 2001 film A Beautiful Mind. Although the man was a mathematical genius who was wooed by the Ivy League and who eventually won a Nobel Prize, he began to believe that a shadowy group of men was chasing him with the intention of starting a new government. Some medications worked better than others, and through sheer perseverance, Nash eventually began to climb out of the mental hole he'd dug.
8.Michael Phelps: Amid the insane number of world records and Olympic gold medals, Michael Phelps is just another guy who's had to deal with a problem that's confronted many other people: attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD. After an inability to concentrate led to the diagnosis when Phelps was in middle school, he worked with his parents and teachers to impose a better structure on his life and learning habits. Coupled with the right medication and dedication, he was able to overcome the issue.
9.Stephen Fry: Stephen Fry's been making fantastic comedy since the early 1980s, but it wasn't until years later that he discussed his struggles with bipolar disorder. His documentary, Stephen Fry: The Secret Life of a Manic Depressive, examined his ups and downs while also interviewing other celebrities who've dealt with the issue. Fry even attempted suicide at one point, but he's been able to push through and take a dryly positive on the affair: "I rely on it to give my life a sense of adventure, and I think most of the good about me has developed as a result of my mood swings."
10.Richard Dreyfuss: Richard Dreyfuss was one of the many who appeared on Fry's documentary, and he spoke about his own battles with bipolar disorder. Before being diagnosed, Dreyfuss would often lose control of his emotions, but work and medication have turned him around. "I reclaimed a career," he says of his ability to not only live with the disease but thrive.
11.Billy Joel: Billy Joel's latter-day battles with alcohol were popular tabloid fodder, but the man had some serious issues with depression when he was younger. Career setbacks in the early 1970s led to an onset so severe that he tried to kill himself by drinking furniture polish. The only thing that saved him was being taken to the hospital by his drummer. He was eventually able to bounce back and resume his musical career.
12.Drew Carey: For all his outward good humor, Drew Carey's dealt with some serious problems in his day. His 1997 autobiography revealed that he was once molested and that he later suffered bouts of depression and even attempted suicide (twice) by swallowing copious amounts of sleeping pills. It was his time in the military in his 20s that helped him discover purpose and direction and helped shape the personality he'd eventually use in his stand-up comedy.
13.Brian Wilson: Beach Boy Brian Wilson's mental health issues aren't news -- there have been songs about them -- but they serve as a reminder to everyone else that the earlier you seek diagnosis and help, the better. His creative worries and despondency deepened when the release of Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band forced him to abandon his band's own Smile, and he spent years locked away in his home. He was later diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, as well as hints of other ailments. Thankfully, he's made improvements, even releasing Smile after decades of getting it just right.
14.Jim Carrey: Extreme moods are no strangers to comedians, and Jim Carrey's no exception. In 2004, he revealed that he's had problems with depression, and took medication for a while before trying a regimen that mixed dietary restrictions with spiritual focus.
15.Mike Wallace: Legendary journalist Mike Wallace was frank about his depression in a recent interview, saying, "There's nothing, repeat, nothing to be ashamed of when you're going through a depression. If you get help, the chances of your licking it are really good. But, you have to get yourself onto a safe path." Wallace sank into depression in the mid-1980s, spurred by a libel lawsuit filed by Gen. Westmoreland about a piece Wallace had done on Vietnam two years earlier. His keys to survival were the same ones for everyone: treatment and support.
Uncovering a Major Aspect of Fraud Perpetrated by Forensic Psychologists in Service of Child Protective Agencies
November 30, 2010
Re: Uncovering a Major Aspect of Fraud Perpetrated by Forensic Psychologists in Service of Child Protective Agencies
Dear Reader,
I have obtained your (or your organization’s) address from a list of lawyers and organizations who defend individuals from Child Protective Services (CPS) aggressive tactics found on the website www.fightcps.com. If you are not aware of having contacted fightcps.com, your information may have been posted this site by a third party. The intention of this letter is to present useful information to help defend your clients against forensic psychologists who use a fraudulent diagnostic practice that has a high probability of being overlooked.
There is much information on the Internet about a high prevalence of forensic psychologists who act as “hired guns” for CPS agencies. Their reports often over-pathologize their test subjects in an extreme manner. This is often done with poorly validated and highly subjective psychometric test instruments.
I have been helping a friend defend herself in what began as a trivial case of neglect of her then 10 year-old child. Like many parents trapped by in Child Protective Services - Family Court system, her only problem was lack of a job and not having a stable place to live. Such a situation is very common and does not even meet the Federal standards for neglect as defined by United States Department of Health and Human Services. This governmental body states that neglect must be intentional, not situational (e.g., unemployment due to the economic climate). Although often mandated to do so, CPS agencies almost never provide meaningful help in such situations. It appears that their intention is to strip away as many children as they can, placing them into foster care and eventual adoptions. This attitude has been promoted by the Adoption and Safe Families Act passed in 1997 (by unanimous vote in the Senate!) that gives social agencies $4,000 for each adoption they carry out. For an excellent short YouTube video on this matter enter the following URL into your browser: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9OoWRPHs24
Without any signs of any serious psychological problems, the social services agency coerced my friend to submit to two different psychological evaluations, each by a different forensic psychologist. While not a subject of this letter, coerced forensic psychological exams employed in this context violate one’s 5th Amendment right to refrain from self-incrimination. This has been supported by case law.
What I would like to discuss, and hopefully this is useful information, is that many forensic psychologists use a known MCMI-III test artifact as a means to harm their test takers. It has been observed that most custody litigants (including single mothers whose child is taken away) test defensively. Answering questions in a positive light is not pathological, it is a means to defend one’s legitimate interests, often in unfounded cases brought on by CPS agencies. I might add that many questions on the MCMI-III are often absurd and/or intimidating, which also promotes defensiveness.
While defensive testing tends to lower most scores, it has the artifactual effect of substantially raising MCMI-III base rate scores in Axis II Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive categories. McCann, et al. in “The MCMI-III in Child Custody Evaluations: A Normative Study” (Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, Vol. 1(2), 2001) did an original investigation on this matter and determined that while most base rate scores were low in custody litigants, scores above 75 (Millon’s original cutoff for pathology) were found in the 39% of custody litigants in the Histrionic category; 22% in the Narcissistic category; and 36% in the Compulsive category. These scores tended to be higher in women than men, presenting an added problem for single mothers. Custody litigants had a much higher incidence of pathological scores than the general population (between 1% and 3%) even though the actual incident rates are similar. The easiest way to obtain a (free) copy of this manuscript is access it through Dr. James R. Flens’ website www.drjamesrflens.com under the Publications link.
Without going into too much detail here, McCann et al., instead of discussing the serious implications of a test artifact that results in substantially elevated psychopathology scores, did everything in their manuscript to “white wash” the study’s conclusions. Reading the manuscripts discussion section was extremely disconcerting. Instead of warning forensic psychologists to be cognizant of this bias and deal with it accordingly, the authors essentially concluded that the MCMI-III demonstrated no biases with respecting over-pathologizing evaluees. The authors went as far as to say that high Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Compulsive scores can be seen to represent favorable personality characteristics. This is incredulous! The conclusion imparted to forensic psychologists reading the article was essentially “Not to worry”. What a lost opportunity!
The topic of high MCMI-III base rate scores resulting from an artifact due to defensive test taking has been broached in a number of forensic psychology textbooks. I have done a brief survey of forensic textbooks and have found that this topic is covered briefly in most books (see below for some listings) and that it was not “white washed” in the same way that McCann, et al. did. However, these books did not mention any practical solutions. For a most definitive and clearly described study, please look up a Power Point presentation by Lenny and Dear posted on the Internet (LENNY_Paul1.ppt). This presentation includes some easy-to-interpret graphs that seriously indict the validity of the MCMI-III for custody litigants and single mothers caught in the system. Out of respect for copyright rules, I have not attached this presentation. However, I have included an abstract written in 2009 by Lenny and Dear entitled: “Faking Good on the MCMI-III: Implications for Child Custody Evaluations” as an attachment to my email. This abstract nicely summarizes the problem.
Getting back to my friend’s involvement with forensic evaluations and its severe implications. Both of her forensic psychologist evaluators mentioned that my friend tested defensively (determined by a high base rate score in Desirability) and reported elevations in her Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive scores. No other elevations were reported. Their forensic reports used these artificial elevations to launch scathing tirades against her by invoking of all the negative personality characteristics associated with Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive personality disorders. My friend does not possess any of the listed personality characteristics, but one of her evaluators incredulously claimed in his report that her behavior was characterized by “dramatic and repeated emotional outbursts” in various settings because of her high score in the Histrionic category. All of the negative personality characteristics mentioned in the forensic reports were manufactured by invoking the artifactually high base rate scores and working backwards. This amounts to scientific fraud.
It is interesting to note that Histrionic and Obsessive personalities show opposing characteristics of exuberance versus rigid suppression, so it is unlikely that a person would be suffering from both.
Pearson Assessments, vendor of the MCMI-III and other psychometric tests is also highly complicit in this mischief. First: Pearson Assessments has arbitrarily reduced Millon’s cutoff for pathology from base rate scores of 75 to 65; Second they have no correction mechanism for the artifactually high Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive scores; and Third: Their computer generated Interpretations, used by 79% of forensic psychologists, are extremely pathologizing. I found a sample evaluation by Pearson Assessments on their website and found the scathing psychological description of the test evaluee to be horrifying. Psych Screen, Inc., another company also interprets MCMI-III evaluations, gave a sample Interpretative report for an 11 year-old child (www.psychscreen.com/singletest/sam_mcmi.html), that was even more disconcerting than the Pearson Assessments sample report. It made the child to appear a monster. I would love to see some savvy attorney(s) delve into this matter and institute a lawsuit against Pearson Assessments or any other companies that provide highly unfair, biased reports that ultimately help Child Protective Services execute their unfounded cases.
My friend lost custody of her son, largely due to the highly negative psychological reports. Before losing custody, the reports’ content and recommendations were employed by CPS to stop all phone calls with her son (for more than a year) and severely limit visitation rights.
I believe that the forensic psychologist is a vulnerable part of the run-amok child removal system. I hope that the information I have provided in this letter can help you in future cases defending against over-prosecution by CPS agencies. I also hope that it might be possible for you to appeal previous lost cases in which elevations in Histrionic, Narcissistic, and/or Obsessive scores were reported. Such fraud may be considered blatant enough to enable lawyers to win lawsuits against forensic expert witnesses even thought the courts historically have protected such witnesses. Forensic experts are given immunity to protect against frivolous attacks against their testimony. I don’t believe that this immunity could stand in cases of outright and substantive fraud.
I believe that if it is found that such fraud has been used historically on a large scale or even to a lesser degree, that this will present as a major vulnerability in Child Protective Services agencies that we have all been waiting for. I believe, for example, that the MCMI-III test artifact has been used frequently in the past by the two forensic psychologists who falsely indicted my friend. Uncovering and publicizing a scandal of this magnitude could be the beginning of the end of CPS and Family Courts hegemony over innocent parents and their children.
Here is a partial listing of books that contain relevant information of the MCMI-III test artifact:
“New Directions in Interpreting the Millon Clinical Multiaxial: Inventory-III”, Robert J. Craig, pp. 122-123, 2005.
“The Scientific Basis of Child Custody Decisions”, Robert M. Galatzer-Levy, Louis Kraus, Jeanne Galatzer-Levy, p. 114, 2005
“Clinician's Guide to Child Custody Evaluations”, Marc J. Ackerman, pp. 153-154, 2006.
Sincerely,
Gerald M. Rubin, Ph.D.
PO Box 110721
Aurora, CO 80042
geraldmrubin@aol.com
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=12d9da58611336ac&mt=application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document&url=http://mail.google.com/mail/?ui%3D2%26ik%3D47167b6cfa%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12d9da58611336ac%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbQi5YfYBxJ_Ta3Uo89-0mnrNlG0ug&pli=1
Re: Uncovering a Major Aspect of Fraud Perpetrated by Forensic Psychologists in Service of Child Protective Agencies
Dear Reader,
I have obtained your (or your organization’s) address from a list of lawyers and organizations who defend individuals from Child Protective Services (CPS) aggressive tactics found on the website www.fightcps.com. If you are not aware of having contacted fightcps.com, your information may have been posted this site by a third party. The intention of this letter is to present useful information to help defend your clients against forensic psychologists who use a fraudulent diagnostic practice that has a high probability of being overlooked.
There is much information on the Internet about a high prevalence of forensic psychologists who act as “hired guns” for CPS agencies. Their reports often over-pathologize their test subjects in an extreme manner. This is often done with poorly validated and highly subjective psychometric test instruments.
I have been helping a friend defend herself in what began as a trivial case of neglect of her then 10 year-old child. Like many parents trapped by in Child Protective Services - Family Court system, her only problem was lack of a job and not having a stable place to live. Such a situation is very common and does not even meet the Federal standards for neglect as defined by United States Department of Health and Human Services. This governmental body states that neglect must be intentional, not situational (e.g., unemployment due to the economic climate). Although often mandated to do so, CPS agencies almost never provide meaningful help in such situations. It appears that their intention is to strip away as many children as they can, placing them into foster care and eventual adoptions. This attitude has been promoted by the Adoption and Safe Families Act passed in 1997 (by unanimous vote in the Senate!) that gives social agencies $4,000 for each adoption they carry out. For an excellent short YouTube video on this matter enter the following URL into your browser: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9OoWRPHs24
Without any signs of any serious psychological problems, the social services agency coerced my friend to submit to two different psychological evaluations, each by a different forensic psychologist. While not a subject of this letter, coerced forensic psychological exams employed in this context violate one’s 5th Amendment right to refrain from self-incrimination. This has been supported by case law.
What I would like to discuss, and hopefully this is useful information, is that many forensic psychologists use a known MCMI-III test artifact as a means to harm their test takers. It has been observed that most custody litigants (including single mothers whose child is taken away) test defensively. Answering questions in a positive light is not pathological, it is a means to defend one’s legitimate interests, often in unfounded cases brought on by CPS agencies. I might add that many questions on the MCMI-III are often absurd and/or intimidating, which also promotes defensiveness.
While defensive testing tends to lower most scores, it has the artifactual effect of substantially raising MCMI-III base rate scores in Axis II Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive categories. McCann, et al. in “The MCMI-III in Child Custody Evaluations: A Normative Study” (Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, Vol. 1(2), 2001) did an original investigation on this matter and determined that while most base rate scores were low in custody litigants, scores above 75 (Millon’s original cutoff for pathology) were found in the 39% of custody litigants in the Histrionic category; 22% in the Narcissistic category; and 36% in the Compulsive category. These scores tended to be higher in women than men, presenting an added problem for single mothers. Custody litigants had a much higher incidence of pathological scores than the general population (between 1% and 3%) even though the actual incident rates are similar. The easiest way to obtain a (free) copy of this manuscript is access it through Dr. James R. Flens’ website www.drjamesrflens.com under the Publications link.
Without going into too much detail here, McCann et al., instead of discussing the serious implications of a test artifact that results in substantially elevated psychopathology scores, did everything in their manuscript to “white wash” the study’s conclusions. Reading the manuscripts discussion section was extremely disconcerting. Instead of warning forensic psychologists to be cognizant of this bias and deal with it accordingly, the authors essentially concluded that the MCMI-III demonstrated no biases with respecting over-pathologizing evaluees. The authors went as far as to say that high Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Compulsive scores can be seen to represent favorable personality characteristics. This is incredulous! The conclusion imparted to forensic psychologists reading the article was essentially “Not to worry”. What a lost opportunity!
The topic of high MCMI-III base rate scores resulting from an artifact due to defensive test taking has been broached in a number of forensic psychology textbooks. I have done a brief survey of forensic textbooks and have found that this topic is covered briefly in most books (see below for some listings) and that it was not “white washed” in the same way that McCann, et al. did. However, these books did not mention any practical solutions. For a most definitive and clearly described study, please look up a Power Point presentation by Lenny and Dear posted on the Internet (LENNY_Paul1.ppt). This presentation includes some easy-to-interpret graphs that seriously indict the validity of the MCMI-III for custody litigants and single mothers caught in the system. Out of respect for copyright rules, I have not attached this presentation. However, I have included an abstract written in 2009 by Lenny and Dear entitled: “Faking Good on the MCMI-III: Implications for Child Custody Evaluations” as an attachment to my email. This abstract nicely summarizes the problem.
Getting back to my friend’s involvement with forensic evaluations and its severe implications. Both of her forensic psychologist evaluators mentioned that my friend tested defensively (determined by a high base rate score in Desirability) and reported elevations in her Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive scores. No other elevations were reported. Their forensic reports used these artificial elevations to launch scathing tirades against her by invoking of all the negative personality characteristics associated with Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive personality disorders. My friend does not possess any of the listed personality characteristics, but one of her evaluators incredulously claimed in his report that her behavior was characterized by “dramatic and repeated emotional outbursts” in various settings because of her high score in the Histrionic category. All of the negative personality characteristics mentioned in the forensic reports were manufactured by invoking the artifactually high base rate scores and working backwards. This amounts to scientific fraud.
It is interesting to note that Histrionic and Obsessive personalities show opposing characteristics of exuberance versus rigid suppression, so it is unlikely that a person would be suffering from both.
Pearson Assessments, vendor of the MCMI-III and other psychometric tests is also highly complicit in this mischief. First: Pearson Assessments has arbitrarily reduced Millon’s cutoff for pathology from base rate scores of 75 to 65; Second they have no correction mechanism for the artifactually high Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive scores; and Third: Their computer generated Interpretations, used by 79% of forensic psychologists, are extremely pathologizing. I found a sample evaluation by Pearson Assessments on their website and found the scathing psychological description of the test evaluee to be horrifying. Psych Screen, Inc., another company also interprets MCMI-III evaluations, gave a sample Interpretative report for an 11 year-old child (www.psychscreen.com/singletest/sam_mcmi.html), that was even more disconcerting than the Pearson Assessments sample report. It made the child to appear a monster. I would love to see some savvy attorney(s) delve into this matter and institute a lawsuit against Pearson Assessments or any other companies that provide highly unfair, biased reports that ultimately help Child Protective Services execute their unfounded cases.
My friend lost custody of her son, largely due to the highly negative psychological reports. Before losing custody, the reports’ content and recommendations were employed by CPS to stop all phone calls with her son (for more than a year) and severely limit visitation rights.
I believe that the forensic psychologist is a vulnerable part of the run-amok child removal system. I hope that the information I have provided in this letter can help you in future cases defending against over-prosecution by CPS agencies. I also hope that it might be possible for you to appeal previous lost cases in which elevations in Histrionic, Narcissistic, and/or Obsessive scores were reported. Such fraud may be considered blatant enough to enable lawyers to win lawsuits against forensic expert witnesses even thought the courts historically have protected such witnesses. Forensic experts are given immunity to protect against frivolous attacks against their testimony. I don’t believe that this immunity could stand in cases of outright and substantive fraud.
I believe that if it is found that such fraud has been used historically on a large scale or even to a lesser degree, that this will present as a major vulnerability in Child Protective Services agencies that we have all been waiting for. I believe, for example, that the MCMI-III test artifact has been used frequently in the past by the two forensic psychologists who falsely indicted my friend. Uncovering and publicizing a scandal of this magnitude could be the beginning of the end of CPS and Family Courts hegemony over innocent parents and their children.
Here is a partial listing of books that contain relevant information of the MCMI-III test artifact:
“New Directions in Interpreting the Millon Clinical Multiaxial: Inventory-III”, Robert J. Craig, pp. 122-123, 2005.
“The Scientific Basis of Child Custody Decisions”, Robert M. Galatzer-Levy, Louis Kraus, Jeanne Galatzer-Levy, p. 114, 2005
“Clinician's Guide to Child Custody Evaluations”, Marc J. Ackerman, pp. 153-154, 2006.
Sincerely,
Gerald M. Rubin, Ph.D.
PO Box 110721
Aurora, CO 80042
geraldmrubin@aol.com
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=12d9da58611336ac&mt=application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document&url=http://mail.google.com/mail/?ui%3D2%26ik%3D47167b6cfa%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12d9da58611336ac%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbQi5YfYBxJ_Ta3Uo89-0mnrNlG0ug&pli=1
Reminder "NH": Initial Appeal/Void/Jury Demand Civil Suit & Amendment as needed for Interested Parties 1/20/11 Nashua Superior Court South 9 AM
The Truth Bites "NH": Initial Appeal/Void/Jury Demand Civil Suit & Amendment as needed for Interested Parties
Reminder "NH": Initial Appeal/Void/Jury Demand Civil Suit & Amendment as needed for Interested Parties 1/20/11 Nashua Superior Court South 9 AM
Reminder "NH": Initial Appeal/Void/Jury Demand Civil Suit & Amendment as needed for Interested Parties 1/20/11 Nashua Superior Court South 9 AM
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
The Truth Bites "NH": New Information no surprises Federal Government again finds NH DCYF not in COMPLIANCE
The Truth Bites "NH": New Information no surprises Federal Government again finds NH DCYF not in COMPLIANCE
Thank you Denise for your submission of the Federal Audit which further explains the audit recently released by NH DHHS, and submitted by Unhappygrammy.
Denise's research relays that when looking at the numbers released by DHHS NH found at:
http://childwelfare.net/cfsreview/hhs_docs/statereports/NH/Statewideassessment2ndRoundCFSR.pdf, it is important to go to the Federal Site found at: http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/cwmd/docs/cb_web/Record?w=NATIVE%28%27DT+ph+is+%27%27CFSR+Final+Report%27%27+and+STATE+%3D+%27%27New+Hampshire%27%27+and+RPERIOD+%3D+%27%271st++Round+CFSR%27%27%2C%27%272nd++Round+CFSR%27%27+and+DOC_AVAILABILITY+%5E%3D+%27%27Not+publicly+available+on+the+Children%27%27%27%27s+Bureau+website%27%27%27%29&m=2
to understand the % factors. To be an effective agency the federal guidelines state they must be within 95% compliance in all areas. While the Federal Report centers on 3 main areas of NH. The state report gives accurate numbers to each of the 12 offices of DCYF another factor these figures is that the cases are pulled randomly.
Thank you Denise for your submission of the Federal Audit which further explains the audit recently released by NH DHHS, and submitted by Unhappygrammy.
Denise's research relays that when looking at the numbers released by DHHS NH found at:
http://childwelfare.net/cfsreview/hhs_docs/statereports/NH/Statewideassessment2ndRoundCFSR.pdf, it is important to go to the Federal Site found at: http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/cwmd/docs/cb_web/Record?w=NATIVE%28%27DT+ph+is+%27%27CFSR+Final+Report%27%27+and+STATE+%3D+%27%27New+Hampshire%27%27+and+RPERIOD+%3D+%27%271st++Round+CFSR%27%27%2C%27%272nd++Round+CFSR%27%27+and+DOC_AVAILABILITY+%5E%3D+%27%27Not+publicly+available+on+the+Children%27%27%27%27s+Bureau+website%27%27%27%29&m=2
to understand the % factors. To be an effective agency the federal guidelines state they must be within 95% compliance in all areas. While the Federal Report centers on 3 main areas of NH. The state report gives accurate numbers to each of the 12 offices of DCYF another factor these figures is that the cases are pulled randomly.
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