ASPE ISSUE BRIEF(*)
FEDERAL FOSTER CARE FINANCING:
How and Why the Current Funding Structure Fails to Meet the Needs of the Child Welfare Field
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
Updated August 2005(1) This Issue Brief provides an overview of the title IV-E federal foster care program's funding structure and documents several key weaknesses.
This Issue Brief is available on the Internet at:
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/05/fc-financing-ib/
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Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
Background and History of Title IV-E Foster Care
Documenting Eligibility and Claiming Foster Care Funds is Burdensome
Differing Claiming Practices Result in Wide Variations in Funding Among States
The Current Funding Structure Has Not Resulted in High Quality Services
States' Title IV-E Claiming Bears Little Relationship to Service Quality or Outcomes
The Current Funding Structure is Inflexible, Emphasizing Foster Care
The Financing Structure Has Not Kept Pace with a Changing Child Welfare Field
Proposed Child Welfare Program Option Described
Benefits of the Proposed Child Welfare Program Option
References
Note on Data Sources:
Executive Summary
The federal foster care program pays a portion of States' costs to provide care for children removed from welfare-eligible homes because of maltreatment. Authorized under title IV-E of the Social Security Act, the program's funding (approximately $5 billion per year) is structured as an uncapped entitlement, so any qualifying State expenditure will be partially reimbursed, or “matched,” without limit. This paper provides an overview of the program's funding structure and documents several key weaknesses. It concludes with a discussion of the Administration's legislative proposal to establish a more flexible financing system.
The program's documentation requirements are burdensome. There are four categories of expenditures for which States may claim federal funds, each matched at a different rate. In addition, there are several statutory eligibility rules that must be met in order to justify the title IV-E claims made on a child's behalf. Some of these apply at the time a child enters foster care, while others must be documented on an ongoing basis. The time and costs involved in documenting and justifying claims is significant.
Differing claiming practices result in wide variations in funding among States. The average annual amount of federal foster care funds received by States ranges from $4,155 to $33,091 per eligible child, based on three year average claims from FY2001 through FY2003. It is unlikely these disparities are the result of actual differences in the cost of operating foster care programs or reflect differential needs among foster children.
The current funding structure has not resulted in high quality services. Strengths and weaknesses of States' child welfare programs are identified through federal monitoring visits called Child and Family Services Reviews. States reviewed have ranged from meeting standards in 1 to 9 of the 14 outcomes and systemic factors examined (the median was 6). Significant weaknesses are evident in programs across the nation, but many of the improvements needed cannot be funded through title IV-E.
States' title IV-E claiming bears little relationship to service quality or outcomes. There are States with both high and low levels of federal title IV-E claims at each level of performance on Child and Family Services Reviews. In addition, there is no relationship between the amounts States claim in title IV-E funds and the proportion of children for whom timely permanency is achieved.
The current funding structure is inflexible, emphasizing foster care. Title IV-E funds foster care on an unlimited basis without providing for services that would either prevent the child's removal from the home or speed permanency. Foster care funding represents 65% of federal funds dedicated to child welfare purposes, and adoption assistance makes up another 22%. Funding sources that may be used for preventive and reunification services represent only 11% of federal child welfare program funds.
The financing structure has not kept pace with a changing child welfare field. The structure of the title IV-E program has continued without major revision since it was created in 1961, despite major changes in child welfare practice. The result is a funding stream seriously mismatched to current program needs. It is driven towards process rather than outcomes and constrains agencies' efforts to achieve improved results for children.
The proposed Child Welfare Program Option offers substantial benefits. The Child Welfare Program Option, first proposed in HHS's Fiscal Year 2004 budget request and currently included in the President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget request, would allow States a choice between the current title IV-E program and a five-year capped, flexible allocation of funds equivalent to anticipated title IV-E program levels. It would allow innovative State and local child welfare agencies to eliminate eligibility determination and claiming functions and redirect funds toward services and activities that more directly achieve safety, permanency and well-being for children and families.
The combination of detailed eligibility requirements and complex but narrow definitions of allowable costs within the federal title IV-E foster care program force a focus on procedure rather than outcomes for children and families. The Administration's proposed Child Welfare Program Option is intended to introduce flexibility while maintaining a focus on outcomes, retaining existing child protections, and providing a financial safety net for states in the form of access to the TANF Contingency Fund during unanticipated and unavoidable crises. The result will be a stronger and more responsive child welfare system that achieves better results for vulnerable children and families.
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Introduction
The federal government currently spends approximately $5 billion per year to reimburse States for a portion of their annual foster care expenditures. Foster care services are intended to provide temporary, safe alternative homes for children who have been abused or neglected until such time as they are able to return to their parents' care safely or can be placed in other permanent homes. Federal foster care funds, authorized under title IV-E of the Social Security Act, are paid to States on an uncapped, “entitlement” basis, meaning any qualifying expenditure by a State will be partially reimbursed, or “matched,” without limit. Definitions of which expenses qualify for reimbursement are laid out in regulations and policy interpretations which have developed, layer upon layer, over the course of many years. Each may have made sense individually, but cumulatively they represent a level of complexity and burden that fails to support the program's basic goals of safety, permanency and child well-being.
This paper provides an overview of the current funding structure, and documents several key weaknesses. In essence, the paper shows that: (1) The current financing structure is connected to the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) for historical, rather than programmatic reasons; (2) the administrative paperwork for claiming federal funds under Title IV-E is burdensome; (3) current funding is highly variable across States; (4) child welfare systems claiming higher amounts of federal funds per child do not perform substantially better or achieve better outcomes for children than those claiming less funding; (5) the current funding structure is inflexible and emphasizes foster care payments over preventive services; and (6) the financing structure has not kept pace with a changing child welfare field. The paper concludes with a discussion of the Administration's proposal to establish a Child Welfare Program Option, allowing States to receive their foster care funds in a fixed, flexible allocation as an alternative to the current mode of financing.
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Background and History of Title IV-E Foster Care
The federal government has, since 1961, shared the cost of foster care services with States. Prior to this time foster care was entirely a State responsibility. Since its very first days foster care funding was intimately linked to federal welfare benefits, then known as the Aid to Dependent Children Program, or ADC. In fact, the federal foster care program was created to settle a dispute with the States over welfare payments to single-parent households. At the time, some States routinely denied welfare payments to families with children born outside of marriage. These States had declared such homes to be morally “unsuitable” to receive welfare benefits. Following a particularly extreme incident in which 23,000 Louisiana children were expelled from ADC, the federal Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW), in what came to be known as the Flemming Rule after then-secretary Arthur Flemming, directed States to cease enforcement of the discriminatory suitable homes criteria unless households were actually unsafe for children. If homes were unsafe, States were required to pay families ADC while making efforts to improve home conditions, or place children in foster care. When States protested the added costs of protecting children in unsafe homes, Congress reacted by creating federal foster care funding. In this way, the federal government ensured States would not be disadvantaged financially by protecting children (Frame 1999; Committee on Ways and Means 1992).
From 1961 until 1980, federal foster care funding was part of the federal welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Since 1980, however, foster care funds have been authorized separately, under title IV-E of the Social Security Act. From 1980 through 1996, States could claim reimbursement for a portion of foster care expenditures on behalf of children removed from homes that were eligible for the pre-welfare reform AFDC program, so long as their placements in foster care met several procedural safeguards. While the underlying AFDC program was abolished in 1996 in favor of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF), income eligibility criteria for title IV-E foster care continues to follow the old AFDC criteria as they existed just before welfare reform was enacted. States are reimbursed on an unlimited basis for the federal share of all eligible expenses.
It should be noted that while title IV-E eligibility is often discussed as if it represents an entitlement of a particular child to particular benefits or services, it does not. Instead, a child's title IV-E eligibility entitles a State to federal reimbursement for a portion of the costs expended for that child's care.
Title IV-E remained little changed from its inception in 1980 until the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997 (ASFA). With ASFA, Congress responded to concerns that children were too often left in unsafe situations while excessive and inappropriate rehabilitative efforts were made with the family. It also addressed what was at least a perceived reluctance on the part of child welfare agencies and judges to seek terminations of parental rights and adoption in a timely fashion when reunification efforts were unsuccessful. ASFA clarified the central importance of safety to child welfare decision making and emphasized to States the need for prompt and continuous efforts to find permanent homes for children. These permanent homes might be with their birth families if that could be accomplished safely, or with adoptive families or permanent legal guardians if it could not. ASFA, together with related activity to improve adoption processes in many States, is widely credited with the rapid increases in adoptions from foster care in the years since the law was passed.
ASFA's emphasis on permanency planning has contributed to increasing exits from foster care in recent years, both to adoptive placements and to other destinations including reunifications with parents and guardianships with relatives. Combined with relatively flat numbers of foster care entries, the number of children in foster care has begun to decline, the first sustained decrease since the program was established.
State claims under the title IV-E foster care program have always grown more quickly than the population of children served. But the recent declines in the number of children in foster care have substantially curbed the tremendous growth the program experienced during the 1980s and 1990s. The number of children in foster care began declining slowly in 1999 after more than doubling in the preceding decade. Federal foster care program expenditures grew an average of 17 percent per year in the 16 years between the program's establishment and the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) in 1997. During that period, in only 3 years did growth dip below 10 percent. However, in the five years since ASFA was enacted, program growth has averaged only 4 percent per year. While some of the growth through 1997 paralleled an increasing population of children in foster care, spending growth far outpaced growth in the number of children served. Improvements in States' ability to claim reimbursement and expanded definitions of administrative expenses in the program also contributed to funding growth. Figure 1 displays the growth in foster care expenditures and the number of children in foster care funded by title IV-E.
Figure 1.
Federal Claims and Caseload History for Title IV-E Foster Care
The major appeal of the title IV-E program has always been that, as an entitlement, funding levels were supposed to adjust automatically to respond to changes in “need,” as represented by State claims. Annual discretionary appropriations were unnecessary to accommodate changing circumstances such as a larger population of children in foster care. The automatic adjustment features of the entitlement structure remain a strength, however, only so long as they respond appropriately and equitably to factors that reflect true changes in need and that promote the well-being of the children and families served. There is little reason to assume this is true at present. Figure 1 shows that funding levels and caseloads have not closely tracked one another for over a decade, and indeed since 1998 have been moving in opposite directions.
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Documenting Eligibility and Claiming Foster Care Funds is Burdensome
In order to receive federal foster care funds, States are required to determine a child's eligibility, and must document expenditures made on behalf of eligible children. This documentation becomes the basis for expenditure reports which are filed quarterly with the federal government. The federal share of eligible expenditures may then be “drawn down” (i.e. withdrawn from federal accounts) by States. While good estimates of the time and costs involved in documenting and justifying claims are not available, such costs can be significant.
As laid out in law and regulations, there are four categories of expenditures for which States may claim federal funds. Each of these is matched at a particular rate that varies from category to category. In addition, the match rate for foster care maintenance payments varies from State to State and may be adjusted from year to year. These categories are:
foster care maintenance payments for eligible children (matched at the Medicaid rate which varies by State and by year, but currently ranges from 50 to 80%)
short- and long-term training for State and local agency staff who administer the title IV-E program, including those preparing for employment by the state agency, as well as for foster parents and staff of licensed child care institutions in which title IV-E eligible children reside (75% federal match)
administrative expenditures necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the program (50% federal match)
costs of required data collection systems (50% federal match)
With so many different categories of expenses, each matched at a different rate, States must accurately track spending in each of these categories and attribute how much of their efforts in each category are being made on behalf of eligible children. States report that doing so is cumbersome, prone to dispute, and does not accomplish program goals. Adding an additional layer of complexity, costs must be allocated to those programs which benefit from the expenditures, a standard practice in federal programs. A State's cost allocation plan is approved by the federal government and distributes expenses that relate to multiple programs and functions.
The categories of administrative and training expenses are typically the most difficult to document and the most often disputed. Federal regulations (45 CFR 1356.60) provide the following examples of allowable administrative expenses:
eligibility determination and re-determination, plus related fair hearings and appeals
referral to services
preparation for and participation in judicial determinations
placement of the child
development of the case plan
case reviews
case management and supervision
recruitment and licensing of foster homes and institutions
rate setting
a proportionate share of agency overhead
costs of data collection systems
There is an ambiguous dividing line between an administrative expense such as case management and ineligible service costs, such as counseling. Such activities may be performed by the same staff and sometimes in the same session with a client. This makes accurate claiming difficult and gives rise to frequent disputes about allowable expenditures. For this reason, administrative costs are much more frequently the subject of disallowances than are other funding categories.
The ability of States to claim title IV-E funds spent on training activities is confounded by statutory and regulatory provisions that are mismatched with how State agencies currently operate their programs. For instance, while many States now contract with private service providers for administrative functions such as those listed above, they receive lower rates of federal reimbursement of their costs for training these workers to perform these functions. Only costs incurred by the State in the training of State and local agency workers and those preparing for employment with the state agency can be reimbursed under title IV-E at the enhanced, 75 percent match rate (rather than the 50 percent match rate for administrative expenses). Furthermore, only public funds or expenditures can be used to match title IV-E training funds. It is common practice to consider the staff time and other resources of a state university as match for federal funds when training child welfare agency employees. However, this practice disadvantages States that utilize private colleges and universities for training and limits the training resources available, particularly in rural States where the number of State universities and colleges are limited and at great distances from those people requiring the training.
Just as claiming rules are complex, requirements for children's title IV-E eligibility are also cumbersome. Several eligibility requirements must be met in order to justify the title IV-E claims made on a child's behalf. These are described in the text box below. Some of these apply at the time a child enters foster care, while others must be documented on an ongoing basis. Most of these are procedural requirements intended to protect children from potential harm caused by inattentive agencies and systems. It is unclear, however, that they function reliably as eligibility criteria. For example, the fact that judicial determinations routinely include “reasonable efforts” and “contrary to the welfare” determinations may represent a judge's careful consideration of these issues, or may simply appear because prescribed language has been automatically inserted into removal orders. These process requirements were essential when federal oversight was limited to assuring the accuracy of eligibility determinations. However, now that the Child and Family Review process (discussed in some detail in a later section) provides comprehensive assessments of States' child welfare programs, some of what are currently individual eligibility criteria could be addressed more effectively as part of the systemic assessment process.
The eligibility criterion that is most routinely criticized by States and child welfare advocates is the financial need criteria as was in effect under the now-defunct AFDC program. As noted above, this requirement relates to the historical origins of the foster care program as part of the welfare system. However, there is no policy reason that the federal government should “care” (in monetary terms) more about children in imminent danger of maltreatment by parents who are poor than it does about children whose parents have higher incomes. The requirement is particularly peculiar because the AFDC program was eliminated in favor of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families in 1996. Therefore the means test used for title IV-E no longer parallels the income and asset limits for existing welfare programs. And since this so-called “look back” provision did not index the 1996 income and asset limits for inflation, over time their value will be further eroded. Fewer children will be eligible for title IV-E in the future as income limits for the program remain static while inflation raises both incomes and the poverty line.
Eligibility Requirements for Title IV-E Foster Care
Contrary to the welfare determination. A child's removal from the home must be the result of a judicial determination to the effect that continuation in the home would be contrary to the child's welfare, or that placement in foster care would be in the best interest of the child. Children in foster care as a result of a voluntary placement agreement are not subject to this requirement.
Reasonable efforts determination. The State agency must obtain a judicial determination within 60 days of a child's removal from the home that it has made reasonable efforts to maintain the family unit and prevent the unnecessary removal of a child from home, as long as the child's safety is ensured. In addition, there must be ongoing documentation that the State is making reasonable efforts to establish and finalize a permanency plan in a timely manner (every 12 months).
State agency placement and care responsibility. The State child welfare agency must have responsibility for placement and care of the child. Usually this means the child is in the State's custody. A tribal agency or other public agency may have responsibility for the child's placement and care if there is a written agreement to that effect with the child welfare agency.
Pre-welfare reform AFDC eligibility. The State must document that the child was financially needy and deprived of parental support at the time of the child's removal from home, using criteria in effect in its July 16, 1996 State plan for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. Income eligibility and deprivation must be redetermined annually.
Licensed Foster Family Home or Child Care Institution. The child must be placed in a home or facility that meets the standards for full licensure or approval that are established by the State.
Criminal background checks or safety checks. The State must provide documentation that criminal records checks have been conducted with respect to prospective foster and adoptive parents and safety checks have been made regarding staff of child care institutions.
Special Requirements in the Case of Voluntary Placements. If a child is placed in foster care under a voluntary placement agreement, title IV-E eligibility rules apply slightly differently. Determinations that remaining in the home is contrary to the child's welfare and that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent placement are not required in these cases. However, if the child is to remain in care beyond 180 days, a judicial determination is required by that time indicating that continued voluntary placement is in the child's best interests.
That each child's eligibility depends on so many factors, some of which may change from time to time, makes title IV-E a potentially error-prone program to which there is recurrent pressure for accuracy, close procedural scrutiny, and the taking of disallowances. On the other hand, the potentially large sums involved mean that disallowances are met with procedural disputes, appeals, and protests from agency directors, legislators, and governors. Yet it is not at all clear that the time and effort spent tracking eligibility criteria results in better outcomes for children. For all the complexity of the eligibility process, the number of States out of compliance is actually quite low.
Compliance with eligibility rules is monitored through Title IV-E Eligibility Reviews that have been conducted since 2000. Fifteen of the forty-four States reviewed by the end of 2003, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, were found not to be in substantial compliance with IV-E eligibility rules. The remainder had minimal errors in their eligibility processes and were generally operating within program eligibility rules. Even among the States required to implement corrective action plans, several are not far from compliance levels.
Of those States not in substantial compliance, the pattern of errors varied. The most widespread problems relate to reasonable efforts to make and finalize permanency plans. Ten states had large numbers of errors in this category and 44% of all errors involved reasonable efforts violations. In most cases these are cases with late or absent permanency hearings, that is States were not operating within the time frames laid out by the Adoption and Safe Families Act. Four States had frequent licensing problems, usually that children were placed in unlicensed foster homes (23% of all errors). Three States had significant errors related to the application of pre-welfare reform AFDC eligibility criteria (11% of all errors). Two States had quite a few missing criminal background checks on foster parents (8% of all errors). There were very few errors with respect to “contrary to the welfare” determinations, placement and care responsibility, or extended voluntary placements. A full listing of errors documented in eligibility reviews through Fiscal Year 2003 appears in Table 1.
Table 1.
Distribution of Errors Among States Found Not in Substantial Compliance with Title IV-E Eligibility Rules State Found Not in Compliance Number Cases Found Ineligible Licensing Problems Lacking Criminal Background Checks Reasonable Efforts Violations Missing Contrary to the Welfare Determinations Child Welfare Agency Lacks Placement and Care Responsibility Extended Voluntary Placement without Court Approval 1996 AFDC Criteria Not Met Disallowance Amount
New Jersey 2000 Initial Primary 44 33 0 14 0 4 3 3 $269,903
Kansas 2000 IP 16 6 0 6 7 0 0 10 $74,265
Maine 2001 1P 24 22 0 3 0 2 0 3 $182,737
Hawaii 2001 IP 25 0 18 1 0 2 1 3 $238,432
Iowa 2001 IP 22 0 3 6 6 0 0 15 $156,915
Vermont 2002 IP 26 2 0 4 7 4 0 14 $312,918
Maryland 2002 IP 37 3 1 36 1 0 0 1 $601,820
Wisconsin 2002 IP 23 3 0 13 4 2 2 1 $206,833
New York 2003 IP 31 0 0 26 7 4 2 5 $806,811
New Jersey 2003 Secondary 56 27 4 36 5 6 7 1 $6,220,853
District of Columbia 2003 IP 54 39 24 19 4 7 1 2 $1,416,169
Puerto Rico 2003 IP 70 17 7 98 7 0 0 26 $271,056
Montana 2003 Primary 22 1 0 28 2 1 1 0 $317,752
West Virginia 2003 P 25 4 0 20 0 0 1 0 $451,305
Alabama 2003 P 23 2 2 19 1 0 1 1 $174,856
Mississippi 2003 IP 10 9 0 3 1 0 0 0 $8,133
Arkansas 2003 IP 10 6 3 0 0 0 0 1 $67,067
Total Cases with Errors 518 $11,777,825
TOTAL ERRORS 757 174 62 332 52 32 19 86
Percent of all errors 23% 8% 44% 7% 4% 3% 11%
Notes:
During 2000 to 2003, 50 states plus the District of Columbia & Puerto Rico were reviewed; of these 35 were found to be in substantial compliance and 17 not in substantial compliance.
Six states (PA, MA, FL, TN, MN, & MI) have not been reviewed.
Six states (KS, NJ, WV, AL, TX, & MT) have had an initial primary plus a primary or secondary review.
Substantial compliance is defined as less than 8 errors for an initial primary review or 4 errors in a primary review. In secondary reviews substantial compliance is calculated as a percentage of cases and/or dollars.
Ineligible cases may have more than one error reason.
Licensing errors were usually children placed in unlicensed homes. In Maine, most errors were foster homes that lacked a fire inspection. Most reasonable efforts violations were late/absent permanency hearings.
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Differing Claiming Practices Result in Wide Variations in Funding Among States
States vary widely in their approaches to claiming federal funds under title IV-E. Some are quite conservative in their claims, counting only children in clearly eligible placements and defining administrative costs narrowly. Other States have become more skilled in the administrative processes necessary to justify more extensive title IV-E claims. Further, not all States have the financial means or budgetary inclination to invest in the full array of foster care related services for which federal financial participation might be available. The result of these different approaches is a complex pattern of title IV-E claims covering a great range of funding levels. However, the disparities in title IV-E claiming are so wide and so lacking in pattern as to undermine the rationale for the complex claiming rules.
Figure 2 shows the average amount of funds each State claimed from the federal government for title IV-E foster care during FY2001 through FY2003, shown as dollars per title IV-E eligible child so as to make the figures comparable across States. That is, for each State the three year average annual federal share in each spending category is divided by the three year average monthly number of title IV-E eligible children in foster care, to give an average, annualized cost per child. Three year averages are used to smooth out claiming anomalies that may occur in a single year because of extraordinary claims or disallowances.
There is a wide range in the amounts claimed as well as in the division of claims between maintenance payments and the category that includes both child placement services and administration. These are the two principal claiming categories. The remaining categories, training and demonstrations, were relatively small in most States. Spending on State Automated Child Welfare Information Systems (SACWIS) has been excluded since these system development costs can vary substantially from year to year in ways unrelated (at least in the short term) to services for children.
Figure 2.
States’ Foster Care Claims — Federal Funds
(excluding SACWIS) per IV-E Child (average of fiscal years 2001 to 2003)
Total federal claims per title IV-E child (averaged across three years), excluding funds for the development of State Automated Child Welfare Information Systems (SACWIS), ranged from $4,155 to $33,091. The median value was $15,914. The range in maintenance claims was $2,829 to $20,539 per title IV-E child, with a median of $6,546. Claims for child placement services and administration ranged from $1,190 to $23,724 per title IV-E child, with a median value of $6,840. These per-child amounts reflect only the federal share of title IV-E costs, which vary according to the match rates used for different categories of expenses. If one were to include the State share in such calculations, the expenditure figures would be substantially higher. This discussion has been framed in terms of the variation in federal share so as to best illustrate and isolate issues related to the federal funding rules.
As shown in figure 3, the balance between maintenance and administrative claims also varies considerably among the States. Claims for child placement and administration vary from 10 cents per dollar claimed of maintenance to $4.34. Six States claim less than 50 cents in administration for every maintenance dollar claimed, while 9 States claim more than $2 in administration for every dollar of maintenance. These differences reflect the extent to which States use a wide or narrow definition of child placement and administrative costs. In addition, some States claim administrative expenses for non-IV-E children as “title IV-E candidates” over extended periods of time, even if those children or the placement settings they reside in never qualify under eligibility rules. In such States this drives up administrative costs as a proportion of total title IV-E payments. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published by HHS January 31, 2005 proposes to prohibit this practice except under limited circumstances.
Figure 3.
Administrative Dollars Claimed per Dollar of Foster Care Maintenance Varies Widely
(calculated on the basis of average claims FY2001 through FY2003)
Below, factors such as the quality of child welfare services are examined in relation to the funding differences across States. Here it is simply observed that the spread of claims is far wider than one would expect to see based on any funding formula one might rationally construct. It is unlikely that differences this large are the result of actual differences either in the cost of operating a foster care program or reflect actual differential needs among foster children across States.
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The Current Funding Structure Has Not Resulted in High Quality Services
If State and local child welfare systems were generally functioning well, most of those concerned might take the view that the approximately $5 billion in federal funds, and even more in State and local funds, was mostly well spent. In fact, however, knowledgeable observers are hard-pressed to name systems that are functioning well overall. Typically one aspect of an agency's efforts may be lauded, while serious weaknesses are acknowledged in other areas. Even so, good evidence of system performance has, until recently, been hard to come by.
After several years of development and pilot testing, the Children's Bureau in 2000 began conducting Child and Family Services Reviews (CFSRs) in each State. These reviews, which include a data-driven Statewide Assessment and an onsite review visit by federal and State staff, are intended to identify systematically the strengths and weaknesses in State child welfare system performance. Once areas of weakness are identified, States are required to develop and implement Program Improvement Plans (PIPs) designed to address shortcomings. During onsite
reviews, teams examine a sample of case files of children with open child welfare cases and interview families, caseworkers and others involved with these cases to determine whether federal standards have been met. System stakeholders such as child advocates and judges are also interviewed. In addition to examining practice in specific cases, the reviews also examine systemic factors such as whether the States' case review system, training, and service array are adequate to meet families' needs. Overall, 47 specific factors are rated and then aggregated to assess whether or not “substantial conformity” with federal requirements is achieved in seven child outcomes and seven systemic factors (shown in the text box below).
Outcomes and Systemic Factors Examined
in Child and Family Services Reviews
Outcomes
Children are first and foremost, protected from abuse and neglect.
Children are safely maintained in their homes whenever possible and appropriate.
Children have permanency and stability in their living situations.
The continuity of family relationships and connections is preserved for children.
Families have enhanced capacity to provide for their children's needs.
Children receive appropriate services to meet their educational needs.
Children receive adequate services to meet their physical and mental health needs.
Systemic Factors
Statewide Information System
Case Review System
Quality Assurance System
Training
Service Array
Agency Responsiveness to the Community
Foster and Adoptive Parenting Licensing, Recruitment and Retention
As described above, there are 14 areas in which a State might be determined in or out of substantial compliance during its Child and Family Services Review. Figure 4 shows the distribution of State performance on initial reviews among all 50 States and the District of Columbia. Median State performance was to be in substantial compliance in 6 of 14 areas. States reviewed to date have ranged from meeting standards in 1 area to 9 areas. While simply counting the areas of compliance presents a very general, simplified and broad-brush approach to evaluating child welfare system quality, the purpose here is not to analyze system performance in any detailed fashion. It is simply to recognize that most States achieved substantial compliance in fewer than half of areas examined, and that all systems reviewed have been in need of significant improvement. Indeed, in the area of permanency and stability in their living situations, an area of crucial importance to children in foster care, no State has yet met federal standards in this area, although a few approach them. Clearly the current federal funding structure has not, to date, resulted in a child welfare system that achieves outcomes with which we may be satisfied.
Figure 4.
Summary of Results for Child and Family Services Reviews
(for 50 states plus DC)
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States' Title IV-E Claiming Bears Little Relationship to Service Quality or Outcomes
Even if not achieving high quality overall, one might expect and hope that spending variations among States might relate to the overall quality of child welfare systems as revealed in results of the Child and Family Services Reviews. Analyses presented below relate the variations in claiming patterns among States described above to child welfare system performance.
Figure 5 shows per child claims plotted against the number of areas measured in the CFSR in which the State was found to be in substantial compliance. The three states with the highest claims per child were in compliance with 3, 5, and 7areas respectively of the 14 possible areas of compliance in their first Child and Family Services Review. Average per-child claims did not differ appreciably between the highest and lowest performing states. The eight states that were in compliance in the fewest areas (1, 2 or 3 of 14) averaged $19,293 in federal funds per title IV-E child, while the 12 highest performing states (in compliance with 8 or 9 of the 14 areas) averaged claims of $19,824 per child. There are States with relatively high- and low-federal claims at each level of CFSR performance.
Figure 5.
Child and Family Services Review Compliance Is
Only Weakly Related to Levels of Title IV-E Foster Care Funds
Claimed Per Eligible Child
(data shown for 50 states plus DC)
Claiming levels similarly bear little relationship to States' performance in achieving permanency for children in foster care. Figure 6 plots each State's federal claims for the title IV-E foster care program per title IV-E eligible child against the percentage of children in foster care for whom permanency is achieved. Permanency data, from the States' Child and Family Services Reviews, shows that States' success in either reunifying children with parents within one year or finalizing an adoption within two years of foster care entry varies widely. Six States achieve permanency within these time frames for under one-third of children in foster care, while five either approach or exceed the national standard of 90 percent. Most perform somewhere in between. The wide disparities among States' performance on what is a key child welfare function seem unconnected to the amount of federal funds claimed from the major source of federal child welfare funding, the title IV-E foster care program.
Figure 6.
Permanency Outcomes Are Unrelated to Levels of State Title IV-E Foster Care Claims
(data shown for 50 states plus DC)
If claims levels are not strongly related to child welfare system quality or outcomes, what other factors might be involved in determining spending? Variation among States in the actual foster care rates paid to families caring for children bears only a weak relationship to per-child foster care claims levels (Figure 7). As an example, four of six States with basic maintenance payments in 2000 of less than $300 per month for a young child had higher than median levels of claims per child. These four States also had higher federal claims per child than did four of seven States which in 2000 paid basic maintenance rates of higher than $500 per month for young children. Patterns of residential care use among States are similarly unrelated to claiming disparities.
Figure 7.
Foster Care Maintenance Rates Are Weakly Related to Foster Care Claims
Wide disparities in federal claims might be viewed as positive if States were achieving better outcomes with higher spending. This argument does not hold up to scrutiny, however, in the face of Child and Family Services Review results. The findings of these reviews are disappointing even in States with relatively high costs. Of course, because title IV-E is the focus here, this analysis only includes foster care costs. States' spending on other child welfare services may contribute to performance. The wide variety of these other potential funding sources and their variability among the States, however, makes it quite difficult to examine them in a consistent fashion.
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The Current Funding Structure is Inflexible, Emphasizing Foster Care
Title IV-E has long been criticized because it funds foster care on an unlimited basis without providing for services that would either prevent the child's removal from the home or speed permanency (see, for example, The Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care, 2004 and McDonald, Salyers and Shaver 2004). Funding sources for preventive and reunification services, primarily the Child Welfare Services Program and the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program funded under title IV-B of the Social Security Act, are quite small in comparison with those dedicated to foster care and adoption. As shown in Figure 8, foster care funding under title IV-E made up nearly two-thirds (65%) of federal funding dedicated to child welfare purposes in Fiscal Year 2004. Adoption Assistance funding (also authorized under title IV-E) represents another 22%. Funding sources that may be used for preventive services (but which also fund some foster care and adoption related services), including funds from the title IV-B programs and the discretionary programs funded from authorizations in the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, represent 11% of federal child welfare program funds.
Figure 8.
Federal Child Welfare Funding, FY2004
Other federal social services programs such as the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) also fund some services for families experiencing or at risk of child welfare involvement, as can Medicaid. These funding streams are not intended primarily for these purposes, however, and, with the exception of SSBG, available program data does not break out spending on child welfare related purposes. (The Fiscal Year 2002 annual expenditure report for the SSBG program (HHS, 2004) shows that states spent a total of $634 million in SSBG funds for child welfare services that year.) Surveys and analysis conducted by private research organizations indicate these funding sources provide considerable funding for child welfare services, though much of that is still concentrated on out-of-home care. Studies conducted by the Urban Institute found that in State Fiscal Year 2002 these “non-traditional” federal child welfare funding sources (primarily SSBG, TANF and Medicaid) paid for just over $5 billion in child welfare services. Of this total, $2.1 billion was spent on out-of-home placements, $1.3 billion paid for other services including prevention and treatment, $419 million went to administrative activities, and $98 million funded adoption services. States were unable to categorize purposes on which the remainder of funds were spent, nearly $700 million (Scarcella, Bess, Zielewski, Warner and Geen, 2004).
Some have argued that because foster care is an entitlement for eligible children while service funds are limited, title IV-E encourages foster care placement. However, it seems unlikely that caseworkers make placement decisions on the basis of children's title IV-E eligibility, nor is it likely that judges use title IV-E status as a significant factor in their placement rulings. Indeed, caseworkers and judges are often unaware of children's eligibility status. A lack of available family services, however, could plausibly tip caseworkers' decisions toward placement or delay a child's discharge. Quantifying such effects is difficult, however.
Many in the child welfare field believe that with more flexibility in funding States would devote additional resources to preventive and reunification services, and that better outcomes for children and families could be achieved. Since 1996, Child Welfare Demonstration Projects in 17 States have generated evidence about the effects of allowing State and local agencies to use federal foster care funds more flexibly, either for children not normally eligible for title IV-E or for services title IV-E would could not otherwise cover. While most of the States tested a single, specific alternative use for foster care funds, such as guardianship subsidies or improved interventions for parents with substance abuse problems or children with serious mental health conditions, four States are testing broader systems of flexible funding that resemble the Administration's proposal for a Child Welfare Program Option. These demonstrations are operating in Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon. In each case, the State provides counties a fixed allotment of title IV-E funds which then may be used to pay for services to prevent foster care placement, facilitate reunification, or otherwise ensure safe, permanent outcomes for children.
Evaluation results to date are encouraging. While the demonstrations did not always achieve their goals, in no case did outcomes for children deteriorate as a result of increased flexibility. North Carolina found flexible funding contributed to declines in the probability of out-of-home placement following a substantiated child abuse or neglect report. Demonstration counties in Ohio expressed increased support for prevention activities and were more likely than traditionally funded counties to create new or expanded prevention services. And in Oregon, the combination of demonstration funds and the State's System of Care Initiative dramatically improved the likelihood that at-risk children could remain safely in their homes rather than being placed in foster care. It should be noted that demonstration projects did not provide any more title IV-E funds than the State would have received in the absence of a demonstration. The projects were cost-neutral. States were granted only the flexibility to spend funds in broader ways than is normally allowed.
Flexible spending alone will not address the weaknesses in child welfare systems around the country. But such flexibility can allow strong local leaders to implement practice improvements more easily and thereby generate improved outcomes. Among the types of practice changes implemented in flexible funding demonstrations are strengthened family assessments; enhanced visitation; intensive family reunification services; family decision meetings; and improved access to substance abuse and mental health treatment. That nearly half of States have implemented waiver demonstrations indicates widespread interest in more flexible funding for State child welfare programs. Interest in flexible funding has grown now that many States have successfully implemented new service models while enhancing, or at least not compromising, safety, permanency and child well-being.
In recognition that flexibility can produce best results when accompanied by enhanced funding, the Bush Administration has consistently supported funding increases for child welfare. In particular, HHS budgets from FY2002 through FY2005 each included substantial proposed increases for the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program, in the amount of $1 billion over five years. However, Congress each year appropriated substantially less than the requested amount. For FY2005, the Administration also proposed substantial increases for several key child abuse prevention efforts authorized under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act which again were not funded by Congress.
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The Financing Structure Has Not Kept Pace with a Changing Child Welfare Field
A great deal has changed in the world of child welfare since the federal foster care program was established. The program initially created in 1961, however, has continued without major revision to its financing structure. The result is a funding stream seriously mismatched to current program needs. The goals of the child welfare system are to improve the safety, permanency and well-being of children and families served. By requiring that the great majority of federal funding for child welfare services be spent only on foster care, the financing system undermines the accomplishment of these goals.
Title IV-E funding was designed with the intention that the program funding would adjust automatically to changes in social need. However, it is difficult to conclude from claims levels that social need has been the driving force behind spending patterns that vary wildly from State to State. Service practices seem to have adjusted to the funding, rather than vice versa. Throughout the program's history, growth far outpaced changes in the population of children being served. And while current growth has slowed considerably, declines in the number of children in foster care have not yet translated into lower program claims. The recent stabilization of the program's funding, however, makes this a good time to re-examine the structure of title IV-E and whether that funding structure continues to meet the needs of the child welfare field. Since the number of children in foster care is expected to be flat or declining for the foreseeable future, there is less short-term risk in potential financing system changes than is the case when needs are rapidly escalating.
Improved preventive and family support services for children and families at risk of foster care placement, therapeutic care and remediation of problems for families with children in foster care, and post-discharge services for families after children leave out of home care, are each essential to the achievement of the child welfare system's goals. Yet these are precisely the services that title IV-E is least able to support. The result has been child welfare systems unable to achieve positive outcomes for children. This weak performance has been documented by Child and Family Services Reviews conducted across the nation. But as States develop and implement Program Improvement Plans, title IV-E funds are largely unavailable to address the challenges.
From complex eligibility criteria based in part on a program that no longer exists, to intricate claiming rules that demand caseworkers' every action be documented and characterized, title IV-E is a funding stream driven toward process rather than outcomes. With the advent of the Child and Family Services Reviews, and systemic improvements initiated in response to the Adoption and Safe Families Act, Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services have made significant strides toward re-orienting child welfare programs to be outcomes focused. Until the funding is structured to support these outcomes, however, improvements may be constrained.
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Proposed Child Welfare Program Option Described
The President's FY2006 budget once again proposes to create a Child Welfare Program Option which would allow States a choice between the current title IV-E program and a five year capped, flexible allocation of funds equivalent to anticipated title IV-E program levels. This concept was first proposed by the President for FY 2004. While the last Congress did not complete work on child welfare financing, the Administration continues to call for consideration of financing reform. The President's proposal has a number of distinct advantages over both current law as well as in contrast to more traditional block grants that have been considered in the past.
The Child Welfare Program Option would allow States to use title IV-E funds for foster care payments, prevention activities, training and other service-related child welfare activities B a far broader range of uses than allowed under current law. Increased flexibility will empower States to develop child welfare systems that support a continuum of services for families in crisis and children at risk while being relieved of the administrative burden created by current federal requirements, including the need to determine the child's eligibility for AFDC.
Child safety protections under current law would continue under the President's proposal. These include requirements for conducting criminal background checks and licensing foster care providers, obtaining judicial oversight of decisions related to a child's removal and permanency, meeting permanency time lines, developing case plans for all children in foster care, and prohibiting race-based discrimination in foster and adoptive placements.
In contrast to some previous flexible funding proposals, the President's Child Welfare Program Option would be an optional alternative to the current financing system. States desiring the flexibility it would afford could opt in during the initial program year for a five year period. State allocations would be based on historic expenditure levels and would be calculated to be cost-neutral to the federal government over a five year period. A State could choose to receive accelerated, up-front funding in the early years of the program in order to make investments in services that are likely to result in cost savings in later years. The proposal includes a maintenance of effort requirement to ensure that those States selecting the new option maintain their existing level of investment in the program. But those States unwilling to accept the risk and the promise of flexibility could choose to continue operating under current program rules.
To address fears that some future social crisis might create unexpected and unforeseeable child welfare needs, the President has also proposed to allow participating States access to the TANF Contingency Fund if unanticipated emergencies result in funding shortfalls. Specific criteria would govern the circumstances under which States could withdraw funds from this source. This feature, too, responds to concerns expressed in past child welfare financing discussions.
The proposal includes two set asides within the Child Welfare Program Option. The first would provide some Tribes direct access to title IV-E funds. Under current law Tribes may only receive title IV-E funds through agreements with States. Through a proposed $30 million set aside in the CWPO, however, tribes demonstrating the capacity to operate foster care programs could receive direct funding to do so and would be subject to similar program requirements as States.
A second set aside would dedicate a relatively small amount of funds to facilitate program monitoring, technical assistance to support the efforts of State and tribal child welfare programs, and to conduct important child welfare research. These funds will ensure that sufficient resources are available to understand how the new option affects child welfare services and outcomes for children and families, and to support States in their efforts to reconfigure programs to achieve better results.
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Benefits of the Proposed Child Welfare Program Option
The Child Welfare Program Option would allow innovative State and local child welfare agencies to eliminate eligibility determination and drastically reduce the time now spent to document federal claims. This effort could then be redirected toward services and activities that more directly achieve safety, permanency and well-being for children and families. Investments in preventive services and improved case planning could also reduce foster care needs. States taking child welfare funds through the Option would be held accountable for their programs through Child and Family Services Reviews and standard audit requirements. But these States would no longer be required to document expenditures in the level of detail now required to justify federal matching funds. The flexibility afforded by the Option would allow agencies to direct funds to those activities most closely addressing families' needs. HHS could then focus more fully on partnerships with States to achieve positive outcomes for children and families.
The proposed Child Welfare Program Option (CWPO):
Creates Structural Incentives for Better Outcomes. The CWPO provides incentives for child welfare system improvement because it is through better outcomes that a State would “win” under the program. With a fixed funding level, States would be better off financially if children either stay at home safely, return home quickly, or are placed in adoptive homes (since Adoption Assistance would remain an entitlement). Since these are also the preferred outcomes for children, the program creates structural incentives that are in line with program goals.
Facilitates Quality Improvement. The CWPO would encourage States to fund service improvements, particularly those called for in their Program Improvement Plans (PIPs) by allowing federal funds to be used for the full range of activities contemplated under the PIPs. In contrast with current law, States operating under the CWPO that are successful in reducing the need for foster care will be able to reinvest their title IV-E funds in other child welfare services rather than losing them to diminished foster care claims.
Reduces Burden. Under the CWPO, the level of documentation required of States in order to receive federal child welfare funds would be reduced dramatically. While States would still be required to spend funds on child welfare services, they would no longer need to justify to the federal government for funding purposes precisely which services were delivered to which children. State and local funding decisions could in turn be made more in line with the needs of children and families without respect to whether the specific activity were reimbursable under title IV-E.
Increases Flexibility. The restrictions in current law regarding which child welfare services may be provided with federal funds constrain State and local decision making regarding service offerings. The increased flexibility afforded by the CWPO will provide officials closest to child welfare cases with additional funding options, potentially leading to a more comprehensive service array for children and families.
Promotes Ongoing Programmatic Adaptation and Innovation. The current system for claiming federal funds encourages status quo programming through its documentation requirements and close scrutiny of categories in which funding levels change significantly from year to year. States risk disallowances if they change how they claim or the services for which they claim federal funds. Alternatively, under current law innovation may be implemented without federal financial participation, a relatively costly option. The CWPO, on the other hand, would enable states to innovate using their federal foster care funds. Funds could be shifted among child welfare functions without concern for artificial expenditure categories or differential matching rates. The result is likely to be increased attention to outcomes for children and an improved ability to focus funding on strategies most likely to result in improved performance.
This paper has described the funding structure of the title IV-E foster care program and documented a number of its key weaknesses. In particular, the combination of detailed eligibility requirements and complex but narrow definitions of allowable costs force a focus on procedure rather than outcomes for children and families. Rules which have built up over the years cumulatively fail to support the program's goals of safety, permanency and child well-being. In addition, the restrictiveness of the federal foster care program prevents States from using these funds, by far the largest source of federal funding dedicated to child welfare activities, to implement many important elements in their Program Improvement Plans. These plans have been required of all States to address weaknesses in their programs detected during Child and Family Services Reviews. The Administration's proposed Child Welfare Program Option is intended to introduce flexibility while maintaining a focus on outcomes, retaining existing child protections, and providing a financial safety net for states in the form of access to the TANF Contingency Fund during unanticipated and unavoidable crises. The result will be a stronger and more responsive child welfare system that achieves better results for vulnerable children and families.
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References
Scarcella, Cynthia Andrews, Bess, Roseana, Zielewski, Erica Hecht, Warner, Lindsay, and Geen, Rob (2004). The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children IV. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Available online at: http://www.urban.org/Template.cfm?Section=ByAuthor&NavMenuID=63&template=/TaggedContent/ViewPublication.cfm&PublicationID=9128.
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (1992). 1992 Green Book. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (2004). 2004 Green Book. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Available online at: http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Documents.asp?section=813.
Frame, Laura (1999). “Suitable homes revisited: An historical look at child protection and welfare reform.” In Children and Youth Services Review, Vol 21, Nos. 9/10, pp. 719-754.
McDonald, Jess, Salyers, Nancy, and Shaver, Michael (2004). The Foster Care Straightjacket: Innovation, Federal Financing and Accountability in State Foster Care Reform. Urbana-Champaign: Child and Family Research Center, School of Social Work, University of Illinois. Available online at http://www.fosteringresults.org/
The Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care (2004). Fostering the Future: Safety, Permanence and Well-Being for Children in Foster Care. Washington, CC: The Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2005). Budget in Brief FY2006. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Available online at: http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004). SSBG 2002: Helping States Serve the Needs of America's Families, Adults and Children. Washington, DC: Administration for Children and Families. Available online at: http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/ssbg/index.htm
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Note on Data Sources:
Data presented in this report are derived primarily from HHS information sources. Most are publicly available as follows:
Data on title IV-E funding and caseload history (figure 1) are from the “2004 Green Book” published by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means (tables 11-2 and 11-3). Years not included in the 2004 Green Book may be found in the equivalent table from previous editions. The 2004 Green Book is online at: http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Documents.asp?section=813.
Data for 2002 federal foster care claims is available in 2004 Green Book, table 11-8. Other years used in this report are unpublished HHS data. These data are used in figures 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7.
Final Reports for Child and Family Services Reviews (which contain data used in figures 4, 5 and 6) and Title IV-E Eligibility Reviews (containing data used in table 1) are available online from the Children's Bureau within HHS's Administration for Children and Families at: http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/cwrp/index.htm.
State foster care maintenance rates shown in figure 7 are those reported by the Child Welfare League of America. They are included in the 2004 Green Book, table 11-9.
Data on child welfare funding in figure 8 are derived from 2004 actual figures shown in HHS's FY2006 Budget. Available online at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm.
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Endnote
1. The August 2005 version contains updates to calculations that incorporate revised Title IV-E foster care caseload data submitted by Ohio. Subsequent to the report’s initial publication, officials in Ohio realized that the number of Title IV-E foster children reported on its program claims forms, which ASPE relied on for the analysis, had been incorrect. This had implications for the claims-per-child calculated in figure 2 and used in figures 5, 6 and 7. The change is most noticeable on figure 2, in which the per-child claims for Ohio have moved down in the rankings. The underlying thesis of the analysis is unaffected by the update.
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* About This Issue Brief
This ASPE Issue Brief on “How and Why the Current Funding Structure Fails to Meet the Needs of the Child Welfare Field” was written by Laura Radel with assistance from staff in the Administration for Children and Families.
The Issue Brief provides an overview of the financing of the federal foster care program, documenting and explaining several key weaknesses in the current funding structure. It also discusses the Administration’s alternative financing proposal, the creation of a Child Welfare Program Option, which would allow States to choose between financing options.
Office of Human Services Policy
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Washington, DC 20201
Michael J. O'Grady, Ph.D.
Assistant Secretary
Barbara B. Broman
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Services Policy
How to Obtain a Printed Copy
To obtain a printed copy of this report, send the title and your mailing information to:
Human Services Policy, Room 404E
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Av, SW
Washington, DC 20201
Fax: (202) 690-6562
Or, you can print the PDF version.
Home Pages:
Human Services Policy (HSP)
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation ASPE)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Last revised: 09/07/05
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/05/fc-financing-ib/index.htm
Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Saturday, January 30, 2010
New Hampshire Foster Care Rates 2005
NEW HAMPSHIRE
RATES UPDATED DECEMBER 2005
ALL COUNTIES ARE PAYING SAME STATE RATE
NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
6 HAZEN DRIVE
CONCORD NEW HAMPSHIRE 03301
603-271-4708
FAX: 603-271-4729
ICPC CONTACT: LINDA BOMBACI
REGULAR DAILY RATES
AGE DAILY RATE
0-5YRS 12.87
6-11 14.02
12-17 16.55
Max of 10 days: Max of 5 days:
SPECIALIZED FOSTER CARE EMERGENCY FOSTER CARE CRISIS FOSTER CARE
AGE DAILY RATE DAILY RATE DAILY RATE
0-5YRS 19.32 33.08 38.08
6-11 21.03 33.08 38.08
12-17 24.81 33.08 38.08
SUPPLEMENTAL FOSTER CARE
DAILY RATE
LEVEL 1 7.01
LEVEL 2 14.02
LEVEL 3 21.03
LEVEL 4 35.95
ANNUAL CLOTHING INITIAL CLOTHING
ALL AGES $.85 daily rate ALL AGES $50. First time in placement
SPECIAL OCCASION ALLOWANCES
(1) In addition to the daily board and care rate, a child in foster care receives funds for his or her birthday, back to school in August, and holiday celebrations in December.
(2) The special occasion allowances are paid to the foster parents to purchase gifts, toys, or extra clothing for the child.
(3) The following table reflects the payment amounts:
Birth - 5 years 6 - 10 years 11 - 13 years 14 - 18 years
Birthday $50.00 $75.00 $75.00 $75.00
Back to School $50.00 $50.00 $75.00 $ 100.00
Holiday $50.00 $50.00 $50.00 $50.00
Nationwide Foster Care Rates: http://dcfs.co.la.ca.us/policy/hndbook%20fce/E070/NationalRates.htm
RATES UPDATED DECEMBER 2005
ALL COUNTIES ARE PAYING SAME STATE RATE
NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
6 HAZEN DRIVE
CONCORD NEW HAMPSHIRE 03301
603-271-4708
FAX: 603-271-4729
ICPC CONTACT: LINDA BOMBACI
REGULAR DAILY RATES
AGE DAILY RATE
0-5YRS 12.87
6-11 14.02
12-17 16.55
Max of 10 days: Max of 5 days:
SPECIALIZED FOSTER CARE EMERGENCY FOSTER CARE CRISIS FOSTER CARE
AGE DAILY RATE DAILY RATE DAILY RATE
0-5YRS 19.32 33.08 38.08
6-11 21.03 33.08 38.08
12-17 24.81 33.08 38.08
SUPPLEMENTAL FOSTER CARE
DAILY RATE
LEVEL 1 7.01
LEVEL 2 14.02
LEVEL 3 21.03
LEVEL 4 35.95
ANNUAL CLOTHING INITIAL CLOTHING
ALL AGES $.85 daily rate ALL AGES $50. First time in placement
SPECIAL OCCASION ALLOWANCES
(1) In addition to the daily board and care rate, a child in foster care receives funds for his or her birthday, back to school in August, and holiday celebrations in December.
(2) The special occasion allowances are paid to the foster parents to purchase gifts, toys, or extra clothing for the child.
(3) The following table reflects the payment amounts:
Birth - 5 years 6 - 10 years 11 - 13 years 14 - 18 years
Birthday $50.00 $75.00 $75.00 $75.00
Back to School $50.00 $50.00 $75.00 $ 100.00
Holiday $50.00 $50.00 $50.00 $50.00
Nationwide Foster Care Rates: http://dcfs.co.la.ca.us/policy/hndbook%20fce/E070/NationalRates.htm
Adoption Incentive Payments
BROWSE FEDERAL GRANTS
Adoption Incentive Payments (93.603)
Program
93.603 Adoption Incentive Payments
Federal Agency
Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Office: Administration for Children and Families
Authorization
Social Security Act, Title IV-E, Section 473A; as amended.
Program Number
93.603
Last Known Status
Active
Objectives
To provide incentives to States to increase annually the number of foster child adoptions, special needs adoptions, and older child adoptions.
Types of Assistance
FORMULA GRANTS
Uses and Use Restrictions
A State shall not expend an amount paid to the State under this grant except to provide to children of families any activity or service (including post-adoption services) that may be provided under Part B or E of Title IV of the Social Security Act. Amounts expended by a State in accordance with the preceding sentence shall be disregarded in determining State expenditures for purposes of Federal matching payments under Sections 423, 434, and 474 of the Social Security Act.
Eligibility Requirements
Applicant Eligibility
Applications are not required. The States, including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, may receive payments. The Children's Bureau shall determine the numbers of foster child adoptions, the special needs adoptions, and the older child adoption in a State on the basis of AFCARS data as reported by each State and accepted by the Children's Bureau no later than May 15 of the fiscal year subsequent to the fiscal year in which the adoptions were finalized (i.e., the "earning year").
Beneficiary Eligibility
Beneficiaries are those children and families eligible under Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, as amended.
Credentials/Documentation
The Children's bureau shall determine the numbers of foster child adoptions, the special needs adoptions, and the older child adoptions, as well as the highest ever foster child adoption rate in a State on the basis of data reported by each State to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data and accepted by the Children's Bureau no later than May 15 of the fiscal year subsequent to the fiscal year in which the adoptions were finalized (i.e., the "earning year"). OMB Circular No. A-87 applies to this program.
Application and Award Process
Preapplication Coordination
Preapplication coordination is not applicable. Environmental impact information is not required for this program. This program is excluded from coverage under E.O. 12372.
Application Procedure
OMB Circular No. A-102 applies to this program. This program is excluded from coverage under OMB Circular No. A-110. States are automatic applicants.
Award Procedure
Incentive payments will be issued annually, in the fiscal year subsequent to the earning year. Payment will be based on AFCARS data submitted no later than May 15 of the fiscal year following the earning year. AFCARS data must be accepted and approved by the Children's Bureau.
Deadlines
Contact the headquarters or regional office, as appropriate, for application deadlines.
Range of Approval/Disapproval Time
AFCARS reports must be received no later than May 15 of subsequent fiscal years in order to be considered for incentive payments.
Appeals
Not Applicable.
Renewals
Each "earning year" (fiscal years 2008 - 2012), State adoption data received through AFCARS will be considered on its own merit.
Assistance Considerations
Formula and Matching Requirements
Statutory Formula:
Matching Requirements: The adoption incentive payment payable to a State for a fiscal year shall be equal to the sum of (a) $4,000, multiplied by the number of foster child adoptions in the State during the fiscal year which exceeds the base number of foster child adoptions for the State for the fiscal year; (b) $8,000 multiplied by the number of foster child adoptions of children age 9 or older in the State during the fiscal year in which exceeds the base number of foster child adoption of children age 9 or older for the State for the fiscal year; and (c) $4,000, multiplied by the number of special needs adoptions of children under age nine in the State during the fiscal year which exceeds the base number of special needs adoptions of children under age 9 for the State for the fiscal year, if the state receives a bonus under (a) or (b). Awards are pro-rated if insufficient funds are available to make the full awards. In addition, if funds remain available after making the above awards, a State is eligible to earn an additional incentive award by exceeding the highest ever foster child adoption rate in the State between FY 2002 and the immediately preceding fiscal year. The incentive is calculated by multiplying the State's highest ever foster child adoption rate times the number of children in foster care on the last day of the preceding fiscal year and subtracting that number from the number of foster child adoptions in the State in that fiscal year. That number is rounded to the nearest whole number and then multiplied by $1,000. There are no matching requirements for these funds.
This program does not have MOE requirements.
Length and Time Phasing of Assistance
Payments to a State in a fiscal year shall remain available for use by the State through the end of the succeeding fiscal year. Method of awarding/releasing assistance: lump sum.
Post Assistance Requirements
Reports
States must identify in the Child and Family Services Plan (CFSP) or Annual Progress and Services Report (APSR) as applicable (due June 30 of each year), the services they have provided to children and families as a result of the expenditure of adoption incentive payments. Should more than one fiscal year's incentive funds be expended during a given reporting period, the report should reflect the services provided and identify the fiscal year's funds expended. PSC-272. No progress reports are required. Actual expenditures of incentive funds must be reported annually on Form SF- 269, Financial Status Report. Performance monitoring is not applicable.
Audits
In accordance with the provisions of OMB Circular No. A-133 (Revised, June 27, 2003), "Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations," nonfederal entities that expend financial assistance of $500,000 or more in Federal awards will have a single or a program-specific audit conducted for that year. Nonfederal entities that expend less than $500,000 a year in Federal awards are exempt from Federal audit requirements for that year, except as noted in Circular No. A-133. In accordance with 45 CFR 92.
Records
None.
Program Accomplishments
Fiscal Year 2009: No Current Data Available Fiscal Year 2010: Number of States to receive incentive awards is unknown. Fiscal Year 2011: No Current Data Available
Financial Information
Account Identification
75-1536-0-1-506.
Obligations
(Formula Grants) FY 08 $9,323,132; FY 09 est $36,500,000; FY 10 est $39,500,000
Range and Average of Financial Assistance
FY 08: For the FY 2007 earning year, 21 States earned incentive payments totaling $11.1 million, which $9.3 million paid in FY 08 and $1.8 million paid in FY 09. The awards ranged from $12,000 to $3,612,000 with an average award amount of $527,905 for qualifying States.
Regulations, Guidelines and Literature
ACYF-CB-PI-04-03, issued 03/23/04; ACYF-CB-PI-08-03, issued October 3, 2008.
Related Programs
93.556 Promoting Safe and Stable Families; 93.645 Child Welfare Services_State Grants; 93.658 Foster Care_Title IV-E; 93.659 Adoption Assistance
Information Contacts
Regional or Local Office
See Regional Agency Offices. ACF Children's Bureau Regional Child Welfare Program Managers.
Headquarters Office
Gail Collins Division of Program Implementation, Children's Bureau, Administration on Children, Youth and Families, 1250 Maryland Ave, SW, 8th Floor, Washington, District of Columbia 20024 Phone: 202-205-8552
Web Site Address
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb.
Examples of Funded Projects
Not Applicable.
Criteria for Selecting Proposals
All State Agencies are considered if the number of adoptions exceed the baseline number of adoptions.
Related Adoption Incentive Payments Federal Grants
Child Welfare Services-State Grants
Services to Victims of a Severe Form of Trafficking
Adoption Assistance
Education and Prevention to Reduce Sexual Abuse of Runaway, Homeless and Street Youth
Refugee and Entrant Assistance-Wilson/Fish Program
Other Department of Health and Human Services Agencies
Administration for Children and Families
Administration on Aging
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Centers for Disease Control
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Food and Drug Administration
Health Resources and Services Administration
Indian Health Service
National Institutes of Health
Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion
Office of Minority Health
Office of Population Affairs
Office of the Secretary
President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
© 2004-2010 Federal Grants Wire, All Rights
http://www.federalgrantswire.com/adoption-incentive-payments.html
Adoption Incentive Payments (93.603)
Program
93.603 Adoption Incentive Payments
Federal Agency
Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Office: Administration for Children and Families
Authorization
Social Security Act, Title IV-E, Section 473A; as amended.
Program Number
93.603
Last Known Status
Active
Objectives
To provide incentives to States to increase annually the number of foster child adoptions, special needs adoptions, and older child adoptions.
Types of Assistance
FORMULA GRANTS
Uses and Use Restrictions
A State shall not expend an amount paid to the State under this grant except to provide to children of families any activity or service (including post-adoption services) that may be provided under Part B or E of Title IV of the Social Security Act. Amounts expended by a State in accordance with the preceding sentence shall be disregarded in determining State expenditures for purposes of Federal matching payments under Sections 423, 434, and 474 of the Social Security Act.
Eligibility Requirements
Applicant Eligibility
Applications are not required. The States, including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, may receive payments. The Children's Bureau shall determine the numbers of foster child adoptions, the special needs adoptions, and the older child adoption in a State on the basis of AFCARS data as reported by each State and accepted by the Children's Bureau no later than May 15 of the fiscal year subsequent to the fiscal year in which the adoptions were finalized (i.e., the "earning year").
Beneficiary Eligibility
Beneficiaries are those children and families eligible under Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, as amended.
Credentials/Documentation
The Children's bureau shall determine the numbers of foster child adoptions, the special needs adoptions, and the older child adoptions, as well as the highest ever foster child adoption rate in a State on the basis of data reported by each State to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data and accepted by the Children's Bureau no later than May 15 of the fiscal year subsequent to the fiscal year in which the adoptions were finalized (i.e., the "earning year"). OMB Circular No. A-87 applies to this program.
Application and Award Process
Preapplication Coordination
Preapplication coordination is not applicable. Environmental impact information is not required for this program. This program is excluded from coverage under E.O. 12372.
Application Procedure
OMB Circular No. A-102 applies to this program. This program is excluded from coverage under OMB Circular No. A-110. States are automatic applicants.
Award Procedure
Incentive payments will be issued annually, in the fiscal year subsequent to the earning year. Payment will be based on AFCARS data submitted no later than May 15 of the fiscal year following the earning year. AFCARS data must be accepted and approved by the Children's Bureau.
Deadlines
Contact the headquarters or regional office, as appropriate, for application deadlines.
Range of Approval/Disapproval Time
AFCARS reports must be received no later than May 15 of subsequent fiscal years in order to be considered for incentive payments.
Appeals
Not Applicable.
Renewals
Each "earning year" (fiscal years 2008 - 2012), State adoption data received through AFCARS will be considered on its own merit.
Assistance Considerations
Formula and Matching Requirements
Statutory Formula:
Matching Requirements: The adoption incentive payment payable to a State for a fiscal year shall be equal to the sum of (a) $4,000, multiplied by the number of foster child adoptions in the State during the fiscal year which exceeds the base number of foster child adoptions for the State for the fiscal year; (b) $8,000 multiplied by the number of foster child adoptions of children age 9 or older in the State during the fiscal year in which exceeds the base number of foster child adoption of children age 9 or older for the State for the fiscal year; and (c) $4,000, multiplied by the number of special needs adoptions of children under age nine in the State during the fiscal year which exceeds the base number of special needs adoptions of children under age 9 for the State for the fiscal year, if the state receives a bonus under (a) or (b). Awards are pro-rated if insufficient funds are available to make the full awards. In addition, if funds remain available after making the above awards, a State is eligible to earn an additional incentive award by exceeding the highest ever foster child adoption rate in the State between FY 2002 and the immediately preceding fiscal year. The incentive is calculated by multiplying the State's highest ever foster child adoption rate times the number of children in foster care on the last day of the preceding fiscal year and subtracting that number from the number of foster child adoptions in the State in that fiscal year. That number is rounded to the nearest whole number and then multiplied by $1,000. There are no matching requirements for these funds.
This program does not have MOE requirements.
Length and Time Phasing of Assistance
Payments to a State in a fiscal year shall remain available for use by the State through the end of the succeeding fiscal year. Method of awarding/releasing assistance: lump sum.
Post Assistance Requirements
Reports
States must identify in the Child and Family Services Plan (CFSP) or Annual Progress and Services Report (APSR) as applicable (due June 30 of each year), the services they have provided to children and families as a result of the expenditure of adoption incentive payments. Should more than one fiscal year's incentive funds be expended during a given reporting period, the report should reflect the services provided and identify the fiscal year's funds expended. PSC-272. No progress reports are required. Actual expenditures of incentive funds must be reported annually on Form SF- 269, Financial Status Report. Performance monitoring is not applicable.
Audits
In accordance with the provisions of OMB Circular No. A-133 (Revised, June 27, 2003), "Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations," nonfederal entities that expend financial assistance of $500,000 or more in Federal awards will have a single or a program-specific audit conducted for that year. Nonfederal entities that expend less than $500,000 a year in Federal awards are exempt from Federal audit requirements for that year, except as noted in Circular No. A-133. In accordance with 45 CFR 92.
Records
None.
Program Accomplishments
Fiscal Year 2009: No Current Data Available Fiscal Year 2010: Number of States to receive incentive awards is unknown. Fiscal Year 2011: No Current Data Available
Financial Information
Account Identification
75-1536-0-1-506.
Obligations
(Formula Grants) FY 08 $9,323,132; FY 09 est $36,500,000; FY 10 est $39,500,000
Range and Average of Financial Assistance
FY 08: For the FY 2007 earning year, 21 States earned incentive payments totaling $11.1 million, which $9.3 million paid in FY 08 and $1.8 million paid in FY 09. The awards ranged from $12,000 to $3,612,000 with an average award amount of $527,905 for qualifying States.
Regulations, Guidelines and Literature
ACYF-CB-PI-04-03, issued 03/23/04; ACYF-CB-PI-08-03, issued October 3, 2008.
Related Programs
93.556 Promoting Safe and Stable Families; 93.645 Child Welfare Services_State Grants; 93.658 Foster Care_Title IV-E; 93.659 Adoption Assistance
Information Contacts
Regional or Local Office
See Regional Agency Offices. ACF Children's Bureau Regional Child Welfare Program Managers.
Headquarters Office
Gail Collins Division of Program Implementation, Children's Bureau, Administration on Children, Youth and Families, 1250 Maryland Ave, SW, 8th Floor, Washington, District of Columbia 20024 Phone: 202-205-8552
Web Site Address
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb.
Examples of Funded Projects
Not Applicable.
Criteria for Selecting Proposals
All State Agencies are considered if the number of adoptions exceed the baseline number of adoptions.
Related Adoption Incentive Payments Federal Grants
Child Welfare Services-State Grants
Services to Victims of a Severe Form of Trafficking
Adoption Assistance
Education and Prevention to Reduce Sexual Abuse of Runaway, Homeless and Street Youth
Refugee and Entrant Assistance-Wilson/Fish Program
Other Department of Health and Human Services Agencies
Administration for Children and Families
Administration on Aging
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Centers for Disease Control
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Food and Drug Administration
Health Resources and Services Administration
Indian Health Service
National Institutes of Health
Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion
Office of Minority Health
Office of Population Affairs
Office of the Secretary
President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
© 2004-2010 Federal Grants Wire, All Rights
http://www.federalgrantswire.com/adoption-incentive-payments.html
HHS Awards $35 Million to States for Increasing Adoptions
News Release
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, September 14, 2009
Contact: ACF Press Office
(202) 401 9215
HHS Awards $35 Million to States for Increasing Adoptions
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) today awarded $35 million to 38 states and Puerto Rico for increasing the number of children adopted from foster care. States use the funds from the adoption incentive award to enhance their programs for abused and neglected children.
“Adopting a child from foster care is a wonderful way to enrich any family’s life,” said HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius. “We congratulate the states that performed so well this year and we thank the parents who are providing loving and permanent homes.”
The Adoption Incentives program was created as part of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. The original program authorized incentive funds to states that increased the number of children adopted from foster care. In order to get payments, states had to increase the number of children adopted relative to baseline data.
Under the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-351), the adoption incentives were revamped to provide stronger incentives for states to redouble their efforts to find children – particularly older children and children with special needs – loving adoptive homes. In addition, the law introduced the concept of an adoption rate, which is derived from comparing current year adoptions to the number of children in care at the end of the previous year. States receive additional money if they exceed their highest foster child adoption rate for previous years back to 2002. The Adoption Incentive program gives states $4,000 for every foster child adopted above their 2007 baseline, plus a payment of $8,000 for every foster child age nine and older and $4,000 for every other special needs child adopted above the respective baselines. In addition, states receive $1,000 for every foster child adopted over and above the level of the state’s highest foster child adoption rate for previous years.
“We are pleased with the positive results states have achieved under the new adoption incentive guidelines,” said David Hansell, acting assistant secretary for children and families. “Older children with special needs are the hardest to find homes for, but they are especially deserving of the safety and stability of an adoptive family.”
States receiving today’s funding are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Puerto Rico also qualified for an incentive award.
A list of each state’s adoption incentive award amount can be found at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/press/2009/fy09_adoption_incentive_awards.htm.
###
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: All HHS press releases, fact sheets and other press materials are available at http://www.hhs.gov/news.
Last revised: November 17, 2009
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/09/20090914a.html
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, September 14, 2009
Contact: ACF Press Office
(202) 401 9215
HHS Awards $35 Million to States for Increasing Adoptions
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) today awarded $35 million to 38 states and Puerto Rico for increasing the number of children adopted from foster care. States use the funds from the adoption incentive award to enhance their programs for abused and neglected children.
“Adopting a child from foster care is a wonderful way to enrich any family’s life,” said HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius. “We congratulate the states that performed so well this year and we thank the parents who are providing loving and permanent homes.”
The Adoption Incentives program was created as part of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. The original program authorized incentive funds to states that increased the number of children adopted from foster care. In order to get payments, states had to increase the number of children adopted relative to baseline data.
Under the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-351), the adoption incentives were revamped to provide stronger incentives for states to redouble their efforts to find children – particularly older children and children with special needs – loving adoptive homes. In addition, the law introduced the concept of an adoption rate, which is derived from comparing current year adoptions to the number of children in care at the end of the previous year. States receive additional money if they exceed their highest foster child adoption rate for previous years back to 2002. The Adoption Incentive program gives states $4,000 for every foster child adopted above their 2007 baseline, plus a payment of $8,000 for every foster child age nine and older and $4,000 for every other special needs child adopted above the respective baselines. In addition, states receive $1,000 for every foster child adopted over and above the level of the state’s highest foster child adoption rate for previous years.
“We are pleased with the positive results states have achieved under the new adoption incentive guidelines,” said David Hansell, acting assistant secretary for children and families. “Older children with special needs are the hardest to find homes for, but they are especially deserving of the safety and stability of an adoptive family.”
States receiving today’s funding are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Puerto Rico also qualified for an incentive award.
A list of each state’s adoption incentive award amount can be found at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/press/2009/fy09_adoption_incentive_awards.htm.
###
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: All HHS press releases, fact sheets and other press materials are available at http://www.hhs.gov/news.
Last revised: November 17, 2009
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/09/20090914a.html
Detailed Information on the Adoption Incentives Assessment
Detailed Information on the
Adoption Incentives Assessment
View this program’s assessment summary.
Visit ExpectMore.gov to learn more about how Federal Government programs are assessed and their plans for improvement.
Learn more about detailed assessments.
Program Code 10003500
Program Title Adoption Incentives
Department Name Dept of Health & Human Service
Agency/Bureau Name Administration for Children and Families
Program Type(s) Block/Formula Grant
Assessment Year 2005
Assessment Rating Adequate
Assessment Section Scores Section Score
Program Purpose & Design 100%
Strategic Planning 62%
Program Management 78%
Program Results/Accountability 16%
Program Funding Level
(in millions) FY2008 $4
FY2009 $4
Ongoing Program Improvement Plans
Completed Program Improvement Plans
Program Performance Measures
Questions/Answers (Detailed Assessment)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ongoing Program Improvement Plans
Year Began Improvement Plan Status Comments
2006 Identifying and addressing the barriers to increasing the proportion of children adopted from the foster care system. Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material "Road to Adoption and Foster Care" to Children's Bureau Regional Office staff.
Action taken, but not completed Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material ??Road to Adoption and Foster Care?? to Children??s Bureau Regional Office staff. Milestone to be completed January 2009.
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Review an additional 10 states through CFSR in FY 2009.
Action taken, but not completed Milestone: Review an additional 10 states through CFSR in FY 2009. Milestone to be completed September 2009.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material "Road to Adoption and Foster Care" to Children's Bureau Regional Office staff.
Action taken, but not completed Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material ??Road to Adoption and Foster Care?? to Children??s Bureau Regional Office staff. Milestone to be completed January 2009.
Completed Program Improvement Plans
Year Began Improvement Plan Status Comments
2006 Identifying and addressing the barriers to increasing the proportion of children adopted from the foster care system. Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency.
Completed Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency. Milestone to be completed October 2008.
2006 Developing an efficiency measure, which ties more closely to the program's goals.
Completed OMB approved the following efficiency measure in May 2006: "Maintain or decrease the average administrative claim per IV-E Adoption Assistance child."
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Encourage more timely adoptions, resulting in reduced adoption assistance administrative costs, by incorporating into the new Child and Family Service Review (CFSR) composite measures components addressing "Progress Toward Adoption of Children Who Are Legally Free for Adoption" and "Exits to Permanency for Children with TPR" (termination of parental rights), and begin using composites in second round of CFSRs.
Completed Milestone completed October 2006.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Report FY05 adoption numbers/rate and assess whether current adoption targets are appropriate.
Completed Milestone completed October 2006.
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Complete 2nd round of Child and Family Service Reviews (CFSR) in 14 states.
Completed Milestone completed September 2007.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Launch Spanish-language component of the national adoption PSA campaign to promote the adoption of children nine and older.
Completed Milestone completed December 2007.
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Review an additional 18 states through CFSR in FY 2008.
Completed Milestone: Review an additional 18 states through CFSR in FY 2008. Milestone to be completed September 2008.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency.
Completed Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency. Milestone to be completed October 2008.
Program Performance Measures
Term Type
Long-term/Annual Outcome Measure: Increase the adoption rate.
Explanation:The program will replace the absolute adoption measure with an adoption rate measure. Adoption rate is defined as the number of adoptions divided by the number of children in foster care at the end of the prior year. Updated 11/7/05. Language of measure changed from "Increase adoption rate to 10% by FY 2008" to "Increase adoption rate from 9.4% in FY 2003 to 10% by FY 2008." based on the FY07 budget submission. This measure is currently under appeal with OMB; a decision is pending. Also, years were out of order on PARTWeb, revised years and data to be in chronological order.
Year Target Actual
2003 58,500 9.67% (50,000)
2004 53,0005 10.22% (52,000)
2005 Baseline 10.26% (52,000)
2006 9.85% 9.91%
2007 9.90% 10.00%
2008 10.00% Oct-09
2009 10.10% Oct-10
2010 10.20% Oct-11
2011
2012
2013 10.50% Oct-14
Long-term/Annual Outcome Measure: Decrease the gap between the percentage of children nine and older waiting to be adopted and those actually adopted by 15 percentage points between FY 2006 and FY 2015.
Explanation:In FY 2003, the gap between the percentage of children nine and older waiting to be adopted and those actually adopted was 17 percentage points. An incentive to address this issue was added to the legislation as of the FY 2003 earning year. This measure will assess whether or not this new incentive is achieving its purpose. Updated 11/7/05. Years out of order on PARTWeb, revised years and data to be in chronological order. Data for FY 2006 will be available in October 2007. There are no results to report at this time.
Year Target Actual
2005 Baseline 15.7%
2006 16.7% 16.4%
2007 15.2% 16.8%
2008 13.7% Oct-09
2009 12.2% Oct-10
2010 10.7% Oct-11
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015 1.4% Oct-16
Annual Efficiency Measure: Maintain or decrease the average administrative claim per IV-E Adoption Assistance child.
Explanation:This efficiency measure sets annual targets to demonstrate improved efficiency through a gradual reduction in the average administrative claim per IV-E Adoption Assistance child. This is calculated by total computable claims submitted by states on the IV-E-1 for administrative costs divided by the average monthly number of children receiving Adoption Assistance maintenance payments.
Year Target Actual
2001 Pre-baseline $1,951
2002 Pre-baseline $1,833
2003 Pre-baseline $1,678
2004 Baseline $1,627
2005 $1,598 $1,560
2006 $1,566 $1,674
2007 $1,535 $1,777
2008 $1,504 Oct-09
2009 -2% under prev actl Oct-10
2010 -2% under prev actl Oct-11
Questions/Answers (Detailed Assessment)
Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design
Number Question Answer Score
1.1 Is the program purpose clear?
Explanation: The purpose of the Adoption Incentives Program is to encourage states to find permanent homes for children in the public foster care system through adoptions. The program provides financial incentives to states that increase the number of adoptions over the baselines in the following categories: 1) adoptions from the public foster care system ($4,000 per child), 2) adoptions of children with special needs under age nine ($2,000 per child), and 3) adoptions of older children, ages nine and older ($4,000 per child). While the number of adoptions in each of the three categories in FY 2002 served as the original baseline, the baseline has adjusted to reflect increases in the number of adoptions over the years.
Evidence: Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentive Payment.
YES 20%
1.2 Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: The program addresses the problem of "foster care drift," which describes children lingering in foster care without ever achieving permanency. According to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) the average length of stay in foster care was 22 months in FY 2003. Between FY 1998 and FY 2003, the proportion of children ages 9 and older waiting to be adopted increased from 39% to 49% while the proportion of children ages 9 and older who were adopted remained less than one third. Also, the average age of children waiting to be adopted increased from 7.8 to 8.7, and close to 8% of all children were emancipated from care and did not achieve permanency.
Evidence: Analysis of data available as of August 2004 from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
YES 20%
1.3 Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?
Explanation: This is the only Federal program that rewards adoptions with a bonus payment. The adoption incentives payments may be used toward allowable activities as defined in Title IV-E and IV-B of the Social Security Act, including the following: 1) recruiting adoptive families; 2) conducting home studies for foster care and adoptive families; 3) providing post-adoption services: and 4) promoting reunification through such services as mental health, parent training, and drug treatment. No such program exists with the adoption bonus design to incentivize more difficult adoptions at the state and local governments nor private and non-profit sectors,
Evidence: Social Security Act. Title IV-B: Child and Family Services and Title IV-E: Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance.
YES 20%
1.4 Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?
Explanation: There is no evidence that another approach or mechanism would be more efficient or effective to achieve the intended purpose. The adoption bonus payments serve as a strong incentive for states in encouraging adoptions and supp
Evidence: Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentive Payment.
YES 20%
1.5 Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?
Explanation: States are required to reinvest the adoption incentives bonus in the child welfare program for any services and activities allowable under title IV-B and title IV-E of the Social Security Act. The Annual Program and Services Report (APSR) requires states to identify how the incentive funds were spent. State primarily use the funds for activities related to recruiting adoptive parents, providing staff training on adoption related issues, and providing post-adoption services.
Evidence: PI 05-04. Annual Program and Services Report (APSR).
YES 20%
Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design Score 100%
Section 2 - Strategic Planning
Number Question Answer Score
2.1 Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?
Explanation: The program has a clear purpose to increase the number of adoption, with a particular emphasis on older children (ages 9 and older) and children with special needs. Currently, the program has a long term goal of finalizing 327,000 adoptions between FY 2003 and FY 2008, as published in the FY 2005 Annual Performance Plan. The program proposes to replace the current measure with the following adoption rate measure: Number of adoptions divided by the number of children in foster care at the end of the prior year. The program also proposes a new measure for decreasing the gap between the percentage of children nine and older waiting to be adopted and those actually adopted by 15 percentage points between FY 2006 and FY 2015, which meaningfully support the program's purpose. Finally, the program does not propose a measure for special needs children under age nine, because they are already adopted at a higher proportion than they appear in the waiting population.
Evidence: Final FY 2005 Annual Performance Plan, Final Revised FY 2004 Performance Plan, and FY 2003 Annual Performance Report.
YES 12%
2.2 Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?
Explanation: A decrease in the adoption gap of older children by 15% in FY 2015 is an ambitious long-term target. However, the proposed long-term targets for the adoption rate measures are not sufficiently ambitious because the minimal incremental increases will result in a decrease in the actual annual number of adoptions. The proposed revised targets also fall significantly short of the original published adoption targets.
Evidence: See measures tab.
NO 0%
2.3 Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?
Explanation: The long term measures also serve as the program's annual measure, which assesses incremental gains made in achieving the long term goal.
Evidence: See measures tab.
YES 12%
2.4 Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?
Explanation: The annual targets for the adoption rate measure are not sufficiently ambitious, because the actual number of annual adoptions would decrease from FY 2003 to FY 2008. The measure for decreasing the adoption gap for children ages 9 and older has a FY 2006 target of 16.7% whereas the FY 2003 actual gap was 16.9%. This is not ambitious since the FY 2006 target would essentially maintain the FY 2003 level for four years from FY 2003 to FY 2006.
Evidence: See measures tab.
NO 0%
2.5 Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?
Explanation: The program's bonus design ensures that partners work toward the common goal of increasing adoptions, especially adoptions of children for whom it is difficult to find a placement. State partners support the overall goal of the program, as evidenced by their participation in the Children Bureau's AdoptusKids project, which promotes the adoption of children waiting to be adopted and emphasizes adoptions of older children. State activities include the following: 1) listing children available for adoption on www.AdoptusKids.org; 2) establishing a recruitment response team, which responds to families inquiring about adoptions; 3) participation in technical assistance on issues such as working with the faith-based communities for effective recruitment strategies. Also, state partners measure and report performance information by submitting adoption data on a bi-annual basis through the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
Evidence: 1) Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentive Payment.; 2) HHS ACF Children's Bureau. www.AdoptusKids.org
YES 12%
2.6 Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: There are no independent evaluations of the Adoption Incentives Program. However, the Adoption Incentive Program supports program improvement since states earn bonus money based on increasingly better performance.
Evidence: No independent evaluations exist.
NO 0%
2.7 Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?
Explanation: ACF includes the budget request for Adoption Incentives in the annual Congressional Justification (CJ.) ACF submitted a fully integrated performance budget for the FY 2006 budget request (Performance Budget) with program performance summary information and results along with the core budget request information and budget tables. The budget request includes a crosswalk table with a presentation of performance summary information. The FY 2006 budget projection of $31,846,000, is the same as the FY 2005 enacted budget and enables the program to cover the incentives it gives to states during the fiscal year. These incentives, in turn, help realize the long-term performance measure of increasing the number of adoptions, as expected by the performance
Evidence: FY 2006 Administration for Children and Families Budget Justification.
YES 12%
2.8 Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?
Explanation: The Adoption Incentives Program is a data-driven program. In FY 2003, analyses of Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data resulted in significant amendments to the program during re-authorization. One significant change was the provision of a new incentive for the adoption of older children. Also, states had substantially increased the number of adoptions during the early years of the program so that it became increasingly difficult to exceed the baseline. For example, only 26 states earned a total of $15 million in FY 2002 versus the program's all time high of 44 states earning $51 million in FY 1999. The baselines have been reset in all categories of adoption incentives to correspond to the number of adoptions finalized in FY 2002.
Evidence: 1) Adoption Promotion Act of 2003. P.L. 108--145.; 2) Adoption Incentives payment history data from Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
YES 12%
Section 2 - Strategic Planning Score 62%
Section 3 - Program Management
Number Question Answer Score
3.1 Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?
Explanation: The program collects Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data from states on a semi-annual basis. The program analyzes the data to determine trends in adoption, as well as monitor state's progress in meeting the old long-term goal of finalizing 327,000 adoptions between FY 2003 and FY 2008. In fact, upon developing acceptable performance measures, the program will use AFCARS data to collect baseline data. Also, analysis of AFCARS data led to adjustment of program priorities and informed the program's reauthorization. This included a new incentive for adoptions of older children and re-setting the baseline for determining incentive payments.
Evidence: 1) Adoption Promotion Act of 2003. P.L. 108-145. < thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR03182:|TOM:/bss/d108query.html>; 2) Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
YES 11%
3.2 Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?
Explanation: Federal managers of the Adoption Incentives program are held accountable for achieving results, as evidenced by the individual performance plans where satisfactory ratings are dependent on the program achieving the adoption targets. The performance plans also contain performance goals for conducting quality data assessment and analyses, and accurate calculation of adoption bonus payments. In addition, states must submit Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data in the required format and within the specified time frame to be eligible to earn bonuses. Throughout the year, the program updates states with reports of where they stand with the number of overall adoptions, adoptions of older children, and adoptions of children with special needs. States are held accountable, as the adoption data are made available in the Annual Child Welfare Outcomes Report to Congress. Also, the program holds states accountable through the on-site Child and Family Services Review and develops Program Improvement Plans for states where areas of deficiencies have been identified.
Evidence: 1) The ACF Assistant Secretary's performance contract; 2) Child Welfare Outcomes 2001 - Annual Report.; 3) Child and Family Services Reviews < www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/cwrp/>
YES 11%
3.3 Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?
Explanation: Each year, adoption incentives funds are awarded prior to the end of the fiscal year. Upon receipt, states have up to two years to expend the funds and are required to submit Form 269, a financial status report, which shows the states' actual disbursements of funds. The first report is due to the ACF regional office 30 days after the end of the twelve-month budget period and the final report is due 90 days after the end of the fiscal year following the award year. Finally, states must spend the bonus for activities as defined in Title IV-E and IV-B of the Social Security Act and report this in the Annual Program and Services Report (APSR). To date, states have most commonly spent the incentives payments for activities pertaining to the recruitment of adoptive parents, staff training on adoption related issues, and post-adoption services.
Evidence: 1) HHS ACF Program Instruction. Procedures for the Implementation of the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-145). Log # ACYF-CB-PL-04-03. Issued on March 23, 2004; 2) Financial status Report. Standard Form # 269; 3) Annual Program and Services Report (APSR).
YES 11%
3.4 Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?
Explanation: The program has a developmental efficiency measure for decreasing the subsequent submittals, or corrections of Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) adoption data. States must submit AFCARS data by May 15 of the year following the earnings year. When states find errors in their data or fail to submit all of the adoptions that occurred during the earning year, they re-submit the data as subsequent submittals. This measure is weak, because it is process-oriented instead of outcome-oriented. Further, the efficiency measure does not tie to the program's goals of increasing adoptions and decreasing the adoption gap in older children. In other words, a decrease in subsequent submittals will not result in increased adoptions. Also, while the program may not have regular procedures such as competitive sourcing and IT consolidations, the program's design allows for efficiency. This is evidenced by less than 1 FTE dedicated to analyzing and making adoption incentives payments.
Evidence: The proposed efficiency measure is as follows: From FY 2006 to FY 2009, the annual number of subsequent submittals of AFCARS adoption data for inclusion in calculations for the Adoption Incentives Program will decline to 16.
NO 0%
3.5 Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?
Explanation: All Federal adoption programs work together and each has a specific role in achieving the overarching goal of moving children to permanency through adoption. For example, the Adoption Opportunities program develops and tests innovative approaches to removing barriers to adoption. This includes demonstration projects for recruiting families for children awaiting adoption and recruitment strategies for adopting older children. On the other hand, Adoption Assistance provides one time and on-going financial assistance to families who adopt children from the foster care system. This program assures that adequate resources will be available to maintain the adopted child in the adoptive family, thereby removing the financial barriers to adoption. States are able to move children to successful adoptions by employing the innovative strategies developed by the Adoption Opportunities Program and by supporting families through the Adoption Assistance Program. Such innovations are disseminated through technical assistance resource centers, information clearinghouses, and AdoptUsKids. States who employ these innovations and result in increased adoptions, are awarded with the adoption incentives bonus. Also, the Children's Bureau management staff meet on a regular basis to ensure systematic coordination of the adoption activities and meetings are held several times a year with relevant grantees and contractors to facilitate the coordination. Finally, the actual number of adoptions is evidence of the results achieved by this collaboration.
Evidence: HHS ACF Children's Bureau. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act as Amended by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003.
YES 11%
3.6 Does the program use strong financial management practices?
Explanation: The program has financial management practices in place, as evidenced by the following: states that submit the financial status report, form #269, on an annual basis; a desk review of states' expenditures documents; and an on-site review by a regional financial management specialist. However, the program lacks evidence to certify that it has minimal erroneous payments, and did not have examples to demonstrated how it integrates financial and performance systems to support day-to-day operations. The program also pointed to a CFO audit where material weaknesses were identified for the Program Support Center, which provides services to the Adoption Incentives Program. The weakness was related to grant advance reporting, reconciliation and analysis, which has since been downgraded to a reportable condition.
Evidence: Financial status Report. Standard Form # 269
NO 0%
3.7 Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?
Explanation: The Adoption Incentives Program is heavily data driven, with bonuses determined solely from the AFCARS data that states submit electronically. The program identifies data quality-related issues as a key management challenge. For example, there are states that miss the May 15 deadline for submitting finalized adoptions, because they await the court documents for adoptions that actually occurred prior to May 15. Hence, states under-report the number of finalized adoption and do not receive the true bonus payments on a timely basis. While this may be out of the program's control, the program works to ensure high data quality by conducting a quality review to identify data inconsistencies, anomalies, and other issues upon receiving the initial state submissions. This includes detecting submission of duplicate adoptions with a de-duplication software and the state's finalized adoptions are adjusted downward. The program notifies states of the results of the data quality review and the Resource Center for Child Welfare Data and Technology provides technical assistance in correcting data deficiencies.
Evidence: 1) Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
YES 11%
3.BF1 Does the program have oversight practices that provide sufficient knowledge of grantee activities?
Explanation: The program oversees the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data system and the states' submission of the data. Data submitted by states are evaluated for duplication, inconsistencies, anomalies, completeness, and other quality issues. The program also provides oversight by collecting and analyzing Form #269 for states' disbursement of bonus funds and the Annual Progress and Services Report (APSR) for states' use of the funds. Also, the ACF regional office conducts site visits and on-site reviews of case level data from the Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System (SACWIS).
Evidence: 1) HHS ACF Program Instruction. Procedures for the Implementation of the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-145). Log # ACYF-CB-PL-04-03. Issued on March 23, 2004.; 2) Financial status Report. Standard Form # 269; 3) Annual Program and Services Report (APSR). CITE LINK.; 4) Information on Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) reviews.; 5) Information on Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System (SACWIS) reviews.
YES 11%
3.BF2 Does the program collect grantee performance data on an annual basis and make it available to the public in a transparent and meaningful manner?
Explanation: The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) is the only data system that can be used to calculate bonuses. The AFCARS data, collected semi-annually, is used to determine bonuses to states. The program notifies states of bonus awards and HHS also makes a public announcement in a press release. As for the AFCARS data and report, they are disseminated through the Child Welfare Outcomes Report and are posted on the ACF website. AFCARS data is made available to the public at national child welfare conferences, and Cornell University's National Data Archives on Child Abuse and Neglect.
Evidence: 1) HHS Press Release. "HHS Awards $17,896,000 in Adoption Bonuses." Released October 14, 2004.; 2) HHS ACF Children's Bureau. Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) ; 3) HHC ACF Children's Bureau. Child Welfare Outcomes Annual Report. ; 4) National Data Archives on Child Abuse and Neglect. Cornell University.
YES 11%
Section 3 - Program Management Score 78%
Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability
Number Question Answer Score
4.1 Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?
Explanation: The adoption rate measure is another way of measuring the number of successful adoptions, in a ratio form. Hence, program can demonstrate progress by examining the absolute number of adoptions. The program's original long-term goal, as published in the FY 2006 HHS Annual Plan, was to complete 327,000 adoptions between FY 2003 and FY 2008. However, the program proposes to revise this measure to 292,000 adoptions. While the proposed revised target is less ambitious than the original published long-term target, the program can demonstrate some progress made in achieving long-term goals by completing about 50,000 adoptions in FY 2003.
Evidence: See measures tab.
SMALL EXTENT 8%
4.2 Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?
Explanation: The program's original FY 2003 adoption target, as published in the FY 2006 HHS Annual Plan, was 58,500. However, the program proposes to revise the target to 50,000, which the program achieved based on preliminary FY 2003 adoption data. While the program can demonstrate progress made in its annual target, it met the less ambitious revised annual goal and did not meet the original ambitious goal.
Evidence: See measures tab.
SMALL EXTENT 8%
4.3 Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?
Explanation: The program has a developmental efficiency measure and at this time, it is not possible to assess improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness.
Evidence: The proposed efficiency measure is as follows: From FY 2006 to FY 2009, the annual number of subsequent submittals of AFCARS adoption data for inclusion in calculations for the Adoption Incentives Program will decline to 16.
NO 0%
4.4 Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?
Explanation: There are no comparable federal, state, local government, or private sector programs, which provide bonuses for successful adoptions.
Evidence: Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentives.
NA 0%
4.5 Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?
Explanation: There are no independent evaluations of the Adoption Incentive Program. However, the Adoption Incentive Program supports program improvement since states earn bonus money based on increasingly better performance.
Evidence: No independent evaluations exist.
NO 0%
Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability Score 16%
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Last updated: 01092009.2005FALL
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003500.2005.html
Adoption Incentives Assessment
View this program’s assessment summary.
Visit ExpectMore.gov to learn more about how Federal Government programs are assessed and their plans for improvement.
Learn more about detailed assessments.
Program Code 10003500
Program Title Adoption Incentives
Department Name Dept of Health & Human Service
Agency/Bureau Name Administration for Children and Families
Program Type(s) Block/Formula Grant
Assessment Year 2005
Assessment Rating Adequate
Assessment Section Scores Section Score
Program Purpose & Design 100%
Strategic Planning 62%
Program Management 78%
Program Results/Accountability 16%
Program Funding Level
(in millions) FY2008 $4
FY2009 $4
Ongoing Program Improvement Plans
Completed Program Improvement Plans
Program Performance Measures
Questions/Answers (Detailed Assessment)
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Ongoing Program Improvement Plans
Year Began Improvement Plan Status Comments
2006 Identifying and addressing the barriers to increasing the proportion of children adopted from the foster care system. Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material "Road to Adoption and Foster Care" to Children's Bureau Regional Office staff.
Action taken, but not completed Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material ??Road to Adoption and Foster Care?? to Children??s Bureau Regional Office staff. Milestone to be completed January 2009.
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Review an additional 10 states through CFSR in FY 2009.
Action taken, but not completed Milestone: Review an additional 10 states through CFSR in FY 2009. Milestone to be completed September 2009.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material "Road to Adoption and Foster Care" to Children's Bureau Regional Office staff.
Action taken, but not completed Milestone: Distribute recruitment and retention training material ??Road to Adoption and Foster Care?? to Children??s Bureau Regional Office staff. Milestone to be completed January 2009.
Completed Program Improvement Plans
Year Began Improvement Plan Status Comments
2006 Identifying and addressing the barriers to increasing the proportion of children adopted from the foster care system. Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency.
Completed Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency. Milestone to be completed October 2008.
2006 Developing an efficiency measure, which ties more closely to the program's goals.
Completed OMB approved the following efficiency measure in May 2006: "Maintain or decrease the average administrative claim per IV-E Adoption Assistance child."
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Encourage more timely adoptions, resulting in reduced adoption assistance administrative costs, by incorporating into the new Child and Family Service Review (CFSR) composite measures components addressing "Progress Toward Adoption of Children Who Are Legally Free for Adoption" and "Exits to Permanency for Children with TPR" (termination of parental rights), and begin using composites in second round of CFSRs.
Completed Milestone completed October 2006.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Report FY05 adoption numbers/rate and assess whether current adoption targets are appropriate.
Completed Milestone completed October 2006.
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Complete 2nd round of Child and Family Service Reviews (CFSR) in 14 states.
Completed Milestone completed September 2007.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Launch Spanish-language component of the national adoption PSA campaign to promote the adoption of children nine and older.
Completed Milestone completed December 2007.
2006 Utilize newly developed efficiency measure to monitor and improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Milestone: Review an additional 18 states through CFSR in FY 2008.
Completed Milestone: Review an additional 18 states through CFSR in FY 2008. Milestone to be completed September 2008.
2006 Exploring programmatic or policy changes in order to set more ambitious adoption targets. Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency.
Completed Milestone: Convene a Permanency Dialogue involving State adoption foster care, and family preservation managers to discuss leading their agencies through system change to improve child welfare outcomes, particularly in the area of adoption and other forms of permanency. Milestone to be completed October 2008.
Program Performance Measures
Term Type
Long-term/Annual Outcome Measure: Increase the adoption rate.
Explanation:The program will replace the absolute adoption measure with an adoption rate measure. Adoption rate is defined as the number of adoptions divided by the number of children in foster care at the end of the prior year. Updated 11/7/05. Language of measure changed from "Increase adoption rate to 10% by FY 2008" to "Increase adoption rate from 9.4% in FY 2003 to 10% by FY 2008." based on the FY07 budget submission. This measure is currently under appeal with OMB; a decision is pending. Also, years were out of order on PARTWeb, revised years and data to be in chronological order.
Year Target Actual
2003 58,500 9.67% (50,000)
2004 53,0005 10.22% (52,000)
2005 Baseline 10.26% (52,000)
2006 9.85% 9.91%
2007 9.90% 10.00%
2008 10.00% Oct-09
2009 10.10% Oct-10
2010 10.20% Oct-11
2011
2012
2013 10.50% Oct-14
Long-term/Annual Outcome Measure: Decrease the gap between the percentage of children nine and older waiting to be adopted and those actually adopted by 15 percentage points between FY 2006 and FY 2015.
Explanation:In FY 2003, the gap between the percentage of children nine and older waiting to be adopted and those actually adopted was 17 percentage points. An incentive to address this issue was added to the legislation as of the FY 2003 earning year. This measure will assess whether or not this new incentive is achieving its purpose. Updated 11/7/05. Years out of order on PARTWeb, revised years and data to be in chronological order. Data for FY 2006 will be available in October 2007. There are no results to report at this time.
Year Target Actual
2005 Baseline 15.7%
2006 16.7% 16.4%
2007 15.2% 16.8%
2008 13.7% Oct-09
2009 12.2% Oct-10
2010 10.7% Oct-11
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015 1.4% Oct-16
Annual Efficiency Measure: Maintain or decrease the average administrative claim per IV-E Adoption Assistance child.
Explanation:This efficiency measure sets annual targets to demonstrate improved efficiency through a gradual reduction in the average administrative claim per IV-E Adoption Assistance child. This is calculated by total computable claims submitted by states on the IV-E-1 for administrative costs divided by the average monthly number of children receiving Adoption Assistance maintenance payments.
Year Target Actual
2001 Pre-baseline $1,951
2002 Pre-baseline $1,833
2003 Pre-baseline $1,678
2004 Baseline $1,627
2005 $1,598 $1,560
2006 $1,566 $1,674
2007 $1,535 $1,777
2008 $1,504 Oct-09
2009 -2% under prev actl Oct-10
2010 -2% under prev actl Oct-11
Questions/Answers (Detailed Assessment)
Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design
Number Question Answer Score
1.1 Is the program purpose clear?
Explanation: The purpose of the Adoption Incentives Program is to encourage states to find permanent homes for children in the public foster care system through adoptions. The program provides financial incentives to states that increase the number of adoptions over the baselines in the following categories: 1) adoptions from the public foster care system ($4,000 per child), 2) adoptions of children with special needs under age nine ($2,000 per child), and 3) adoptions of older children, ages nine and older ($4,000 per child). While the number of adoptions in each of the three categories in FY 2002 served as the original baseline, the baseline has adjusted to reflect increases in the number of adoptions over the years.
Evidence: Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentive Payment.
YES 20%
1.2 Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: The program addresses the problem of "foster care drift," which describes children lingering in foster care without ever achieving permanency. According to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) the average length of stay in foster care was 22 months in FY 2003. Between FY 1998 and FY 2003, the proportion of children ages 9 and older waiting to be adopted increased from 39% to 49% while the proportion of children ages 9 and older who were adopted remained less than one third. Also, the average age of children waiting to be adopted increased from 7.8 to 8.7, and close to 8% of all children were emancipated from care and did not achieve permanency.
Evidence: Analysis of data available as of August 2004 from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
YES 20%
1.3 Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?
Explanation: This is the only Federal program that rewards adoptions with a bonus payment. The adoption incentives payments may be used toward allowable activities as defined in Title IV-E and IV-B of the Social Security Act, including the following: 1) recruiting adoptive families; 2) conducting home studies for foster care and adoptive families; 3) providing post-adoption services: and 4) promoting reunification through such services as mental health, parent training, and drug treatment. No such program exists with the adoption bonus design to incentivize more difficult adoptions at the state and local governments nor private and non-profit sectors,
Evidence: Social Security Act. Title IV-B: Child and Family Services and Title IV-E: Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance.
YES 20%
1.4 Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?
Explanation: There is no evidence that another approach or mechanism would be more efficient or effective to achieve the intended purpose. The adoption bonus payments serve as a strong incentive for states in encouraging adoptions and supp
Evidence: Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentive Payment.
YES 20%
1.5 Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?
Explanation: States are required to reinvest the adoption incentives bonus in the child welfare program for any services and activities allowable under title IV-B and title IV-E of the Social Security Act. The Annual Program and Services Report (APSR) requires states to identify how the incentive funds were spent. State primarily use the funds for activities related to recruiting adoptive parents, providing staff training on adoption related issues, and providing post-adoption services.
Evidence: PI 05-04. Annual Program and Services Report (APSR).
YES 20%
Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design Score 100%
Section 2 - Strategic Planning
Number Question Answer Score
2.1 Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?
Explanation: The program has a clear purpose to increase the number of adoption, with a particular emphasis on older children (ages 9 and older) and children with special needs. Currently, the program has a long term goal of finalizing 327,000 adoptions between FY 2003 and FY 2008, as published in the FY 2005 Annual Performance Plan. The program proposes to replace the current measure with the following adoption rate measure: Number of adoptions divided by the number of children in foster care at the end of the prior year. The program also proposes a new measure for decreasing the gap between the percentage of children nine and older waiting to be adopted and those actually adopted by 15 percentage points between FY 2006 and FY 2015, which meaningfully support the program's purpose. Finally, the program does not propose a measure for special needs children under age nine, because they are already adopted at a higher proportion than they appear in the waiting population.
Evidence: Final FY 2005 Annual Performance Plan, Final Revised FY 2004 Performance Plan, and FY 2003 Annual Performance Report.
YES 12%
2.2 Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?
Explanation: A decrease in the adoption gap of older children by 15% in FY 2015 is an ambitious long-term target. However, the proposed long-term targets for the adoption rate measures are not sufficiently ambitious because the minimal incremental increases will result in a decrease in the actual annual number of adoptions. The proposed revised targets also fall significantly short of the original published adoption targets.
Evidence: See measures tab.
NO 0%
2.3 Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?
Explanation: The long term measures also serve as the program's annual measure, which assesses incremental gains made in achieving the long term goal.
Evidence: See measures tab.
YES 12%
2.4 Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?
Explanation: The annual targets for the adoption rate measure are not sufficiently ambitious, because the actual number of annual adoptions would decrease from FY 2003 to FY 2008. The measure for decreasing the adoption gap for children ages 9 and older has a FY 2006 target of 16.7% whereas the FY 2003 actual gap was 16.9%. This is not ambitious since the FY 2006 target would essentially maintain the FY 2003 level for four years from FY 2003 to FY 2006.
Evidence: See measures tab.
NO 0%
2.5 Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?
Explanation: The program's bonus design ensures that partners work toward the common goal of increasing adoptions, especially adoptions of children for whom it is difficult to find a placement. State partners support the overall goal of the program, as evidenced by their participation in the Children Bureau's AdoptusKids project, which promotes the adoption of children waiting to be adopted and emphasizes adoptions of older children. State activities include the following: 1) listing children available for adoption on www.AdoptusKids.org; 2) establishing a recruitment response team, which responds to families inquiring about adoptions; 3) participation in technical assistance on issues such as working with the faith-based communities for effective recruitment strategies. Also, state partners measure and report performance information by submitting adoption data on a bi-annual basis through the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
Evidence: 1) Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentive Payment.
YES 12%
2.6 Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: There are no independent evaluations of the Adoption Incentives Program. However, the Adoption Incentive Program supports program improvement since states earn bonus money based on increasingly better performance.
Evidence: No independent evaluations exist.
NO 0%
2.7 Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?
Explanation: ACF includes the budget request for Adoption Incentives in the annual Congressional Justification (CJ.) ACF submitted a fully integrated performance budget for the FY 2006 budget request (Performance Budget) with program performance summary information and results along with the core budget request information and budget tables. The budget request includes a crosswalk table with a presentation of performance summary information. The FY 2006 budget projection of $31,846,000, is the same as the FY 2005 enacted budget and enables the program to cover the incentives it gives to states during the fiscal year. These incentives, in turn, help realize the long-term performance measure of increasing the number of adoptions, as expected by the performance
Evidence: FY 2006 Administration for Children and Families Budget Justification.
YES 12%
2.8 Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?
Explanation: The Adoption Incentives Program is a data-driven program. In FY 2003, analyses of Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data resulted in significant amendments to the program during re-authorization. One significant change was the provision of a new incentive for the adoption of older children. Also, states had substantially increased the number of adoptions during the early years of the program so that it became increasingly difficult to exceed the baseline. For example, only 26 states earned a total of $15 million in FY 2002 versus the program's all time high of 44 states earning $51 million in FY 1999. The baselines have been reset in all categories of adoption incentives to correspond to the number of adoptions finalized in FY 2002.
Evidence: 1) Adoption Promotion Act of 2003. P.L. 108--145.
YES 12%
Section 2 - Strategic Planning Score 62%
Section 3 - Program Management
Number Question Answer Score
3.1 Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?
Explanation: The program collects Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data from states on a semi-annual basis. The program analyzes the data to determine trends in adoption, as well as monitor state's progress in meeting the old long-term goal of finalizing 327,000 adoptions between FY 2003 and FY 2008. In fact, upon developing acceptable performance measures, the program will use AFCARS data to collect baseline data. Also, analysis of AFCARS data led to adjustment of program priorities and informed the program's reauthorization. This included a new incentive for adoptions of older children and re-setting the baseline for determining incentive payments.
Evidence: 1) Adoption Promotion Act of 2003. P.L. 108-145. < thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR03182:|TOM:/bss/d108query.html>; 2) Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
YES 11%
3.2 Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?
Explanation: Federal managers of the Adoption Incentives program are held accountable for achieving results, as evidenced by the individual performance plans where satisfactory ratings are dependent on the program achieving the adoption targets. The performance plans also contain performance goals for conducting quality data assessment and analyses, and accurate calculation of adoption bonus payments. In addition, states must submit Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data in the required format and within the specified time frame to be eligible to earn bonuses. Throughout the year, the program updates states with reports of where they stand with the number of overall adoptions, adoptions of older children, and adoptions of children with special needs. States are held accountable, as the adoption data are made available in the Annual Child Welfare Outcomes Report to Congress. Also, the program holds states accountable through the on-site Child and Family Services Review and develops Program Improvement Plans for states where areas of deficiencies have been identified.
Evidence: 1) The ACF Assistant Secretary's performance contract; 2) Child Welfare Outcomes 2001 - Annual Report.
YES 11%
3.3 Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?
Explanation: Each year, adoption incentives funds are awarded prior to the end of the fiscal year. Upon receipt, states have up to two years to expend the funds and are required to submit Form 269, a financial status report, which shows the states' actual disbursements of funds. The first report is due to the ACF regional office 30 days after the end of the twelve-month budget period and the final report is due 90 days after the end of the fiscal year following the award year. Finally, states must spend the bonus for activities as defined in Title IV-E and IV-B of the Social Security Act and report this in the Annual Program and Services Report (APSR). To date, states have most commonly spent the incentives payments for activities pertaining to the recruitment of adoptive parents, staff training on adoption related issues, and post-adoption services.
Evidence: 1) HHS ACF Program Instruction. Procedures for the Implementation of the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-145). Log # ACYF-CB-PL-04-03. Issued on March 23, 2004; 2) Financial status Report. Standard Form # 269; 3) Annual Program and Services Report (APSR).
YES 11%
3.4 Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?
Explanation: The program has a developmental efficiency measure for decreasing the subsequent submittals, or corrections of Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) adoption data. States must submit AFCARS data by May 15 of the year following the earnings year. When states find errors in their data or fail to submit all of the adoptions that occurred during the earning year, they re-submit the data as subsequent submittals. This measure is weak, because it is process-oriented instead of outcome-oriented. Further, the efficiency measure does not tie to the program's goals of increasing adoptions and decreasing the adoption gap in older children. In other words, a decrease in subsequent submittals will not result in increased adoptions. Also, while the program may not have regular procedures such as competitive sourcing and IT consolidations, the program's design allows for efficiency. This is evidenced by less than 1 FTE dedicated to analyzing and making adoption incentives payments.
Evidence: The proposed efficiency measure is as follows: From FY 2006 to FY 2009, the annual number of subsequent submittals of AFCARS adoption data for inclusion in calculations for the Adoption Incentives Program will decline to 16.
NO 0%
3.5 Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?
Explanation: All Federal adoption programs work together and each has a specific role in achieving the overarching goal of moving children to permanency through adoption. For example, the Adoption Opportunities program develops and tests innovative approaches to removing barriers to adoption. This includes demonstration projects for recruiting families for children awaiting adoption and recruitment strategies for adopting older children. On the other hand, Adoption Assistance provides one time and on-going financial assistance to families who adopt children from the foster care system. This program assures that adequate resources will be available to maintain the adopted child in the adoptive family, thereby removing the financial barriers to adoption. States are able to move children to successful adoptions by employing the innovative strategies developed by the Adoption Opportunities Program and by supporting families through the Adoption Assistance Program. Such innovations are disseminated through technical assistance resource centers, information clearinghouses, and AdoptUsKids. States who employ these innovations and result in increased adoptions, are awarded with the adoption incentives bonus. Also, the Children's Bureau management staff meet on a regular basis to ensure systematic coordination of the adoption activities and meetings are held several times a year with relevant grantees and contractors to facilitate the coordination. Finally, the actual number of adoptions is evidence of the results achieved by this collaboration.
Evidence: HHS ACF Children's Bureau. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act as Amended by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003.
YES 11%
3.6 Does the program use strong financial management practices?
Explanation: The program has financial management practices in place, as evidenced by the following: states that submit the financial status report, form #269, on an annual basis; a desk review of states' expenditures documents; and an on-site review by a regional financial management specialist. However, the program lacks evidence to certify that it has minimal erroneous payments, and did not have examples to demonstrated how it integrates financial and performance systems to support day-to-day operations. The program also pointed to a CFO audit where material weaknesses were identified for the Program Support Center, which provides services to the Adoption Incentives Program. The weakness was related to grant advance reporting, reconciliation and analysis, which has since been downgraded to a reportable condition.
Evidence: Financial status Report. Standard Form # 269
NO 0%
3.7 Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?
Explanation: The Adoption Incentives Program is heavily data driven, with bonuses determined solely from the AFCARS data that states submit electronically. The program identifies data quality-related issues as a key management challenge. For example, there are states that miss the May 15 deadline for submitting finalized adoptions, because they await the court documents for adoptions that actually occurred prior to May 15. Hence, states under-report the number of finalized adoption and do not receive the true bonus payments on a timely basis. While this may be out of the program's control, the program works to ensure high data quality by conducting a quality review to identify data inconsistencies, anomalies, and other issues upon receiving the initial state submissions. This includes detecting submission of duplicate adoptions with a de-duplication software and the state's finalized adoptions are adjusted downward. The program notifies states of the results of the data quality review and the Resource Center for Child Welfare Data and Technology provides technical assistance in correcting data deficiencies.
Evidence: 1) Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
YES 11%
3.BF1 Does the program have oversight practices that provide sufficient knowledge of grantee activities?
Explanation: The program oversees the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data system and the states' submission of the data. Data submitted by states are evaluated for duplication, inconsistencies, anomalies, completeness, and other quality issues. The program also provides oversight by collecting and analyzing Form #269 for states' disbursement of bonus funds and the Annual Progress and Services Report (APSR) for states' use of the funds. Also, the ACF regional office conducts site visits and on-site reviews of case level data from the Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System (SACWIS).
Evidence: 1) HHS ACF Program Instruction. Procedures for the Implementation of the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-145). Log # ACYF-CB-PL-04-03. Issued on March 23, 2004.; 2) Financial status Report. Standard Form # 269; 3) Annual Program and Services Report (APSR). CITE LINK.; 4) Information on Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) reviews.
YES 11%
3.BF2 Does the program collect grantee performance data on an annual basis and make it available to the public in a transparent and meaningful manner?
Explanation: The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) is the only data system that can be used to calculate bonuses. The AFCARS data, collected semi-annually, is used to determine bonuses to states. The program notifies states of bonus awards and HHS also makes a public announcement in a press release. As for the AFCARS data and report, they are disseminated through the Child Welfare Outcomes Report and are posted on the ACF website. AFCARS data is made available to the public at national child welfare conferences, and Cornell University's National Data Archives on Child Abuse and Neglect.
Evidence: 1) HHS Press Release. "HHS Awards $17,896,000 in Adoption Bonuses." Released October 14, 2004.
YES 11%
Section 3 - Program Management Score 78%
Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability
Number Question Answer Score
4.1 Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?
Explanation: The adoption rate measure is another way of measuring the number of successful adoptions, in a ratio form. Hence, program can demonstrate progress by examining the absolute number of adoptions. The program's original long-term goal, as published in the FY 2006 HHS Annual Plan, was to complete 327,000 adoptions between FY 2003 and FY 2008. However, the program proposes to revise this measure to 292,000 adoptions. While the proposed revised target is less ambitious than the original published long-term target, the program can demonstrate some progress made in achieving long-term goals by completing about 50,000 adoptions in FY 2003.
Evidence: See measures tab.
SMALL EXTENT 8%
4.2 Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?
Explanation: The program's original FY 2003 adoption target, as published in the FY 2006 HHS Annual Plan, was 58,500. However, the program proposes to revise the target to 50,000, which the program achieved based on preliminary FY 2003 adoption data. While the program can demonstrate progress made in its annual target, it met the less ambitious revised annual goal and did not meet the original ambitious goal.
Evidence: See measures tab.
SMALL EXTENT 8%
4.3 Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?
Explanation: The program has a developmental efficiency measure and at this time, it is not possible to assess improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness.
Evidence: The proposed efficiency measure is as follows: From FY 2006 to FY 2009, the annual number of subsequent submittals of AFCARS adoption data for inclusion in calculations for the Adoption Incentives Program will decline to 16.
NO 0%
4.4 Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?
Explanation: There are no comparable federal, state, local government, or private sector programs, which provide bonuses for successful adoptions.
Evidence: Social Security Act. Section 473A: Adoption Incentives.
NA 0%
4.5 Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?
Explanation: There are no independent evaluations of the Adoption Incentive Program. However, the Adoption Incentive Program supports program improvement since states earn bonus money based on increasingly better performance.
Evidence: No independent evaluations exist.
NO 0%
Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability Score 16%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
View this program’s assessment summary.
Visit ExpectMore.gov to learn more about program assessment and improvement by the Federal Government.
Learn more about detailed assessments.
Last updated: 01092009.2005FALL
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003500.2005.html
FY 2009 Adoption Incentive Awards for the Kidnapping of our Children
FY 2009 Adoption Incentive Awards
Based on FY 2008 Earning Year State Award
Alabama $412,000
Alaska $224,000
Arizona $499,197
Arkansas $822,078
California $1,504,944
Colorado $0 !!!!
Connecticut $511,354
Delaware $0 !!!!
Dist of Columbia $0 !!!!
Florida $9,754,990
Georgia $288,635
Hawaii $204,000
Idaho $356,800
Illinois $236,000
Indiana $1,623,350
Iowa $0!!!!
Kansas $72,000
Kentucky $764,000
Louisiana $1,206,559
Maine $5,280
Maryland $196,000
Massachusetts $0!!!!
Michigan $856,000
Minnesota $1,329,276
Mississippi $0!!!!
Missouri $488,000
Montana $7,679
Nebraska $569,917
Nevada $24,000
New Hampshire $280,319
New Jersey $0!!!!
New Mexico $534,558
New York $0!!!!
North Carolina $1,388,312
North Dakota $80,320
Ohio $0!!!!
Oklahoma $1,504,000
Oregon $220,000
Pennsylvania $1,264,154
Rhode Island $208,000
South Carolina $721,757
South Dakota $112,800
Tennessee $2,400
Texas $4,969,734
Utah $788,000
Vermont $0!!!!
Virginia $0!!!!
Washington $0!!!!
West Virginia $523,359
Wisconsin $0!!!!
Wyoming $131,360
Puerto Rico $52,000
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/press/2009/fy09_adoption_incentive_awards.htm
Based on FY 2008 Earning Year State Award
Alabama $412,000
Alaska $224,000
Arizona $499,197
Arkansas $822,078
California $1,504,944
Colorado $0 !!!!
Connecticut $511,354
Delaware $0 !!!!
Dist of Columbia $0 !!!!
Florida $9,754,990
Georgia $288,635
Hawaii $204,000
Idaho $356,800
Illinois $236,000
Indiana $1,623,350
Iowa $0!!!!
Kansas $72,000
Kentucky $764,000
Louisiana $1,206,559
Maine $5,280
Maryland $196,000
Massachusetts $0!!!!
Michigan $856,000
Minnesota $1,329,276
Mississippi $0!!!!
Missouri $488,000
Montana $7,679
Nebraska $569,917
Nevada $24,000
New Hampshire $280,319
New Jersey $0!!!!
New Mexico $534,558
New York $0!!!!
North Carolina $1,388,312
North Dakota $80,320
Ohio $0!!!!
Oklahoma $1,504,000
Oregon $220,000
Pennsylvania $1,264,154
Rhode Island $208,000
South Carolina $721,757
South Dakota $112,800
Tennessee $2,400
Texas $4,969,734
Utah $788,000
Vermont $0!!!!
Virginia $0!!!!
Washington $0!!!!
West Virginia $523,359
Wisconsin $0!!!!
Wyoming $131,360
Puerto Rico $52,000
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/press/2009/fy09_adoption_incentive_awards.htm
THE MONEY BEHIND STATE ADOPTIONS
Posted by innerpeace5 on Tuesday, January 26, 2010 8:26:14 AM
THE MONEY BEHIND STATE ADOPTIONS
A Harsh Reality!
Adoption Bonuses
The Money Behind the Madness
DSS and affiliates rewarded for breaking up families
By Nev Moore
Massachusetts News
Child "protection" is one of the biggest businesses in the country. We spend $12 billion a year on it. The money goes to tens of thousands of a) state employees, b) collateral professionals, such as lawyers, court personnel, court investigators, evaluators and guardians, judges, and c) DSS contracted vendors such as counselors, therapists, more "evaluators" , junk psychologists, residential facilities, foster parents, adoptive parents, MSPCC, Big Brothers/Big Sisters, YMCA, etc. This newspaper is not big enough to list all of the people in this state who have a job, draw a paycheck, or make their profits off the kids in DSS custody. In this article I explain the financial infrastructure that provides the motivation for DSS to take people’s children – and not give them back.
In 1974 Walter Mondale promoted the Child Abuse and Prevention Act which began feeding massive amounts of federal funding to states to set up programs to combat child abuse and neglect. From that came Child "Protective" Services, as we know it today. After the bill passed, Mondale himself expressed concerns that it could be misused. He worried that it could lead states to create a "business" in dealing with children.
Then in 1997 President Clinton passed the "Adoption and Safe Families Act." The public relations campaign promoted it as a way to help abused and neglected children who languished in foster care for years, often being shuffled among dozens of foster homes, never having a real home and family. In a press release from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services dated November 24, 1999, it refers to "President Clinton’s initiative to double by 2002 the number of children in foster care who are adopted or otherwise permanently placed."
It all sounded so heartwarming. We, the American public, are so easily led. We love to buy stereotypes; we just eat them up, no questions asked. But, my mother, bless her heart, taught me from the time I was young to "consider the source." In the stereotype that we’ve been sold about kids in foster care, we picture a forlorn, hollow-eyed child, thin and pale, looking up at us beseechingly through a dirt streaked face. Unconsciously, we pull up old pictures from Life magazine of children in Appalachia in the 1930s. We think of orphans and children abandoned by parents who look like Manson family members. We play a nostalgic movie in our heads of the little fellow shyly walking across an emerald green, manicured lawn to meet Ward and June Cleaver, his new adoptive parents, who lead him into their lovely suburban home. We imagine the little tyke’s eyes growing as big as saucers as the Cleavers show him his very own room, full of toys and sports gear. And we just feel so gosh darn good about ourselves. Now it’s time to wake up to the reality of the adoption business.
Very few children who are being used to supply the adoption market are hollow-eyed tykes from Appalachia. Very few are crack babies from the projects. [Oh… you thought those were the children they were saving? Think again]. When you are marketing a product you have to provide a desirable product that sells. In the adoption business that would be nice kids with reasonably good genetics who clean up good. An interesting point is that the Cape Cod & Islands office leads the state in terms of processing kids into the system and having them adopted out. More than the inner city areas, the projects, Mission Hill, Brockton, Lynn, etc . Interesting…
With the implementation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, President Clinton tried to make himself look like a humanitarian who is responsible for saving the abused and neglected children. The drive of this initiative is to offer cash "bonuses" to states for every child they have adopted out of foster care, with the goal of doubling their adoptions by 2002, and sustaining that for each subsequent year. They actually call them "adoption incentive bonuses," to promote the adoption of children.
Where to Find the Children
A whole new industry was put into motion. A sweet marketing scheme that even Bill Gates could envy. Now, if you have a basket of apples, and people start giving you $100 per apple, what are you going to do? Make sure that you have an unlimited supply of apples, right?
The United States Department of Health & Human Services administers Child Protective Services. To accompany the ASF Act, the President requested, by executive memorandum, an initiative entitled Adoption 2002, to be implemented and managed by Health & Human Services. The initiative not only gives the cash adoption bonuses to the states, it also provides cash adoption subsidies to adoptive parents until the children turn eighteen.
Everybody makes money. If anyone really believes that these people are doing this out of the goodness of their hearts, then I’ve got some bad news for you. The fact that this program is run by HHS, ordered from the very top, explains why the citizens who are victims of DSS get no response from their legislators. It explains why no one in the Administration cares about the abuse and fatalities of children in the "care" of DSS, and no one wants to hear about the broken arms, verbal abuse, or rapes. They are just business casualties. It explains why the legislators I’ve talked to for the past three years look at me with pity. Because I’m preaching to the already damned. The legislators have forgotten who funds their paychecks and who they need to account to, as has the Governor. Because it isn’t the President. It’s us.
How DSS Is Helped
The way that the adoption bonuses work is that each state is given a baseline number of expected adoptions based on population. For every child that DSS can get adopted, there is a bonus of $4,000 to $6,000. But that is just the starting figure in a complex mathematical formula in which each bonus is multiplied by the percentage that the state has managed to exceed its baseline adoption number. The states must maintain this increase in each successive year. [Like compound interest.] The bill reads: "$4,000 to $6,000 will be multiplied by the amount (if any) by which the number of foster child adoptions in the State exceeds the base number of foster child adoptions for the State for the fiscal year." In the "technical assistance" section of the bill it states that, "the Secretary [of HHS] may, directly or through grants or contracts, provide technical assistance to assist states and local communities to reach their targets for increased numbers of adoptions for children in foster care." The technical assistance is to support "the goal of encouraging more adoptions out of the foster care system; the development of best practice guidelines for expediting the termination of parental rights; the development of special units and expertise in moving children toward adoption as a permanent goal; models to encourage the fast tracking of children who have not attained 1 year of age into pre-adoptive placements; and the development of programs that place children into pre-adoptive placements without waiting for termination of parental rights."
In the November press release from HHS it continues, " HHS awarded the first ever adoption bonuses to States for increases in the adoption of children from the public foster care system." Some of the other incentives offered are "innovative grants" to reduce barriers to adoption [i.e., parents], more State support for adoptive families, making adoption affordable for families by providing cash subsides and tax credits.
A report from a private think tank, the National Center for Policy Analysis, reads: "The way the federal government reimburses States rewards a growth in the size of the program instead of the effective care of children." Another incentive being promoted is the use of the Internet to make adoption easier. Clinton directed HHS to develop an Internet site to "link children in foster care with adoptive families." So we will be able to window shop for children on a government web site. If you don’t find anything you like there, you can surf on over to the "Adopt Shoppe." If you prefer to actually be able to kick tires instead of just looking at pictures you could attend one of DSS’s quaint "Adoption Fairs," where live children are put on display and you can walk around and browse. Like a flea market to sell kids. If one of them begs you to take him home you can always say, "Sorry. Just looking." The incentives for government child snatching are so good that I’m surprised we don’t have government agents breaking down people’s doors and just shooting the parents in the heads and grabbing the kids. But then, if you need more apples you don’t chop down your apple trees.
Benefits for Foster Parents
That covers the goodies the State gets. Now let’s have a look at how the Cleavers make out financially after the adoption is finalized. After the adoption is finalized, the State and federal subsidies continue. The adoptive parents may collect cash subsidies until the child is 18. If the child stays in school, subsidies continue to the age of 22. There are State funded subsidies as well as federal funds through the Title IV-E section of the Social Security Act. The daily rate for State funds is the same as the foster care payments, which range from $410-$486 per month per child. Unless the child can be designated "special needs," which of course, they all can. According to the NAATRIN State Subsidy profile from DSS, "special needs" may be defined as: "Physical disability, mental disability, emotional disturbance; a significant emotional tie with the foster parents where the child has resided with the foster parents for one or more years and separation would adversely affect the child’s development if not adopted by them."
But their significant emotional ties with their parents, since birth, never enter the equation.
Additional "special needs" designations are: a child twelve years of age or older; racial or ethnic factors; child having siblings or half-siblings . In their report on the State of the Children, Boston’s Institute for Children says: "In part because the States can garner extra federal funds for special needs children the designation has been broadened so far as to become meaningless. " "Special needs" children may also get an additional Social Security check. The adoptive parents also receive Medicaid for the child, a clothing allowance and reimbursement for adoption costs such as adoption fees, court and attorney fees, cost of adoption home study, and "reasonable costs of food and lodging for the child and adoptive parents when necessary to complete the adoption process." Under Title XX of the Social Security Act adoptive parents are also entitled to post adoption services "that may be helpful in keeping the family intact," including "daycare, specialized daycare, respite care, in-house support services such as housekeeping, and personal care, counseling, and other child welfare services". [Wow! Everything short of being knighted by the Queen!]
The subsidy profile actually states that it does not include money to remodel the home to accommodate the child. But, as subsidies can be negotiated, remodeling could possibly be accomplished under the "innovative incentives to remove barriers to adoption" section. The subsidy regulations read that "adoption assistance is based solely on the needs of the child without regard to the income of the family." What an interesting government policy when compared to the welfare program that the same child’s mother may have been on before losing her children, and in which she may not own anything, must prove that she has no money in the bank; no boats, real estate, stocks or bonds; and cannot even own a car that is safe to drive worth over $1000. This is all so she can collect $539 per month for herself and two children. The foster parent who gets her children gets $820 plus. We spit on the mother on welfare as a parasite who is bleeding the taxpayers, yet we hold the foster and adoptive parents [who are bleeding ten times as much from the taxpayers] up as saints. The adoptive and foster parents aren’t subjected to psychological evaluations, ink blot tests, MMPI’s, drug & alcohol evaluations, or urine screens as the parents are.
Adoption subsidies may be negotiated on a case by case basis. [Anyone ever tried to "negotiate" with the Welfare Department?] There are many e-mail lists and books published to teach adoptive parents how to negotiate to maximize their subsidies. As one pro writes on an e-mail list: "We receive a subsidy for our kids of $1,900 per month plus another $500 from the State of Florida. We are trying to adopt three more teens and we will get subsidies for them, too. It sure helps out with the bills."
I can’t help but wonder why we don’t give this same level of support to the children’s parents in the first place? According to Cornell University, about 68% of all child protective cases "do not involve child maltreatment. " The largest percentage of CPS/DSS cases are for "deprivation of necessities" due to poverty. So, if the natural parents were given the incredible incentives and services listed above that are provided to the adoptive parents, wouldn’t it stand to reason that the causes for removing children in the first place would be eliminated? How many less children would enter foster care in the first place? The child protective budget would be reduced from $12 billion to around $4 billion. Granted, tens of thousands of social workers, administrators, lawyers, juvenile court personnel, therapists, and foster parents would be out of business, but we would have safe, healthy, intact families, which are the foundation of any society.
That’s just a fantasy, of course. The reality is that maybe we will see Kathleen Crowley’s children on the government home-shopping- for-children web site and some one out there can buy them.
by State Senator Pam Roach
http://pas.blogtownhall.com/?tag=THE MONEY BEHIND STATE ADOPTIONS
THE MONEY BEHIND STATE ADOPTIONS
A Harsh Reality!
Adoption Bonuses
The Money Behind the Madness
DSS and affiliates rewarded for breaking up families
By Nev Moore
Massachusetts News
Child "protection" is one of the biggest businesses in the country. We spend $12 billion a year on it. The money goes to tens of thousands of a) state employees, b) collateral professionals, such as lawyers, court personnel, court investigators, evaluators and guardians, judges, and c) DSS contracted vendors such as counselors, therapists, more "evaluators" , junk psychologists, residential facilities, foster parents, adoptive parents, MSPCC, Big Brothers/Big Sisters, YMCA, etc. This newspaper is not big enough to list all of the people in this state who have a job, draw a paycheck, or make their profits off the kids in DSS custody. In this article I explain the financial infrastructure that provides the motivation for DSS to take people’s children – and not give them back.
In 1974 Walter Mondale promoted the Child Abuse and Prevention Act which began feeding massive amounts of federal funding to states to set up programs to combat child abuse and neglect. From that came Child "Protective" Services, as we know it today. After the bill passed, Mondale himself expressed concerns that it could be misused. He worried that it could lead states to create a "business" in dealing with children.
Then in 1997 President Clinton passed the "Adoption and Safe Families Act." The public relations campaign promoted it as a way to help abused and neglected children who languished in foster care for years, often being shuffled among dozens of foster homes, never having a real home and family. In a press release from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services dated November 24, 1999, it refers to "President Clinton’s initiative to double by 2002 the number of children in foster care who are adopted or otherwise permanently placed."
It all sounded so heartwarming. We, the American public, are so easily led. We love to buy stereotypes; we just eat them up, no questions asked. But, my mother, bless her heart, taught me from the time I was young to "consider the source." In the stereotype that we’ve been sold about kids in foster care, we picture a forlorn, hollow-eyed child, thin and pale, looking up at us beseechingly through a dirt streaked face. Unconsciously, we pull up old pictures from Life magazine of children in Appalachia in the 1930s. We think of orphans and children abandoned by parents who look like Manson family members. We play a nostalgic movie in our heads of the little fellow shyly walking across an emerald green, manicured lawn to meet Ward and June Cleaver, his new adoptive parents, who lead him into their lovely suburban home. We imagine the little tyke’s eyes growing as big as saucers as the Cleavers show him his very own room, full of toys and sports gear. And we just feel so gosh darn good about ourselves. Now it’s time to wake up to the reality of the adoption business.
Very few children who are being used to supply the adoption market are hollow-eyed tykes from Appalachia. Very few are crack babies from the projects. [Oh… you thought those were the children they were saving? Think again]. When you are marketing a product you have to provide a desirable product that sells. In the adoption business that would be nice kids with reasonably good genetics who clean up good. An interesting point is that the Cape Cod & Islands office leads the state in terms of processing kids into the system and having them adopted out. More than the inner city areas, the projects, Mission Hill, Brockton, Lynn, etc . Interesting…
With the implementation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, President Clinton tried to make himself look like a humanitarian who is responsible for saving the abused and neglected children. The drive of this initiative is to offer cash "bonuses" to states for every child they have adopted out of foster care, with the goal of doubling their adoptions by 2002, and sustaining that for each subsequent year. They actually call them "adoption incentive bonuses," to promote the adoption of children.
Where to Find the Children
A whole new industry was put into motion. A sweet marketing scheme that even Bill Gates could envy. Now, if you have a basket of apples, and people start giving you $100 per apple, what are you going to do? Make sure that you have an unlimited supply of apples, right?
The United States Department of Health & Human Services administers Child Protective Services. To accompany the ASF Act, the President requested, by executive memorandum, an initiative entitled Adoption 2002, to be implemented and managed by Health & Human Services. The initiative not only gives the cash adoption bonuses to the states, it also provides cash adoption subsidies to adoptive parents until the children turn eighteen.
Everybody makes money. If anyone really believes that these people are doing this out of the goodness of their hearts, then I’ve got some bad news for you. The fact that this program is run by HHS, ordered from the very top, explains why the citizens who are victims of DSS get no response from their legislators. It explains why no one in the Administration cares about the abuse and fatalities of children in the "care" of DSS, and no one wants to hear about the broken arms, verbal abuse, or rapes. They are just business casualties. It explains why the legislators I’ve talked to for the past three years look at me with pity. Because I’m preaching to the already damned. The legislators have forgotten who funds their paychecks and who they need to account to, as has the Governor. Because it isn’t the President. It’s us.
How DSS Is Helped
The way that the adoption bonuses work is that each state is given a baseline number of expected adoptions based on population. For every child that DSS can get adopted, there is a bonus of $4,000 to $6,000. But that is just the starting figure in a complex mathematical formula in which each bonus is multiplied by the percentage that the state has managed to exceed its baseline adoption number. The states must maintain this increase in each successive year. [Like compound interest.] The bill reads: "$4,000 to $6,000 will be multiplied by the amount (if any) by which the number of foster child adoptions in the State exceeds the base number of foster child adoptions for the State for the fiscal year." In the "technical assistance" section of the bill it states that, "the Secretary [of HHS] may, directly or through grants or contracts, provide technical assistance to assist states and local communities to reach their targets for increased numbers of adoptions for children in foster care." The technical assistance is to support "the goal of encouraging more adoptions out of the foster care system; the development of best practice guidelines for expediting the termination of parental rights; the development of special units and expertise in moving children toward adoption as a permanent goal; models to encourage the fast tracking of children who have not attained 1 year of age into pre-adoptive placements; and the development of programs that place children into pre-adoptive placements without waiting for termination of parental rights."
In the November press release from HHS it continues, " HHS awarded the first ever adoption bonuses to States for increases in the adoption of children from the public foster care system." Some of the other incentives offered are "innovative grants" to reduce barriers to adoption [i.e., parents], more State support for adoptive families, making adoption affordable for families by providing cash subsides and tax credits.
A report from a private think tank, the National Center for Policy Analysis, reads: "The way the federal government reimburses States rewards a growth in the size of the program instead of the effective care of children." Another incentive being promoted is the use of the Internet to make adoption easier. Clinton directed HHS to develop an Internet site to "link children in foster care with adoptive families." So we will be able to window shop for children on a government web site. If you don’t find anything you like there, you can surf on over to the "Adopt Shoppe." If you prefer to actually be able to kick tires instead of just looking at pictures you could attend one of DSS’s quaint "Adoption Fairs," where live children are put on display and you can walk around and browse. Like a flea market to sell kids. If one of them begs you to take him home you can always say, "Sorry. Just looking." The incentives for government child snatching are so good that I’m surprised we don’t have government agents breaking down people’s doors and just shooting the parents in the heads and grabbing the kids. But then, if you need more apples you don’t chop down your apple trees.
Benefits for Foster Parents
That covers the goodies the State gets. Now let’s have a look at how the Cleavers make out financially after the adoption is finalized. After the adoption is finalized, the State and federal subsidies continue. The adoptive parents may collect cash subsidies until the child is 18. If the child stays in school, subsidies continue to the age of 22. There are State funded subsidies as well as federal funds through the Title IV-E section of the Social Security Act. The daily rate for State funds is the same as the foster care payments, which range from $410-$486 per month per child. Unless the child can be designated "special needs," which of course, they all can. According to the NAATRIN State Subsidy profile from DSS, "special needs" may be defined as: "Physical disability, mental disability, emotional disturbance; a significant emotional tie with the foster parents where the child has resided with the foster parents for one or more years and separation would adversely affect the child’s development if not adopted by them."
But their significant emotional ties with their parents, since birth, never enter the equation.
Additional "special needs" designations are: a child twelve years of age or older; racial or ethnic factors; child having siblings or half-siblings . In their report on the State of the Children, Boston’s Institute for Children says: "In part because the States can garner extra federal funds for special needs children the designation has been broadened so far as to become meaningless. " "Special needs" children may also get an additional Social Security check. The adoptive parents also receive Medicaid for the child, a clothing allowance and reimbursement for adoption costs such as adoption fees, court and attorney fees, cost of adoption home study, and "reasonable costs of food and lodging for the child and adoptive parents when necessary to complete the adoption process." Under Title XX of the Social Security Act adoptive parents are also entitled to post adoption services "that may be helpful in keeping the family intact," including "daycare, specialized daycare, respite care, in-house support services such as housekeeping, and personal care, counseling, and other child welfare services". [Wow! Everything short of being knighted by the Queen!]
The subsidy profile actually states that it does not include money to remodel the home to accommodate the child. But, as subsidies can be negotiated, remodeling could possibly be accomplished under the "innovative incentives to remove barriers to adoption" section. The subsidy regulations read that "adoption assistance is based solely on the needs of the child without regard to the income of the family." What an interesting government policy when compared to the welfare program that the same child’s mother may have been on before losing her children, and in which she may not own anything, must prove that she has no money in the bank; no boats, real estate, stocks or bonds; and cannot even own a car that is safe to drive worth over $1000. This is all so she can collect $539 per month for herself and two children. The foster parent who gets her children gets $820 plus. We spit on the mother on welfare as a parasite who is bleeding the taxpayers, yet we hold the foster and adoptive parents [who are bleeding ten times as much from the taxpayers] up as saints. The adoptive and foster parents aren’t subjected to psychological evaluations, ink blot tests, MMPI’s, drug & alcohol evaluations, or urine screens as the parents are.
Adoption subsidies may be negotiated on a case by case basis. [Anyone ever tried to "negotiate" with the Welfare Department?] There are many e-mail lists and books published to teach adoptive parents how to negotiate to maximize their subsidies. As one pro writes on an e-mail list: "We receive a subsidy for our kids of $1,900 per month plus another $500 from the State of Florida. We are trying to adopt three more teens and we will get subsidies for them, too. It sure helps out with the bills."
I can’t help but wonder why we don’t give this same level of support to the children’s parents in the first place? According to Cornell University, about 68% of all child protective cases "do not involve child maltreatment. " The largest percentage of CPS/DSS cases are for "deprivation of necessities" due to poverty. So, if the natural parents were given the incredible incentives and services listed above that are provided to the adoptive parents, wouldn’t it stand to reason that the causes for removing children in the first place would be eliminated? How many less children would enter foster care in the first place? The child protective budget would be reduced from $12 billion to around $4 billion. Granted, tens of thousands of social workers, administrators, lawyers, juvenile court personnel, therapists, and foster parents would be out of business, but we would have safe, healthy, intact families, which are the foundation of any society.
That’s just a fantasy, of course. The reality is that maybe we will see Kathleen Crowley’s children on the government home-shopping- for-children web site and some one out there can buy them.
by State Senator Pam Roach
http://pas.blogtownhall.com/?tag=THE MONEY BEHIND STATE ADOPTIONS
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