XOb (Child's Death was Anything but a Suicide)
By James R. Marsh on April 30, 2009 10:56 AM
From the Miami Herald:
Calling the death of Gabriel Myers a ''suicide'' lets his killers off the hook.
The 7-year-old was propelled by a vast conspiracy of abuse and neglect and malpractice. The boy only finished the job on April 15, when he locked himself in the bathroom of his Margate foster home and coiled a shower hose around his neck.
. . . .
The drugs, which come with a long and sobering list of possible side effects in children, have been doled out to troublesome kids to make them more manageable. Eli Lilly was fined $1.4 billion -- that's billion with a B -- in March for nefariously marketing the unauthorized use of Zyprexa for children, despite the known risks. A big chunk of those kids, like Gabriel, were foster kids, whose lives by definition were inflicted with the kind of trauma apt to cause unruly behavior.
. . . .
Foster kids were essentially guinea pigs in a vast, public-financed drug experiment.
. . . .
Absent a parent, a judge must give the OK for psychotropics. But the courts and case workers from the Department of Children & Families are all too overwhelmed by caseloads and beset by budget cuts to spend time contesting a doctor's judgment.
''No one was looking out for Gabriel.''
What Gabriel got, instead of real help, were powerful adult drugs laden with dangerous side effects. His cause of death was listed as suicide. It was just another misdiagnosis. When Qualified Immunity Protects
Isabella Brooke Knightly and Austin Gamez-Knightly
In Memory of my Loving Husband, William F. Knightly Jr. Murdered by ILLEGAL Palliative Care at a Nashua, NH Hospital
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Florida Rules for Drugging Foster Children Ignored
FL Rules for Drugging Foster Children Ignored
By James R. Marsh on June 10, 2009 11:20 AM
More on this important topic from the Miami Herald:
A first detailed look at the youngest foster children on mental-health drugs offers a disturbing glimpse into the state's failure to heed a 2005 law -- and its own policies.
Florida child-welfare administrators are largely ignoring a host of rules put in place to protect children from potentially dangerous -- and sometimes unnecessary -- drugs, according to a detailed state review of the records for more than 100 young foster children who are being given powerful psychiatric medications.
Caseworkers under contract with the state Department of Children & Families are failing to comply with almost every benchmark governing the use of psychotropic medication among foster children, according to the DCF report, obtained Tuesday by The Miami Herald.
Recent revelations come only four years after state lawmakers passed legislation to curb the use of mental-health drugs among children in state care. The law requires, among other things, informed consent from a parent or judge, second-party review of doctors' prescriptions for the youngest children, and annual reports to the state Senate.
Among the most troubling findings, child advocates say, is the state's almost complete failure to seek a second opinion from a psychiatrist under contract with DCF before administering mental-health drugs to the youngest children in state care -- younger than age 6.
Front-line social workers, judges and child welfare administrators, how are you addressing this issue in your states? XOb (Child's Death was Anything but a Suicide)
By James R. Marsh on April 30, 2009 10:56 AM
By James R. Marsh on June 10, 2009 11:20 AM
More on this important topic from the Miami Herald:
A first detailed look at the youngest foster children on mental-health drugs offers a disturbing glimpse into the state's failure to heed a 2005 law -- and its own policies.
Florida child-welfare administrators are largely ignoring a host of rules put in place to protect children from potentially dangerous -- and sometimes unnecessary -- drugs, according to a detailed state review of the records for more than 100 young foster children who are being given powerful psychiatric medications.
Caseworkers under contract with the state Department of Children & Families are failing to comply with almost every benchmark governing the use of psychotropic medication among foster children, according to the DCF report, obtained Tuesday by The Miami Herald.
Recent revelations come only four years after state lawmakers passed legislation to curb the use of mental-health drugs among children in state care. The law requires, among other things, informed consent from a parent or judge, second-party review of doctors' prescriptions for the youngest children, and annual reports to the state Senate.
Among the most troubling findings, child advocates say, is the state's almost complete failure to seek a second opinion from a psychiatrist under contract with DCF before administering mental-health drugs to the youngest children in state care -- younger than age 6.
Front-line social workers, judges and child welfare administrators, how are you addressing this issue in your states? XOb (Child's Death was Anything but a Suicide)
By James R. Marsh on April 30, 2009 10:56 AM
Legal Immunity for CPS/DCYF Workers Who Lie?
Commentary, insight and analysis on children's law, policy and current issues. Legal Immunity for CPS Workers who Lie?
By James R. Marsh on August 5, 2009 12:33 PM
The critics and plaintiffs’ attorneys are out there. They seethe with frustration in their assertion that there are child protection workers who are as dysfunctional and flawed as some of the abusive and neglectful parents they investigate. They feel mistreated, ambushed, without recourse to a neutral oversight authority, and fume that the courts will believe the word of child protection workers over their clients. And yet, when there is a credible allegation that a child protection worker has knowingly made misleading or false statements which resulted in the wrongful removal of a child, their criticism and anger seem justified. Such misrepresentations may involve highly contested issues of material fact that more properly should be examined by an agency supervisor or in court on the merits. The supervisor or court, inadvertently giving credence to the worker’s misrepresentation, may thereby be swayed in favor of the worker’s recommendations.
Guest Feature Article by Daniel Pollack, MSW, JD Legal Aspects of Immunity for Government Social Workers
It is an accepted principle that a parent has a constitutionally protected interest in the custody and care of his or her child. This interest does have exceptions, especially when the child may be in immediate or apparent danger. This is when child protection services gets involved. Crucial to every child protection investigation is to establish the facts and circumstances of the case. When these are presented to the court at a dependency hearing, the evidence may become proof.
The best professional judgment of child protection workers may, in hindsight, be wrong. For this and other reasons, child protection workers usually have some level of immunity from prosecution. [1] When individual government officials are sued for monetary damages they generally are granted either absolute or qualified immunity. The United States Supreme Court has stated that qualified immunity is the norm, absolute immunity is the exception. [2]
Should that immunity disappear when, in their official capacities as child protection workers, they make knowingly inaccurate or false statements which result in the wrongful removal of a child? California law provides for public employee immunity from liability for an injury caused by the employee instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of their employment, even if he or she acts maliciously and without probable cause. [3] However, a public employee has no such immunity if he or she acted with malice in committing perjury, fabricating evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence or obtaining evidence by duress.
Generally, whether an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined in light of the evidence of the particular case. Some courts hold that immunity for child protective workers exists as long as they act responsibly in the performance of their duties. The immunity applies even where a complaint alleges caseworker misconduct or intentional wrongdoing. [4] Others hold that the worker must be involved in a function critical to the judicial process itself. In either case, the more outrageous the employee's alleged tortuous conduct, the less likely it could be described as foreseeable, and the less likely the social service agency could be required to assume responsibility for the act as a general risk of doing business.
Recent Cases
In Doe v. Lebbos, [5] the Ninth Circuit held that a social worker was entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly failing to investigate adequately the allegations of abuse and neglect against a father and in allegedly fabricating evidence in a child dependency petition because those actions had the "requisite connection to the judicial process' to be protected by absolute immunity (at 826)." In Van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., [6] the court found that child protective caseworkers were entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the removal of a child from the custody of her parents during a child abuse investigation. In the Sixth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit the type of immunity depends on the particular task the worker is doing. In Gray v. Poole, [7] the court held that qualified immunity covers social workers acting as investigators, while social workers testifying as witnesses are protected by absolute immunity. In Rippy ex rel. Rippy v. Hattaway, [8] the court ruled that absolute immunity protects social workers who initiate proceedings on behalf of a child. In Austin v. Borel, [9] the court ruled that child protection workers were not entitled to absolute immunity when they filed an "allegedly false verified complaint seeking the removal of two children" from the family home (at 1363).
Ethical Considerations
There is, of course, a difference between misrepresentation of a piece of physical or verbal evidence and the actual creation of false evidence. Misrepresentation involves the willful giving of a misleading representation of the facts. Creation of false evidence involves the act of improperly causing a ‘fact’ to exist. More often, critics and attorneys accuse workers of a willingness to misrepresent, selectively quote, and misconstrue information to support their claims and therefore to present an entirely misleading case. Rather than sticking to agency protocols and training the workers sensationalize their documentation and findings in a misleading fashion.
To what extent are such allegations true? Do workers consciously or unconsciously misrepresent evidence, and selectively engage in systematic distortion? How often do they may make deliberate efforts to mislead, deceive, or confuse their own supervisor or the court in order to promote their own personal or ideological objectives? How frequently are workers omitting or concealing material facts? Under the guise of vigilance, are there child protection workers whose adherence to rules and procedures is purposely excessive?
From a social work, legal, or judicial perspective, making a knowing misrepresentation in a child protection case is a serious ethical breach. The NASW Code of Ethics, 4.01(c), notes that: “Social workers should base practice on recognized knowledge, including empirically based knowledge, relevant to social work and social work ethics.” At 4.04 the Code goes on to state: “Social workers should not participate in, condone, or be associated with dishonesty, fraud, or deception.” Dishonesty, shading the truth, or a lack of candor cannot be tolerated in child protection services, a field of endeavor built upon trust and respect for the law. Whether or not child protection workers deserve immunity from prosecution when they misrepresent or fabricate evidence is a question each states’ courts are dealing with. Similarly, each court must decide whether such misconduct warrants setting aside the decision to remove the child from his or her home. In the final analysis, the question might soon find itself before the U.S. Supreme Court.
A worker’s misrepresentation or fabrication of evidence is particularly pernicious because it puts the whole field of child protection in a negative light. Whether or not immunity is granted, there is simply no excuse for this kind of willful and egregious conduct.
Endnotes
[1] See, e.g., Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2005) and Babcock v. Tyler (884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989) (absolute immunity shields social workers to the extent that their role is functionally equivalent to that of a prosecutor); but see Burton v. Richmond, 276 F.3d 973 (2002) (when a state department of human services affirmatively places children in an abusive foster care setting, the state may be liable for damages); Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, (D.C. Cir. 2002) (qualified immunity covers social service workers acting as investigators, but when testifying as witnesses they are protected by absolute immunity). Qualified immunity is often afforded if the social work is involved in a “discretionary function” unless his or her conduct is clearly a violation of a statute or constitutional principle (Snell v. Tunnell, 698 F. Supp. 1542 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
[2] Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (absolute immunity is appropriate in limited circumstances -- judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions-- whereas executive officials usually receive qualified immunity).
[3] Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6
[4] Cunningham v. Wenatchee, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (E.D. Wash. 2002).
[5] 348 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
[6] 911 F.2d 863, (2d Cir. 1990).
[7] 275 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir 2002).
[8] 270 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2001).
[9] 830 F.2d 1356, 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
http://www.childlaw.us/2009/08/legal-immunity-for-cps-workers.html#more
By James R. Marsh on August 5, 2009 12:33 PM
The critics and plaintiffs’ attorneys are out there. They seethe with frustration in their assertion that there are child protection workers who are as dysfunctional and flawed as some of the abusive and neglectful parents they investigate. They feel mistreated, ambushed, without recourse to a neutral oversight authority, and fume that the courts will believe the word of child protection workers over their clients. And yet, when there is a credible allegation that a child protection worker has knowingly made misleading or false statements which resulted in the wrongful removal of a child, their criticism and anger seem justified. Such misrepresentations may involve highly contested issues of material fact that more properly should be examined by an agency supervisor or in court on the merits. The supervisor or court, inadvertently giving credence to the worker’s misrepresentation, may thereby be swayed in favor of the worker’s recommendations.
Guest Feature Article by Daniel Pollack, MSW, JD Legal Aspects of Immunity for Government Social Workers
It is an accepted principle that a parent has a constitutionally protected interest in the custody and care of his or her child. This interest does have exceptions, especially when the child may be in immediate or apparent danger. This is when child protection services gets involved. Crucial to every child protection investigation is to establish the facts and circumstances of the case. When these are presented to the court at a dependency hearing, the evidence may become proof.
The best professional judgment of child protection workers may, in hindsight, be wrong. For this and other reasons, child protection workers usually have some level of immunity from prosecution. [1] When individual government officials are sued for monetary damages they generally are granted either absolute or qualified immunity. The United States Supreme Court has stated that qualified immunity is the norm, absolute immunity is the exception. [2]
Should that immunity disappear when, in their official capacities as child protection workers, they make knowingly inaccurate or false statements which result in the wrongful removal of a child? California law provides for public employee immunity from liability for an injury caused by the employee instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of their employment, even if he or she acts maliciously and without probable cause. [3] However, a public employee has no such immunity if he or she acted with malice in committing perjury, fabricating evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence or obtaining evidence by duress.
Generally, whether an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined in light of the evidence of the particular case. Some courts hold that immunity for child protective workers exists as long as they act responsibly in the performance of their duties. The immunity applies even where a complaint alleges caseworker misconduct or intentional wrongdoing. [4] Others hold that the worker must be involved in a function critical to the judicial process itself. In either case, the more outrageous the employee's alleged tortuous conduct, the less likely it could be described as foreseeable, and the less likely the social service agency could be required to assume responsibility for the act as a general risk of doing business.
Recent Cases
In Doe v. Lebbos, [5] the Ninth Circuit held that a social worker was entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly failing to investigate adequately the allegations of abuse and neglect against a father and in allegedly fabricating evidence in a child dependency petition because those actions had the "requisite connection to the judicial process' to be protected by absolute immunity (at 826)." In Van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., [6] the court found that child protective caseworkers were entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the removal of a child from the custody of her parents during a child abuse investigation. In the Sixth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit the type of immunity depends on the particular task the worker is doing. In Gray v. Poole, [7] the court held that qualified immunity covers social workers acting as investigators, while social workers testifying as witnesses are protected by absolute immunity. In Rippy ex rel. Rippy v. Hattaway, [8] the court ruled that absolute immunity protects social workers who initiate proceedings on behalf of a child. In Austin v. Borel, [9] the court ruled that child protection workers were not entitled to absolute immunity when they filed an "allegedly false verified complaint seeking the removal of two children" from the family home (at 1363).
Ethical Considerations
There is, of course, a difference between misrepresentation of a piece of physical or verbal evidence and the actual creation of false evidence. Misrepresentation involves the willful giving of a misleading representation of the facts. Creation of false evidence involves the act of improperly causing a ‘fact’ to exist. More often, critics and attorneys accuse workers of a willingness to misrepresent, selectively quote, and misconstrue information to support their claims and therefore to present an entirely misleading case. Rather than sticking to agency protocols and training the workers sensationalize their documentation and findings in a misleading fashion.
To what extent are such allegations true? Do workers consciously or unconsciously misrepresent evidence, and selectively engage in systematic distortion? How often do they may make deliberate efforts to mislead, deceive, or confuse their own supervisor or the court in order to promote their own personal or ideological objectives? How frequently are workers omitting or concealing material facts? Under the guise of vigilance, are there child protection workers whose adherence to rules and procedures is purposely excessive?
From a social work, legal, or judicial perspective, making a knowing misrepresentation in a child protection case is a serious ethical breach. The NASW Code of Ethics, 4.01(c), notes that: “Social workers should base practice on recognized knowledge, including empirically based knowledge, relevant to social work and social work ethics.” At 4.04 the Code goes on to state: “Social workers should not participate in, condone, or be associated with dishonesty, fraud, or deception.” Dishonesty, shading the truth, or a lack of candor cannot be tolerated in child protection services, a field of endeavor built upon trust and respect for the law. Whether or not child protection workers deserve immunity from prosecution when they misrepresent or fabricate evidence is a question each states’ courts are dealing with. Similarly, each court must decide whether such misconduct warrants setting aside the decision to remove the child from his or her home. In the final analysis, the question might soon find itself before the U.S. Supreme Court.
A worker’s misrepresentation or fabrication of evidence is particularly pernicious because it puts the whole field of child protection in a negative light. Whether or not immunity is granted, there is simply no excuse for this kind of willful and egregious conduct.
Endnotes
[1] See, e.g., Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2005) and Babcock v. Tyler (884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989) (absolute immunity shields social workers to the extent that their role is functionally equivalent to that of a prosecutor); but see Burton v. Richmond, 276 F.3d 973 (2002) (when a state department of human services affirmatively places children in an abusive foster care setting, the state may be liable for damages); Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, (D.C. Cir. 2002) (qualified immunity covers social service workers acting as investigators, but when testifying as witnesses they are protected by absolute immunity). Qualified immunity is often afforded if the social work is involved in a “discretionary function” unless his or her conduct is clearly a violation of a statute or constitutional principle (Snell v. Tunnell, 698 F. Supp. 1542 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
[2] Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (absolute immunity is appropriate in limited circumstances -- judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions-- whereas executive officials usually receive qualified immunity).
[3] Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6
[4] Cunningham v. Wenatchee, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (E.D. Wash. 2002).
[5] 348 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
[6] 911 F.2d 863, (2d Cir. 1990).
[7] 275 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir 2002).
[8] 270 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2001).
[9] 830 F.2d 1356, 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
http://www.childlaw.us/2009/08/legal-immunity-for-cps-workers.html#more
Report finds Florida overmedicates Foster children-So Do The rest of the States!
Report finds Florida overmedicates foster children
By James R. Marsh on August 13, 2009 12:08 PM
Yesterday, the Miami Herald revealed that in a report "expected to be released publicly later this month," a "panel of child-welfare experts, including two top administrators from the" Florida Department of Children & Families, "says child welfare authorities too often rely on the potent medications to manage abused and neglected children -- but fail to offer psychiatric treatment to help them overcome the trauma they suffered."
The report states that "caregivers for children in state custody frequently use powerful mind-altering drugs to manage unruly kids, rather than treat their anger and sadness." According to the report, "psychotherapeutic medications are often being used to help parents, teachers, and other child workers quiet and manage, rather than treat, children." The Herald adds that "the use of psychiatric drugs among children in state care is widespread." In fact, "records updated by DCF last week show that, among children in state care aged six to 12, more than 22 percent are being given psychiatric" medications.
By James R. Marsh on August 13, 2009 12:08 PM
Yesterday, the Miami Herald revealed that in a report "expected to be released publicly later this month," a "panel of child-welfare experts, including two top administrators from the" Florida Department of Children & Families, "says child welfare authorities too often rely on the potent medications to manage abused and neglected children -- but fail to offer psychiatric treatment to help them overcome the trauma they suffered."
The report states that "caregivers for children in state custody frequently use powerful mind-altering drugs to manage unruly kids, rather than treat their anger and sadness." According to the report, "psychotherapeutic medications are often being used to help parents, teachers, and other child workers quiet and manage, rather than treat, children." The Herald adds that "the use of psychiatric drugs among children in state care is widespread." In fact, "records updated by DCF last week show that, among children in state care aged six to 12, more than 22 percent are being given psychiatric" medications.
Friday, December 4, 2009
SHUT DOWN New Hampshire DCYF Petition-Please Sign
http://www.thepetitionsite.com/1/give-the-children-back
Heres the link. Please get anybody and everybody to sign this petition. Our families of tomorrow are at stake. The corruption and fraudalent practices toward our families and children needs to stop! Your family could be next!
Thursday, December 3, 2009
The System is Broken
Family Attorney Marsha Freeman: 'The System is Broken'
December 2nd, 2009 by Robert Franklin, Esq.
John Nelson went from six-figure-earning software exectutive to unemployed overnight. But his $2,200 child support payment didn't change that quickly. It took a year for him to get a hearing, and when he finally did, the judge increased his obligation. By that time he had gotten a job as a science teacher, but the newly-upped child support obligation meant that he took home a grand total of $58 per week. Read about it here (WFTV, 11/9/09).
The judge, Julian Piggotte's attitude was you "can afford it; figure it out." Then she discovered that she had a conflict of interest in Nelson's case and withdrew.
His ex-wife sees the situation this way:
"Our lives go on. The kids still have lunches, they still go to school, and they still have field trips."
That's true. And if she and John were still together, the kids would need to be fed and go to school, but their standard of living would drop along with that of their parents. That's what happens when parents lose their jobs - parents and children live on less. They all manage the best they can. It's one of the sometimes-harsh realities of daily life.
Only if the parents are divorced does the concept arise that the children's lives must in no way change due to a parent's loss of income. It's as if Judge Piggotte lives in a fantasy world in which children must and do remain unaffected when their father loses his job. Indeed, it's the same fantasy world in which an adult can live on $58 per week.
Nelson's case is like countless others these days. Some 80% of job losses have been suffered by men in the last year or so. A lot of those guys are fathers, some of them divorced. That means they have to file for a modification of their support orders.
It's another strange aspect of the whole matter that, if Nelson's wife had wanted a temporary restraining order against him, she could have gotten a hearing and had an order issued in a matter of hours. But when he loses his job and needs to reduce his child support to reflect what he can actually pay, it takes over a year.
I've written before about the corruption in the child support system. Countless people have spoken up about it. Carol Rhodes was an insider who told us how child support bureaucrats think of fathers as "payers," and how they frankly do everything in their power to prevent downward modifications of support. It's all because states are paid about 66 cents by the federal government for every dollar of child support collected. It's a system that's ripe for corruption and abuse, and that's exactly what happens.
As I've mentioned before, debtors' prisons were supposed to have been done away with in the 19th century. As a child I learned the obvious fact that debtors' prisons were a ridiculous approach to debt. How could a debtor pay if he/she were in prison? That seemed perfectly obvious to me, so it's a surprise that we've reinstituted them at this late date, and for one form of debt only - child support.
Here's another thing I learned, albeit somewhat later. For much of European history (and perhaps that of other parts of the world), tax collectors were paid a percentage of what they could squeeze out of obligors. The more they collected, the more they got paid. It was a system that absolutely guaranteed that collectors would use the most ruthless and brutal of tactics against taxpayers. It also guaranteed that tax collectors would be hated and feared, and that the system of collection would be resented by all.
So, like debtors' prisons, it's astonishing that we've basically resurrected the same concept. The feds give states a percentage of their child support collections, which results in ruthless abuse of obligors like John Nelson, who in turn hate the system.
What's next, the iron maiden?
Thanks to Laurie for the heads-up.
This entry was posted on Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009 at 5:54 pm and is filed under
http://glennsacks.com/blog/?p=4423
December 2nd, 2009 by Robert Franklin, Esq.
John Nelson went from six-figure-earning software exectutive to unemployed overnight. But his $2,200 child support payment didn't change that quickly. It took a year for him to get a hearing, and when he finally did, the judge increased his obligation. By that time he had gotten a job as a science teacher, but the newly-upped child support obligation meant that he took home a grand total of $58 per week. Read about it here (WFTV, 11/9/09).
The judge, Julian Piggotte's attitude was you "can afford it; figure it out." Then she discovered that she had a conflict of interest in Nelson's case and withdrew.
His ex-wife sees the situation this way:
"Our lives go on. The kids still have lunches, they still go to school, and they still have field trips."
That's true. And if she and John were still together, the kids would need to be fed and go to school, but their standard of living would drop along with that of their parents. That's what happens when parents lose their jobs - parents and children live on less. They all manage the best they can. It's one of the sometimes-harsh realities of daily life.
Only if the parents are divorced does the concept arise that the children's lives must in no way change due to a parent's loss of income. It's as if Judge Piggotte lives in a fantasy world in which children must and do remain unaffected when their father loses his job. Indeed, it's the same fantasy world in which an adult can live on $58 per week.
Nelson's case is like countless others these days. Some 80% of job losses have been suffered by men in the last year or so. A lot of those guys are fathers, some of them divorced. That means they have to file for a modification of their support orders.
It's another strange aspect of the whole matter that, if Nelson's wife had wanted a temporary restraining order against him, she could have gotten a hearing and had an order issued in a matter of hours. But when he loses his job and needs to reduce his child support to reflect what he can actually pay, it takes over a year.
I've written before about the corruption in the child support system. Countless people have spoken up about it. Carol Rhodes was an insider who told us how child support bureaucrats think of fathers as "payers," and how they frankly do everything in their power to prevent downward modifications of support. It's all because states are paid about 66 cents by the federal government for every dollar of child support collected. It's a system that's ripe for corruption and abuse, and that's exactly what happens.
As I've mentioned before, debtors' prisons were supposed to have been done away with in the 19th century. As a child I learned the obvious fact that debtors' prisons were a ridiculous approach to debt. How could a debtor pay if he/she were in prison? That seemed perfectly obvious to me, so it's a surprise that we've reinstituted them at this late date, and for one form of debt only - child support.
Here's another thing I learned, albeit somewhat later. For much of European history (and perhaps that of other parts of the world), tax collectors were paid a percentage of what they could squeeze out of obligors. The more they collected, the more they got paid. It was a system that absolutely guaranteed that collectors would use the most ruthless and brutal of tactics against taxpayers. It also guaranteed that tax collectors would be hated and feared, and that the system of collection would be resented by all.
So, like debtors' prisons, it's astonishing that we've basically resurrected the same concept. The feds give states a percentage of their child support collections, which results in ruthless abuse of obligors like John Nelson, who in turn hate the system.
What's next, the iron maiden?
Thanks to Laurie for the heads-up.
This entry was posted on Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009 at 5:54 pm and is filed under
http://glennsacks.com/blog/?p=4423
A descriptive study of abuse and neglect in out-of-home-placement
Rosenthal JA, Motz JK, Edmonson DA, Groze V.
University of Oklahoma.
Selected characteristics of 290 reports of physical abuse, sexual abuse and neglect in foster homes, group homes, residential treatment centers, and institutions are described. At each type of setting physical abuse reports were most common, and neglect reports were least common. Quantitative and qualitative methods demonstrate that a significant percentage of confirmed reports are of a serious nature. Injuries occurred most frequently because of physical abuse while sexual abuse reports were most likely to be confirmed. Prior allegations of abuse or neglect regarding the perpetrator were indicated in 27% of reports. Factors contributing to abuse and neglect and the role of a state institutional review team in developing a systematic approach to this problem are discussed.
PMID: 2043976 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2043976?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_SingleItemSupl.Pubmed_Discovery_RA&linkpos=3&log$=relatedarticles&logdbfrom=pubmed
University of Oklahoma.
Selected characteristics of 290 reports of physical abuse, sexual abuse and neglect in foster homes, group homes, residential treatment centers, and institutions are described. At each type of setting physical abuse reports were most common, and neglect reports were least common. Quantitative and qualitative methods demonstrate that a significant percentage of confirmed reports are of a serious nature. Injuries occurred most frequently because of physical abuse while sexual abuse reports were most likely to be confirmed. Prior allegations of abuse or neglect regarding the perpetrator were indicated in 27% of reports. Factors contributing to abuse and neglect and the role of a state institutional review team in developing a systematic approach to this problem are discussed.
PMID: 2043976 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2043976?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_SingleItemSupl.Pubmed_Discovery_RA&linkpos=3&log$=relatedarticles&logdbfrom=pubmed
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