Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Saturday, May 15, 2010
Teacher arrested & Fired For Beating Student in FOSTER HELLHOLE
Jamie's House RTC, Residential Treatment Center, became Michelle's Center ..the school retained the name of Jamie's House Charter School. Foster children who live at Michelle's Center (or whatever name they may have now) attend Jamies House Charter School. IF Sue Jones is horrifed, she needs to view videos of what is going on in her school. She is mortified that a STUDENT recorded what the schools video cameras have shown for years. Davis Jones, unless he woke up there yesterday, KNOWS this type of abuse is commonplace. I wonder how many kids get hauled off for defending themselves, caught only in the swing. Instant violation of probation and here comes TYC. There is nothing funny about what has been happening in this charter school, without anyone who has the power to make the teachers stop beating up foster children who attend Jamies House Charter school. I hope the media is relentless in this investigation.
Kidnapping
Kidnapping
The crime of unlawfully seizing and carrying away a person by force or Fraud, or seizing and detaining a person against his or her will with an intent to carry that person away at a later time.
The law of kidnapping is difficult to define with precision because it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Most state and federal kidnapping statutes define the term kidnapping vaguely, and courts fill in the details.
Generally, kidnapping occurs when a person, without lawful authority, physically asports (i.e., moves) another person without that other person's consent, with the intent to use the abduction in connection with some other nefarious objective. Under the Model Penal Code (a set of exemplary criminal ruleFs fashioned by the American Law Institute), kidnapping occurs when any person is unlawfully and non-consensually asported and held for certain purposes. These purposes include gaining a ransom or reward; facilitating the commission of a felony or a flight after the commission of a felony; terrorizing or inflicting bodily injury on the victim or a third person; and interfering with a governmental or political function (Model Penal Code § 212.1).
Kidnapping laws in the United States derive from the Common Law of kidnapping that was developed by courts in England. Originally, the crime of kidnapping was defined as the unlawful and non-consensual transportation of a person from one country to another. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states began to redefine kidnapping, most notably eliminating the requirement of interstate transport.
At the federal level, Congress passed the Lindbergh Act in 1932 to prohibit interstate kidnapping (48 Stat. 781 [codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201 et seq.]). The Lindbergh Act was named for Charles A. Lindbergh, a celebrated aviator and Air Force colonel whose baby was kidnapped and killed in 1932. The act provides that if a victim is not released within 24 hours after being abducted, a court may presume that the victim was transported across state lines. This presumption may be rebutted with evidence to the contrary. Other federal kidnapping statutes prohibit kidnapping in U.S. territories, kidnapping on the high seas and in the air, and kidnapping of government officials (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201 et seq., 1751 et seq.).
A person who is convicted of kidnapping is usually sentenced to prison for a certain number of years. In some states, and at the federal level, the term of imprisonment may be the remainder of the offender's natural life. In jurisdictions that authorize the death penalty, a kidnapper is charged with a capital offense if the kidnapping results in death. Kidnapping is so severely punished because it is a dreaded offense. It usually occurs in connection with another criminal offense, or underlying crime. It involves violent deprivation of liberty, and it requires a special criminal boldness. Furthermore, the act of moving a crime victim exposes the victim to risks above and beyond those that are inherent in the underlying crime.
Most kidnapping statutes recognize different types and levels of kidnapping and assign punishment accordingly. New York State, for example, bases its definition of first-degree kidnapping on the purpose and length of the abduction. First-degree kidnapping occurs when a person abducts another person to obtain ransom (N.Y. Penal Code § 135.25 [McKinney 1996]). First-degree kidnapping also occurs when the abduction lasts for more than 12 hours and the abductor intends to injure the victim; to accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; to terrorize the victim or a third person; or to interfere with a governmental or political function. An abduction that results in death is also first-degree kidnapping. A first-degree kidnapping in New York State is a class A-1 felony, which carries a sentence of at least 20 years in prison (§ 70.00).
New York State also has a second-degree kidnapping statute. A person is guilty of second-degree kidnapping if he or she abducts another person (§ 135.20). This crime lacks the aggravating circumstances in first-degree kidnapping, and it is ranked as a class B felony. A person who is convicted of a class B felony in New York State can be sentenced to one to eight years in prison (§ 70.00).
Two key elements are common to all charges of kidnapping. First, the asportation ordetention must be unlawful. Under various state and federal statutes, not all seizures and asportations constitute kidnapping: Police officers may arrest and jail a person they suspect of a crime, and parents are allowed to reasonably restrict and control the movement of their children.
Second, some aggravating circumstance must accompany the restraint or asportation. This can be a demand for money; a demand for anything of value; an attempt to affect a function of government; an attempt to inflict injury on the abductee; an attempt to terrorize a third party; or an attempt to commit a felony.
In most states, kidnapping statutes specify that any unlawful detention or physical movement of a child, other than that performed by a parent or guardian, constitutes kidnapping. An abduction of a child thus need not be accompanied by some other circumstance, such as Extortionor physical injury, to qualify for the highest level of kidnapping charge. In the absence of an aggravating circumstance, an unlawful, non-consensual restraint or movement is usually charged as something less than the highest degree or level of kidnapping.
Many states have enacted special laws for Carjacking, a specialized form of kidnapping. Generally, carjacking occurs when one person forces a driver out of the driver's seat and steals the vehicle. Carjacking is a felony whether the aggressor keeps the victim in the car or forces the victim from the car. In California, a carjacking statute is contained within the penal code's chapter on kidnapping, and it carries a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Cal. Penal Code § 209.5 [West]).
Kidnapping laws are similar to laws on unlawful or felonious restraint, parental kidnapping, and False Imprisonment. These crimes cover the range of unlawful-movement and unlawful-restraint cases. Felonious or unlawful restraint, also known as simple kidnapping, is the unlawful restraint of a person that exposes the victim to physical harm or places the victim in Slavery. It is a lesser form of kidnapping because it does not require restraint for a specified period or specific purpose (such as to secure money or commit a felony). False imprisonment is a relatively inoffensive, harmless restraint of another person. It is usually a misdemeanor, punishable by no more than a year in jail. Parental kidnapping is the abduction of a child by a parent. The law on parental kidnapping varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction: Some jurisdictions define it as a felony, others as a misdemeanor. Many states consider parental kidnapping to be less offensive than classic kidnapping because of the strong bond between parents and children.
The chief judicial concern with the charge of kidnapping is Double Jeopardy, which is multiple punishment for the same offense. It is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Kidnapping often is an act that facilitates another offense, such as rape,Robbery, or assault. Rape, robbery, and assault often involve the act of moving a person against his or her will, which is the gravamen (i.e., the significant element) of a kidnapping charge. Thus, a persistent problem with kidnapping prosecutions is in determining whether a kidnapping conviction would constitute a second punishment for the same act.
Legislatures have passed statutes, and courts have fashioned rules, to prevent and detect double jeopardy in kidnapping cases. Generally, these laws and rules hold that for kidnapping to be charged as a separate crime, some factor must set the asportation apart from a companion crime. Most courts will sustain multiple convictions if the asportation exposes the victim to increased risk of harm or results in harm to the victim separate from that caused by the companion offense. In other jurisdictions, the test is whether the asportation involves a change of environment or is designed to conceal a companion offense.
In most states, an asportation of a few feet may constitute the separate offense of kidnapping; in other states, distance is not a factor. In New York State, for example, the focus of the kidnapping statute is not distance, but purpose. Thus, an asportation of 27 city blocks might not constitute kidnapping if it is merely incidental to a companion crime (People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 204 N.E.2d 842 [N.Y. 1965]). Likewise, an asportation from the borough of Manhattan to the borough of Queens might not constitute kidnapping if it plays no significant role in the commission of another crime (People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519, 229 N.E.2d 206 [Ct. App. 1967]).
Some states have eliminated the asportation element from their kidnapping statutes. In Ohio, for example, kidnapping is defined in part as restraining the liberty of another person (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.01 [Baldwin 1996]). This creates an increased risk of double jeopardy in kidnapping convictions because, by definition, every robbery, rape, or assault would constitute kidnapping. However, the Ohio state legislature has enacted a statute that prohibits multiple convictions for the same conduct unless the defendant exhibits a separate animus (i.e., a separate intent) to commit a separate crime (§ 2941.25). Whether the prosecution proves a separate animus to kidnap is a Question of Factbased on the circumstances surrounding the crime.
In State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St. 2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345, 14 Ohio Op. 3d 373 (1979), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the defendant could not be convicted of both rape and kidnapping when he had moved the victim a mere few feet and had released the victim immediately after the rape. Under the facts of the case, the asportation had no significance apart from the rape offense. According to the court, the defendant had displayed no animus beyond that necessary to commit rape, so punishment for both rape and kidnapping was not warranted.
In contrast, in State v. Wagner, 191 Wis. 2d 322, 528 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1995), the appeals court upheld a separate conviction for kidnapping. In Wagner, the defendant approached two women on two separate occasions in a laundromat. Both times, the defendant tried to force the women into a bathroom to rape them. He was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree sexual assault, one count of kidnapping while armed, and one count of attempted kidnapping while armed. On appeal, he argued that he should not have been convicted of kidnapping because, under section 940.31(1)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes, kidnapping is defined in part as the carrying of a person "from one place to another," and he had not taken his victims to another place. The court disagreed, holding that forced movement from one room to another falls within the meaning of the kidnapping statute. Ultimately, the appeals court affirmed the defendant's sentence of 72 years in prison.
The kidnapping of children has presented a particularly emotional issue for lawmakers. In 1984, in response to the kidnapping and murder of his child Adam, John Walsh founded the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC serves as a resource in providing assistance to parents, children, law enforcement, schools, and the community in recovering missing children and raising public awareness about ways to help prevent child abduction.
In 1996, the kidnapping and murder of Amber Hagerman in Texas inspired the Dallas/Fort Worth Association of Radio Managers and local law enforcement agencies in north Texas to create the nation's first "AMBER Alert" plan. AMBER, in addition to being Amber Hagerman's first name, also serves as an acronym for America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response. "Amber Alert" plans allow the development of an early warning system to help find abducted children by broadcasting information over radio and television to the public as quickly as possible. This information includes descriptions and pictures of the missing child, the suspected abductor, a suspected vehicle, and any other information available and valuable to identifying the child and suspect.
From its beginnings in Texas, the AMBER Alert system spread until, by 2002, 55 versions had been adopted at local, regional, and statewide levels. Eighteen states had adopted the plan by 2002, urged on by the NCMEC, which adopted the AMBER Alert as one of its top priorities. As a result, many people were convinced that the late 1990s and new millennium saw a sharp decline in child kidnappings, which were well publicized, thanks to AMBER Alerts. In fact, the FBI reported that child abductions had actually declined from the 1980s, from an average between 200 and 300 per year to only 93 in 2000.
The AMBER Alerts were considered so successful—credited with recovering 30 children—that Congress passed a national AMBER Alert bill as part of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. Under this bill, the attorney general, in cooperation with the secretary of transportation and the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), appoints a National AMBER Alert Coordinator to oversee the communication network. The AMBER Alert Coordinator at the Justice Department works with states, broadcasters, and law enforcement agencies to set up AMBER plans, to serve as a point of contact to supplement existing AMBER plans, and to facilitate appropriate regional coordination of AMBER Alerts. Grants were provided to help set up effective AMBER Alert programs at the state and local levels.
The crime of unlawfully seizing and carrying away a person by force or Fraud, or seizing and detaining a person against his or her will with an intent to carry that person away at a later time.
The law of kidnapping is difficult to define with precision because it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Most state and federal kidnapping statutes define the term kidnapping vaguely, and courts fill in the details.
Generally, kidnapping occurs when a person, without lawful authority, physically asports (i.e., moves) another person without that other person's consent, with the intent to use the abduction in connection with some other nefarious objective. Under the Model Penal Code (a set of exemplary criminal ruleFs fashioned by the American Law Institute), kidnapping occurs when any person is unlawfully and non-consensually asported and held for certain purposes. These purposes include gaining a ransom or reward; facilitating the commission of a felony or a flight after the commission of a felony; terrorizing or inflicting bodily injury on the victim or a third person; and interfering with a governmental or political function (Model Penal Code § 212.1).
Kidnapping laws in the United States derive from the Common Law of kidnapping that was developed by courts in England. Originally, the crime of kidnapping was defined as the unlawful and non-consensual transportation of a person from one country to another. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states began to redefine kidnapping, most notably eliminating the requirement of interstate transport.
At the federal level, Congress passed the Lindbergh Act in 1932 to prohibit interstate kidnapping (48 Stat. 781 [codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201 et seq.]). The Lindbergh Act was named for Charles A. Lindbergh, a celebrated aviator and Air Force colonel whose baby was kidnapped and killed in 1932. The act provides that if a victim is not released within 24 hours after being abducted, a court may presume that the victim was transported across state lines. This presumption may be rebutted with evidence to the contrary. Other federal kidnapping statutes prohibit kidnapping in U.S. territories, kidnapping on the high seas and in the air, and kidnapping of government officials (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201 et seq., 1751 et seq.).
A person who is convicted of kidnapping is usually sentenced to prison for a certain number of years. In some states, and at the federal level, the term of imprisonment may be the remainder of the offender's natural life. In jurisdictions that authorize the death penalty, a kidnapper is charged with a capital offense if the kidnapping results in death. Kidnapping is so severely punished because it is a dreaded offense. It usually occurs in connection with another criminal offense, or underlying crime. It involves violent deprivation of liberty, and it requires a special criminal boldness. Furthermore, the act of moving a crime victim exposes the victim to risks above and beyond those that are inherent in the underlying crime.
Most kidnapping statutes recognize different types and levels of kidnapping and assign punishment accordingly. New York State, for example, bases its definition of first-degree kidnapping on the purpose and length of the abduction. First-degree kidnapping occurs when a person abducts another person to obtain ransom (N.Y. Penal Code § 135.25 [McKinney 1996]). First-degree kidnapping also occurs when the abduction lasts for more than 12 hours and the abductor intends to injure the victim; to accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; to terrorize the victim or a third person; or to interfere with a governmental or political function. An abduction that results in death is also first-degree kidnapping. A first-degree kidnapping in New York State is a class A-1 felony, which carries a sentence of at least 20 years in prison (§ 70.00).
New York State also has a second-degree kidnapping statute. A person is guilty of second-degree kidnapping if he or she abducts another person (§ 135.20). This crime lacks the aggravating circumstances in first-degree kidnapping, and it is ranked as a class B felony. A person who is convicted of a class B felony in New York State can be sentenced to one to eight years in prison (§ 70.00).
Two key elements are common to all charges of kidnapping. First, the asportation ordetention must be unlawful. Under various state and federal statutes, not all seizures and asportations constitute kidnapping: Police officers may arrest and jail a person they suspect of a crime, and parents are allowed to reasonably restrict and control the movement of their children.
Second, some aggravating circumstance must accompany the restraint or asportation. This can be a demand for money; a demand for anything of value; an attempt to affect a function of government; an attempt to inflict injury on the abductee; an attempt to terrorize a third party; or an attempt to commit a felony.
In most states, kidnapping statutes specify that any unlawful detention or physical movement of a child, other than that performed by a parent or guardian, constitutes kidnapping. An abduction of a child thus need not be accompanied by some other circumstance, such as Extortionor physical injury, to qualify for the highest level of kidnapping charge. In the absence of an aggravating circumstance, an unlawful, non-consensual restraint or movement is usually charged as something less than the highest degree or level of kidnapping.
Many states have enacted special laws for Carjacking, a specialized form of kidnapping. Generally, carjacking occurs when one person forces a driver out of the driver's seat and steals the vehicle. Carjacking is a felony whether the aggressor keeps the victim in the car or forces the victim from the car. In California, a carjacking statute is contained within the penal code's chapter on kidnapping, and it carries a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Cal. Penal Code § 209.5 [West]).
Kidnapping laws are similar to laws on unlawful or felonious restraint, parental kidnapping, and False Imprisonment. These crimes cover the range of unlawful-movement and unlawful-restraint cases. Felonious or unlawful restraint, also known as simple kidnapping, is the unlawful restraint of a person that exposes the victim to physical harm or places the victim in Slavery. It is a lesser form of kidnapping because it does not require restraint for a specified period or specific purpose (such as to secure money or commit a felony). False imprisonment is a relatively inoffensive, harmless restraint of another person. It is usually a misdemeanor, punishable by no more than a year in jail. Parental kidnapping is the abduction of a child by a parent. The law on parental kidnapping varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction: Some jurisdictions define it as a felony, others as a misdemeanor. Many states consider parental kidnapping to be less offensive than classic kidnapping because of the strong bond between parents and children.
The chief judicial concern with the charge of kidnapping is Double Jeopardy, which is multiple punishment for the same offense. It is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Kidnapping often is an act that facilitates another offense, such as rape,Robbery, or assault. Rape, robbery, and assault often involve the act of moving a person against his or her will, which is the gravamen (i.e., the significant element) of a kidnapping charge. Thus, a persistent problem with kidnapping prosecutions is in determining whether a kidnapping conviction would constitute a second punishment for the same act.
Legislatures have passed statutes, and courts have fashioned rules, to prevent and detect double jeopardy in kidnapping cases. Generally, these laws and rules hold that for kidnapping to be charged as a separate crime, some factor must set the asportation apart from a companion crime. Most courts will sustain multiple convictions if the asportation exposes the victim to increased risk of harm or results in harm to the victim separate from that caused by the companion offense. In other jurisdictions, the test is whether the asportation involves a change of environment or is designed to conceal a companion offense.
In most states, an asportation of a few feet may constitute the separate offense of kidnapping; in other states, distance is not a factor. In New York State, for example, the focus of the kidnapping statute is not distance, but purpose. Thus, an asportation of 27 city blocks might not constitute kidnapping if it is merely incidental to a companion crime (People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 204 N.E.2d 842 [N.Y. 1965]). Likewise, an asportation from the borough of Manhattan to the borough of Queens might not constitute kidnapping if it plays no significant role in the commission of another crime (People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519, 229 N.E.2d 206 [Ct. App. 1967]).
Some states have eliminated the asportation element from their kidnapping statutes. In Ohio, for example, kidnapping is defined in part as restraining the liberty of another person (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.01 [Baldwin 1996]). This creates an increased risk of double jeopardy in kidnapping convictions because, by definition, every robbery, rape, or assault would constitute kidnapping. However, the Ohio state legislature has enacted a statute that prohibits multiple convictions for the same conduct unless the defendant exhibits a separate animus (i.e., a separate intent) to commit a separate crime (§ 2941.25). Whether the prosecution proves a separate animus to kidnap is a Question of Factbased on the circumstances surrounding the crime.
In State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St. 2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345, 14 Ohio Op. 3d 373 (1979), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the defendant could not be convicted of both rape and kidnapping when he had moved the victim a mere few feet and had released the victim immediately after the rape. Under the facts of the case, the asportation had no significance apart from the rape offense. According to the court, the defendant had displayed no animus beyond that necessary to commit rape, so punishment for both rape and kidnapping was not warranted.
In contrast, in State v. Wagner, 191 Wis. 2d 322, 528 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1995), the appeals court upheld a separate conviction for kidnapping. In Wagner, the defendant approached two women on two separate occasions in a laundromat. Both times, the defendant tried to force the women into a bathroom to rape them. He was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree sexual assault, one count of kidnapping while armed, and one count of attempted kidnapping while armed. On appeal, he argued that he should not have been convicted of kidnapping because, under section 940.31(1)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes, kidnapping is defined in part as the carrying of a person "from one place to another," and he had not taken his victims to another place. The court disagreed, holding that forced movement from one room to another falls within the meaning of the kidnapping statute. Ultimately, the appeals court affirmed the defendant's sentence of 72 years in prison.
The kidnapping of children has presented a particularly emotional issue for lawmakers. In 1984, in response to the kidnapping and murder of his child Adam, John Walsh founded the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC serves as a resource in providing assistance to parents, children, law enforcement, schools, and the community in recovering missing children and raising public awareness about ways to help prevent child abduction.
In 1996, the kidnapping and murder of Amber Hagerman in Texas inspired the Dallas/Fort Worth Association of Radio Managers and local law enforcement agencies in north Texas to create the nation's first "AMBER Alert" plan. AMBER, in addition to being Amber Hagerman's first name, also serves as an acronym for America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response. "Amber Alert" plans allow the development of an early warning system to help find abducted children by broadcasting information over radio and television to the public as quickly as possible. This information includes descriptions and pictures of the missing child, the suspected abductor, a suspected vehicle, and any other information available and valuable to identifying the child and suspect.
From its beginnings in Texas, the AMBER Alert system spread until, by 2002, 55 versions had been adopted at local, regional, and statewide levels. Eighteen states had adopted the plan by 2002, urged on by the NCMEC, which adopted the AMBER Alert as one of its top priorities. As a result, many people were convinced that the late 1990s and new millennium saw a sharp decline in child kidnappings, which were well publicized, thanks to AMBER Alerts. In fact, the FBI reported that child abductions had actually declined from the 1980s, from an average between 200 and 300 per year to only 93 in 2000.
The AMBER Alerts were considered so successful—credited with recovering 30 children—that Congress passed a national AMBER Alert bill as part of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. Under this bill, the attorney general, in cooperation with the secretary of transportation and the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), appoints a National AMBER Alert Coordinator to oversee the communication network. The AMBER Alert Coordinator at the Justice Department works with states, broadcasters, and law enforcement agencies to set up AMBER plans, to serve as a point of contact to supplement existing AMBER plans, and to facilitate appropriate regional coordination of AMBER Alerts. Grants were provided to help set up effective AMBER Alert programs at the state and local levels.
Friday, May 14, 2010
Program would pay relatives to foster children
Program would pay relatives to foster children
By: News 8 Austin Staff
Foster care was up for discussion Thursday at a public hearing before the state's House Human Services Committee.
Lawmakers said they were pleased by a Child Protective Services program to place children with relatives.
Starting Sept. 1, the new program will pay relatives to care for youths. The federally-backed program will also require the foster parents to be licensed.
Changes in foster care
Click here to view our interactive timeline of the changes of CPS and foster care. Also you can see videos of those who've made it through the system and see their take on it all.
http://news8austin.com/content/top_stories/271035/program-would-pay-relatives-to-foster-children
In the back of everyone's mind was the projected $18-billion hole in the state budget.
"The easiest thing to do when you have a big budget deficit or shortfall is trim, cut or slash health and human services programs,” Rep. Elliott Naishtat said. “Child Protective Services could fall under that. In which case, low income kids would be hurt again. I hope it doesn't happen, but we're all concerned about that."
Earlier this week, House Speaker Joe Straus said lawmakers would not raise taxes and directed budget writers to get creative about finding cuts.
In January the state paid more to house foster children than the budget allowed.
By: News 8 Austin Staff
Foster care was up for discussion Thursday at a public hearing before the state's House Human Services Committee.
Lawmakers said they were pleased by a Child Protective Services program to place children with relatives.
Starting Sept. 1, the new program will pay relatives to care for youths. The federally-backed program will also require the foster parents to be licensed.
Changes in foster care
Click here to view our interactive timeline of the changes of CPS and foster care. Also you can see videos of those who've made it through the system and see their take on it all.
http://news8austin.com/content/top_stories/271035/program-would-pay-relatives-to-foster-children
In the back of everyone's mind was the projected $18-billion hole in the state budget.
"The easiest thing to do when you have a big budget deficit or shortfall is trim, cut or slash health and human services programs,” Rep. Elliott Naishtat said. “Child Protective Services could fall under that. In which case, low income kids would be hurt again. I hope it doesn't happen, but we're all concerned about that."
Earlier this week, House Speaker Joe Straus said lawmakers would not raise taxes and directed budget writers to get creative about finding cuts.
In January the state paid more to house foster children than the budget allowed.
Foster Care Quality Linked to Hyperactive Youths' Progress
Foster Care Quality Linked to Hyperactive Youths' Progress
Study finds number of foster care moves also affects behavior of children with ADHD
Publish date: Feb 1, 2010
MONDAY, Feb. 1 (HealthDay News) -- The degrees of parental warmth and hostility, as well as the number of foster-care moves, affect the progression of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity among children placed in foster care, according to a study published online Feb. 1 in Pediatrics.
L. Oriana Linares, Ph.D., of the New York University Langone Medical Center in New York City, and colleagues conducted a study of 252 maltreated children placed with 95 families. They gathered data from biological parents, foster parents and classroom teachers regarding parental warmth and hostility and the stability of placement, as well as the progress of symptoms of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
The odds of higher inattention were greater among children who experienced less warmth and more hostility from their parents, the researchers found. These two factors were also associated with higher hyperactivity, as were a higher average number of moves and discharge from care, the investigators note.
"The results of this study advance the current knowledge of family variables that affect the course of inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity symptoms in foster care," the authors write. "These data offer an emerging clinical picture of risk for symptom types under the unique caregiving conditions of foster placement. The identification of parental quality and placement stability as malleable factors points to intervention goals for promoting child psychological well-being in the foster care system."
Abstract
Full Text (subscription or payment may be required)
Copyright © 2010 HealthDay. All rights reserved.
http://www.modernmedicine.com/modernmedicine/Modern+Medicine+Now/Foster-Care-Quality-Linked-to-Hyperactive-Youths-P/ArticleNewsFeed/Article/detail/654709?contextCategoryId=40165
Study finds number of foster care moves also affects behavior of children with ADHD
Publish date: Feb 1, 2010
MONDAY, Feb. 1 (HealthDay News) -- The degrees of parental warmth and hostility, as well as the number of foster-care moves, affect the progression of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity among children placed in foster care, according to a study published online Feb. 1 in Pediatrics.
L. Oriana Linares, Ph.D., of the New York University Langone Medical Center in New York City, and colleagues conducted a study of 252 maltreated children placed with 95 families. They gathered data from biological parents, foster parents and classroom teachers regarding parental warmth and hostility and the stability of placement, as well as the progress of symptoms of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
The odds of higher inattention were greater among children who experienced less warmth and more hostility from their parents, the researchers found. These two factors were also associated with higher hyperactivity, as were a higher average number of moves and discharge from care, the investigators note.
"The results of this study advance the current knowledge of family variables that affect the course of inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity symptoms in foster care," the authors write. "These data offer an emerging clinical picture of risk for symptom types under the unique caregiving conditions of foster placement. The identification of parental quality and placement stability as malleable factors points to intervention goals for promoting child psychological well-being in the foster care system."
Abstract
Full Text (subscription or payment may be required)
Copyright © 2010 HealthDay. All rights reserved.
http://www.modernmedicine.com/modernmedicine/Modern+Medicine+Now/Foster-Care-Quality-Linked-to-Hyperactive-Youths-P/ArticleNewsFeed/Article/detail/654709?contextCategoryId=40165
Citing Widespread Abuse of Kids in Foster Care and Seeking Sweeping Reforms, Advocates Sue Massachusetts Governor
Citing Widespread Abuse of Kids in Foster Care and Seeking Sweeping Reforms, Advocates Sue Massachusetts Governor
15 Apr 2010 / Posted by cr
SPRINGFIELD & BOSTON, MA — Citing one of the nation’s highest rates of abuse of children in foster care and other persistent and severe problems throughout the Massachusetts child welfare system, the national advocacy group Children’s Rights and Boston law firm Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP — with the support of advocates and families throughout the state — today filed a class action in federal court seeking broad reform on behalf of 8,500 abused and neglected children statewide.
Naming six child plaintiffs who have been badly harmed in Massachusetts foster care, the lawsuit (known as Connor B. v. Patrick) charges the state’s Department of Children and Families (DCF) with violating the constitutional rights of children by routinely placing them in dangerous and unstable situations once removed from their parents’ care and failing to take necessary actions to meet the legal and moral obligation of the state-run child welfare system to ensure the safety and well-being of children in its custody.
According to the children’s complaint, the rate at which children in Massachusetts foster care suffer abuse in state-supervised foster homes and institutions is nearly four times the national standard. DCF further traumatizes children by moving them frequently between foster placements; one-third of children in state foster care get shuffled around to at least five different placements during their time in state custody, according to the complaint. The complaint also points to the state’s decade-long failure to adequately prepare and support families to be successfully reunified with their children in foster care.
“There is absolutely no justification for what Massachusetts is doing to its most vulnerable children. It is robbing them of their right to be protected from abuse and neglect and to grow up in safe and stable homes with loving, permanent families,” said Marcia Robinson Lowry, executive director of Children’s Rights. “With this class action, Children’s Rights joins advocates throughout the state in seeking a court-enforceable commitment from the state to reform its failing child welfare system and dramatically improve its treatment of the thousands of abused and neglected children who depend on it.”
The lawsuit names six children as plaintiffs to represent the class. They range in age from nine to 15 years old and share a history of harm in DCF custody. They include:
Nine-year-old Connor B., who suffered severe sexual abuse as DCF shuffled him around to seven different foster homes over the last three years. Connor now struggles with severe mental, behavioral, and emotional challenges as a result.
Adam S., a 15-year-old boy who has spent his entire life since the age of eight bouncing in and out of foster care — and enduring repeated physical and psychological abuse at the hands of his foster parents. Now he is a few years from aging out of the system — and DCF has provided him with no prospects for a permanent family and no preparation for living independently as an adult.
Camila R., 13 years old, who was separated from her two sisters and returned to her abusive mother, has lived in at least 11 different placements while in foster care. Even now, DCF continues to deny her vital educational and mental health services.
Fifteen-year-old Andre S., who has been legally free for adoption for over 10 years and spent seven of 12 years in the state’s care in a residential facility rather than a foster or relative home. Andre now faces adulthood with no stable family or plan for adequate services from DCF to support him.
Seth T., 13 years old, who was bounced around to five different foster placements in just his first year of foster care. Still in foster care after five years, DCF has effectively cut Seth’s ties with his family, managing visits with his brothers only a few times a year and never properly exploring the possibility of placing him with available relatives.
Fifteen-year-old Rakeem D., who entered foster care two and a half years ago and was not only immediately separated from his three siblings, but also denied the opportunity to live with relatives who may have been able to care for him. As DCF has bounced Rakeem around to at least eight different foster and group homes, his education and behavioral health has suffered, and he now resides in an institution 50 miles away from his nearest relative.
“We believe it is necessary to file a class action lawsuit because children’s constitutional rights are being violated as a result of the shortcomings of the child welfare system,” said Mary K. Ryan, a partner at Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP. “I think most people would be shocked to learn that Massachusetts, which has done so much for the education and health of children, falls in the bottom ten among states on so many measures related to the well-being of children in foster care.”
Citing evidence that DCF and state officials have been aware of serious problems throughout the state-run child welfare system for many years without taking appropriate action to solve them, the child plaintiffs ask the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts to enjoin the state from further violating their constitutional rights and order relief via widespread reforms. Among the failures detailed in their complaint:
Children are frequently subjected to abuse or neglect while in foster care. The high rate at which children suffer maltreatment in state custody makes DCF the fourth most harmful child welfare system in the nation in this regard.
Children are routinely bounced from one foster home or institution to another at alarming rates. One third of children in foster care have been moved around five or more different foster placements in a single stint in foster care, causing repeated emotional trauma with every move. DCF often aggravates this trauma with the inappropriate practice of shuttling children each night to different temporary “hotline” homes until a longer-term placement becomes available.
Families are not provided adequate visitation with their children in foster care or sufficient services and support to successfully bring their children home. In order for children to be safely reunified with their parents after spending time in foster care, parents must have access to vital services to help them overcome their challenges and ample opportunities to visit one another. DCF regularly fails to provide sufficient visitation and services for families, thus placing children at risk of lingering in care longer than necessary or even returning to foster care.
Too many children are literally growing up in foster care. Many of the 2,500 children currently waiting to be adopted from DCF foster care are likely to linger in foster care for several years. Among children adopted between 2002 and 2005, more than half waited more than three years before finding permanent, adoptive families.
Children are aging out of foster care without permanent families and vital support and resources. Approximately 900 children age out of the state foster care system each year with no permanent family at all, and approximately half of those children have spent three or more years in state custody. Additionally, DCF fails to prepare these children for life as adults, placing them at a higher risk of experiencing homelessness, unemployment, and incarceration than their adopted and reunified peers.
The children’s complaint links these problems to DCF’s failure to effectively manage its workforce, resources, and practices:
DCF has failed to recruit and maintain a sufficient number of safe and appropriate family foster homes and other out-of-home placements. The pool of available foster homes has been steadily shrinking over the last several years, and DCF has not done enough to find ways to both recruit and retain licensed foster homes. This serious shortage of placements has caused overcrowding in foster homes and forced excessive moves of children between multiple foster homes.
DCF caseworkers are overloaded with unmanageable caseloads. DCF routinely assigns its child welfare workers 22 to 27 families each — far in excess of the Child Welfare League of America’s caseload standard of 12 to 15 children per worker. When workers are so overburdened with large caseloads, they are often too busy to engage with families and develop vital safety plans and services for families and children in foster care.
Over the last 18 months, DCF and state officials have exacerbated these systemic problems by depleting vital resources, including cutting the child welfare workforce, failing to provide promised increases to foster parent maintenance payment rates, reducing funding for essential services for children and families, and decreasing the resources and administrative support necessary to support a full continuum of foster care placements and services.
Additionally, the complaint cites evidence that Massachusetts continues to be one of the worst states in the nation with respect to drawing down funding from the federal government, which provides matching funds for state-managed foster care systems. DCF continues to miss out on millions of dollars in available federal funds to finance the state’s overburdened foster care system.
“While short resources and tight budgets have forced states across the nation to make tough decisions, DCF’s failure to meet the most basic needs of vulnerable children in state foster care cannot be simply blamed on difficult fiscal times,” said Sara Bartosz, senior staff attorney for Children’s Rights and lead counsel on the case. “DCF’s management has failed to take the necessary steps to ensure quality case practice and positive outcomes for children. Quite simply, this is a serious management problem that has existed for a long time.”
Related Press
Children’s rights group files suit against state over foster care (Boston Herald, April 15, 2010)
Advocacy group sues state over foster care system (Boston Globe, April 15, 2010)
Group files foster care lawsuit against Mass. (AP via WBZ Radio, April 15, 2010)
15 Apr 2010 / Posted by cr
SPRINGFIELD & BOSTON, MA — Citing one of the nation’s highest rates of abuse of children in foster care and other persistent and severe problems throughout the Massachusetts child welfare system, the national advocacy group Children’s Rights and Boston law firm Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP — with the support of advocates and families throughout the state — today filed a class action in federal court seeking broad reform on behalf of 8,500 abused and neglected children statewide.
Naming six child plaintiffs who have been badly harmed in Massachusetts foster care, the lawsuit (known as Connor B. v. Patrick) charges the state’s Department of Children and Families (DCF) with violating the constitutional rights of children by routinely placing them in dangerous and unstable situations once removed from their parents’ care and failing to take necessary actions to meet the legal and moral obligation of the state-run child welfare system to ensure the safety and well-being of children in its custody.
According to the children’s complaint, the rate at which children in Massachusetts foster care suffer abuse in state-supervised foster homes and institutions is nearly four times the national standard. DCF further traumatizes children by moving them frequently between foster placements; one-third of children in state foster care get shuffled around to at least five different placements during their time in state custody, according to the complaint. The complaint also points to the state’s decade-long failure to adequately prepare and support families to be successfully reunified with their children in foster care.
“There is absolutely no justification for what Massachusetts is doing to its most vulnerable children. It is robbing them of their right to be protected from abuse and neglect and to grow up in safe and stable homes with loving, permanent families,” said Marcia Robinson Lowry, executive director of Children’s Rights. “With this class action, Children’s Rights joins advocates throughout the state in seeking a court-enforceable commitment from the state to reform its failing child welfare system and dramatically improve its treatment of the thousands of abused and neglected children who depend on it.”
The lawsuit names six children as plaintiffs to represent the class. They range in age from nine to 15 years old and share a history of harm in DCF custody. They include:
Nine-year-old Connor B., who suffered severe sexual abuse as DCF shuffled him around to seven different foster homes over the last three years. Connor now struggles with severe mental, behavioral, and emotional challenges as a result.
Adam S., a 15-year-old boy who has spent his entire life since the age of eight bouncing in and out of foster care — and enduring repeated physical and psychological abuse at the hands of his foster parents. Now he is a few years from aging out of the system — and DCF has provided him with no prospects for a permanent family and no preparation for living independently as an adult.
Camila R., 13 years old, who was separated from her two sisters and returned to her abusive mother, has lived in at least 11 different placements while in foster care. Even now, DCF continues to deny her vital educational and mental health services.
Fifteen-year-old Andre S., who has been legally free for adoption for over 10 years and spent seven of 12 years in the state’s care in a residential facility rather than a foster or relative home. Andre now faces adulthood with no stable family or plan for adequate services from DCF to support him.
Seth T., 13 years old, who was bounced around to five different foster placements in just his first year of foster care. Still in foster care after five years, DCF has effectively cut Seth’s ties with his family, managing visits with his brothers only a few times a year and never properly exploring the possibility of placing him with available relatives.
Fifteen-year-old Rakeem D., who entered foster care two and a half years ago and was not only immediately separated from his three siblings, but also denied the opportunity to live with relatives who may have been able to care for him. As DCF has bounced Rakeem around to at least eight different foster and group homes, his education and behavioral health has suffered, and he now resides in an institution 50 miles away from his nearest relative.
“We believe it is necessary to file a class action lawsuit because children’s constitutional rights are being violated as a result of the shortcomings of the child welfare system,” said Mary K. Ryan, a partner at Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP. “I think most people would be shocked to learn that Massachusetts, which has done so much for the education and health of children, falls in the bottom ten among states on so many measures related to the well-being of children in foster care.”
Citing evidence that DCF and state officials have been aware of serious problems throughout the state-run child welfare system for many years without taking appropriate action to solve them, the child plaintiffs ask the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts to enjoin the state from further violating their constitutional rights and order relief via widespread reforms. Among the failures detailed in their complaint:
Children are frequently subjected to abuse or neglect while in foster care. The high rate at which children suffer maltreatment in state custody makes DCF the fourth most harmful child welfare system in the nation in this regard.
Children are routinely bounced from one foster home or institution to another at alarming rates. One third of children in foster care have been moved around five or more different foster placements in a single stint in foster care, causing repeated emotional trauma with every move. DCF often aggravates this trauma with the inappropriate practice of shuttling children each night to different temporary “hotline” homes until a longer-term placement becomes available.
Families are not provided adequate visitation with their children in foster care or sufficient services and support to successfully bring their children home. In order for children to be safely reunified with their parents after spending time in foster care, parents must have access to vital services to help them overcome their challenges and ample opportunities to visit one another. DCF regularly fails to provide sufficient visitation and services for families, thus placing children at risk of lingering in care longer than necessary or even returning to foster care.
Too many children are literally growing up in foster care. Many of the 2,500 children currently waiting to be adopted from DCF foster care are likely to linger in foster care for several years. Among children adopted between 2002 and 2005, more than half waited more than three years before finding permanent, adoptive families.
Children are aging out of foster care without permanent families and vital support and resources. Approximately 900 children age out of the state foster care system each year with no permanent family at all, and approximately half of those children have spent three or more years in state custody. Additionally, DCF fails to prepare these children for life as adults, placing them at a higher risk of experiencing homelessness, unemployment, and incarceration than their adopted and reunified peers.
The children’s complaint links these problems to DCF’s failure to effectively manage its workforce, resources, and practices:
DCF has failed to recruit and maintain a sufficient number of safe and appropriate family foster homes and other out-of-home placements. The pool of available foster homes has been steadily shrinking over the last several years, and DCF has not done enough to find ways to both recruit and retain licensed foster homes. This serious shortage of placements has caused overcrowding in foster homes and forced excessive moves of children between multiple foster homes.
DCF caseworkers are overloaded with unmanageable caseloads. DCF routinely assigns its child welfare workers 22 to 27 families each — far in excess of the Child Welfare League of America’s caseload standard of 12 to 15 children per worker. When workers are so overburdened with large caseloads, they are often too busy to engage with families and develop vital safety plans and services for families and children in foster care.
Over the last 18 months, DCF and state officials have exacerbated these systemic problems by depleting vital resources, including cutting the child welfare workforce, failing to provide promised increases to foster parent maintenance payment rates, reducing funding for essential services for children and families, and decreasing the resources and administrative support necessary to support a full continuum of foster care placements and services.
Additionally, the complaint cites evidence that Massachusetts continues to be one of the worst states in the nation with respect to drawing down funding from the federal government, which provides matching funds for state-managed foster care systems. DCF continues to miss out on millions of dollars in available federal funds to finance the state’s overburdened foster care system.
“While short resources and tight budgets have forced states across the nation to make tough decisions, DCF’s failure to meet the most basic needs of vulnerable children in state foster care cannot be simply blamed on difficult fiscal times,” said Sara Bartosz, senior staff attorney for Children’s Rights and lead counsel on the case. “DCF’s management has failed to take the necessary steps to ensure quality case practice and positive outcomes for children. Quite simply, this is a serious management problem that has existed for a long time.”
Related Press
Children’s rights group files suit against state over foster care (Boston Herald, April 15, 2010)
Advocacy group sues state over foster care system (Boston Globe, April 15, 2010)
Group files foster care lawsuit against Mass. (AP via WBZ Radio, April 15, 2010)
New Report Cites Montana Commission As Model for Addressing Foster Care Rates Nationally
New Report Cites Montana Commission As Model for Addressing Foster Care Rates Nationally
The Alliance for Children and Families today released the second in a series of three reports highlighting the crisis in foster care rates and the need to address them nationally.
Today’s report (see also our press release), which was welcomed by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT), cites Montana’s DPHHS Rate Commission as a model for other states. The commission has created increased transparency and promoted collaboration in the foster care rate-setting process.
This approach may produce better outcomes for children than legal action, which is being undertaken in many states, culminating most recently in a December 2009, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision (California Alliance v. Allenby), where the court ruled that federal law requires states to pay the full cost of care for children in foster care. This decision, which may affect foster care rates throughout the country, was the focus of the first report from the Alliance, released in late March.
“The Montana model for child welfare reimbursement creates positive results for our kids through open communication between policy-makers, child welfare caregivers and everyday people who use the services,” said Sen. Baucus in a prepared statement. “Providing lawmakers with more and better information is essential to helping them improve child welfare services and the successful Montana model is one that may benefit children in other states as well.”
The Alliance for Children and Families expects to release a third report in the weeks ahead that will review rate-setting processes in all 50 states.
Congress is expected to address foster care financing as part of TANF reauthorization over the next year. During that process, the Alliance for Children and Families will be advocating for national reforms that will promote foster care rates that better serve children and families throughout the country.
http://unca-acf.org/insider/?p=512
The Alliance for Children and Families today released the second in a series of three reports highlighting the crisis in foster care rates and the need to address them nationally.
Today’s report (see also our press release), which was welcomed by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT), cites Montana’s DPHHS Rate Commission as a model for other states. The commission has created increased transparency and promoted collaboration in the foster care rate-setting process.
This approach may produce better outcomes for children than legal action, which is being undertaken in many states, culminating most recently in a December 2009, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision (California Alliance v. Allenby), where the court ruled that federal law requires states to pay the full cost of care for children in foster care. This decision, which may affect foster care rates throughout the country, was the focus of the first report from the Alliance, released in late March.
“The Montana model for child welfare reimbursement creates positive results for our kids through open communication between policy-makers, child welfare caregivers and everyday people who use the services,” said Sen. Baucus in a prepared statement. “Providing lawmakers with more and better information is essential to helping them improve child welfare services and the successful Montana model is one that may benefit children in other states as well.”
The Alliance for Children and Families expects to release a third report in the weeks ahead that will review rate-setting processes in all 50 states.
Congress is expected to address foster care financing as part of TANF reauthorization over the next year. During that process, the Alliance for Children and Families will be advocating for national reforms that will promote foster care rates that better serve children and families throughout the country.
http://unca-acf.org/insider/?p=512
National Reunification Day
Celebrate National Reunification Day!
June 19, 2010
This year, a number of national organizations, including the NACC, are working together to organize the first National Reunification Day on June 19, 2010. The goal of National Reunification Day is to celebrate families and communities coming together and to raise awareness about the importance of family reunification to children in foster care. While June 19, 2010 is the official day, a number of jurisdictions are celebrating on different days and weeks. The important part of this initiative is to celebrate successful reunifications whenever it works for your organization. A number of states already celebrate Reunification Day just as they do National Adoption Day. We encourage you to promote this effort in your state.
unhappygrammy-I can't promote National Reunification Day in NH, because families are NEVER re-unified here!
June 19, 2010
This year, a number of national organizations, including the NACC, are working together to organize the first National Reunification Day on June 19, 2010. The goal of National Reunification Day is to celebrate families and communities coming together and to raise awareness about the importance of family reunification to children in foster care. While June 19, 2010 is the official day, a number of jurisdictions are celebrating on different days and weeks. The important part of this initiative is to celebrate successful reunifications whenever it works for your organization. A number of states already celebrate Reunification Day just as they do National Adoption Day. We encourage you to promote this effort in your state.
unhappygrammy-I can't promote National Reunification Day in NH, because families are NEVER re-unified here!
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